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At the beginning of the twentieth century the State Department 
was a small informal organization; in I908 the Departmental staff con­
sisted of sli^tly over I50 people. The smallness of numbers, made it 
possible for the employees to know each other professionally and socially; 
friendships were established which continued even after individuals left 
the government service. Indeed, the Department had a remote and tradi­
tional atmosphere of leisure at the turn of the century. It lost that 
quality as the size and complexity of organization increased and the 
problems under consideration grew in magnitude and importance. In 1924, 
the United States government upgraded its Foreign Service for meeting 
greater demands by providing for the selection and promotion of candi­
dates and personnel solely on the basis of merit. This evolution of 
both the State Department and the Foreign Service continued into the 
1930's and beyond.
Hugh Robert Wilson witnessed those changes between I9II and 
1940. Bom into wealth, he tired of the daily routine of everyday busi­
ness life and decided to enter the Foreign Service to mix travel, diplo­
macy, and study; he accepted his first assignments in Latin America, 
where he served in Argentina and Guatemala. After tenure in Europe 
during World War I, he decided to make a career of government work. 
Subsequently, he progressed through the diplomatic ranks in posts in 
Europe, Japan, and Washington as the Chief of the Division of Current 
Information and the Chief of the Personnel Section.
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In 1927; he became the American Minister to Switzerland, a posi­
tion which he held for ten years. He spent most of that time handling 
American contacts with the League of Nations and League-related activi­
ties. Throughout the 1920's the United States maintained a nebulous 
and tenuous association with the League. Invariably encumbered by 
orders from Washington, as his successors had been, Wilson cooperated 
with the international organization in a limited manner whether the 
topic was arms control, the Manchurian crisis, the Italian-Ethiopian 
incident, or the disarmament problem. The issues primarily concerned 
Europe, so the United States did not utilize its potentially great dip­
lomatic influence. For several years Wilson held various ranks at the 
conferences, but at the major disarmament meetings his rank was usually 
below that of his regular colleagues in Geneva. Finally, he attained an 
equal status only to have the League decline in international prestige 
within a short time.
Frustrated that his contribution in Switzerland was minimal, he 
began searching for another assignment in 1937, in the hope of securing 
a major field post before retirement. Unable to find one.immediately, 
he served briefly as an Assistant Secretary of State. Within six months 
the ambassador to Berlin resigned, and Wilson succeeded him, anticipat­
ing that this ambassadorship would be the peak of his career. Once 
again, circumstances thwarted his ambition for he was soon called home 
as a protest of Nazi persecution of the Jews. He was thus in the awk­
ward position of being unable to serve in Germany, to resign lest his 
action embarrass the administration, or to be assigned to the field.
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At the beginning of wax in Europe, he resigned the ambassadorship only 
to find that all the major assignments were competently filled. For 
more than a year he did odd jobs around the Department, until, feeling 
that he was making no special contribution, he resigned. Despite his 
frustration, he indicated a willingness to return to the State Depart­
ment if it really needed him.
The author originally undertook this study to examine the ca­
reer and contributions of Hugh Wilson to American diplomacy between I9II 
and 19^0. Gradually it became clear that the focus would be on the 
years 1927 to 19^0 because Wilson's work was more significant then and 
because the period is better documented, especially since his personal 
papers were destroyed in the Tokyo earthquake and fire of 1923 • At the 
same time, the investigation resolved largely into one of America's 
awkward relationships to the League which was largely dictated by the 
prevalent isolationist emphasis in the United States. As such, Wil­
son's ministerial activities served as the unifying thread in the 
account. Consequently, the purpose of this dissertation is to show 
that a wealthy young man entered the Foreign Service as a temporary 
diversion from business life, chose to make a career of the profes­
sion, and, while making little or no contribution to policy-making, 
did his job well as the representative of a potentially influential 
nation which largely based its policy on isolation from problems which 
directly or indirectly affected it.
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HUGH R. WILSON AND AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE 
LEAGUE OP NATIONS, 1927-1937 
CHAPTER I.
PREPARATIONS FOR A POST
H u ^  Robert Wilson was born in Evanston, Illinois, on January 29, 
1885, to Hugh R. Wilson and Alice Tousey Wilson. Hugh Wilson, Sr., and 
his brother Milton were partners and co-founders of Wilson Brothers, 
wholesale manufacturers of men's clothing which provided both men with an 
upper-class income. Hugh, a Civil War veteran in an Illinois regiment of 
the Union Army, had four children, Oliver, Morris, %ra, and Hugh. The 
senior Wilson died in May, I9OI, and Mrs. Wilson passed â ray in 3910, 
leaving their son Hugh part of a sizeable inheritance which allowed him 
to pursue whatever activity he wished.
Hugh Wilson enjoyed the benefits of good educational opportuni­
ties = He attended the Hill School, a distinguished private preparatory 
school in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, graduating in 1902. His schooling 
there contained the element of classical studies, since the institution 
awarded him a book for "excellence in Greek." Following his graduation 
in 1902, he enrolled at Yale where he was active in student government 
affairs and the school newspaper, being a member and, in I906, chairman 
of the editorial board of the Yale News. During his undergraduate days 
he also contributed articles to New York papers. In I905, his studies 
were temporarily interrupted by an attack of appendicitis, complicated 
by peritonitis, which was almost fatal and which left him prematurely 




Hugh had many interests which gave him a hroad background for his 
later diplomatic work. He kept abreast of world developments by general 
reading of biography, which he especially enjoyed, history, and govern­
ment. For relaxation throughout his life he enjoyed both mystery stories 
and humorous works, the latter being at least in part an outgrowth of his 
keen sense of humor. In the fine arts, he liked paintings, but he de­
voted more time and attention to music, although he played no musical 
instrument. He listened to most classical music, and he particularly 
liked opera which he attended frequently; at the same time, he loathed 
jazz and other modem music of the 1920's and 1930's.
Besides those interests, he possessed a love of good food and 
fine wines of which he was a connoisseur. He drank whisky, soda, and 
sherry in moderate amounts, but he usually declined cocktails which he 
claimed spoiled the taste buds. His abstemiousness was a matter of per­
sonal practice rather than a religious tenet, for he was a nominal Epis­
copalian and was influenced by deism. Though not a regular attender of 
any formal worship services, he did believe in a higher being and regu­
lated his life according to his general belief. Ironically, he later 
greatly admired the Roman Catholic Church and at one point in his life 
considered becoming a member.^
%axine Block, ed., "Wilson, Hugh (Robert)," Current Biography: 
Who's News and Why, 19^1 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 19^1 ), P* 9^6;
hereafter cited as Block, ed.. Current Biography; H u ^  R. Wilson, The 
Education of a Diplomat (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938),
pp. 3-4; hereafter cited as Wilson, Education; Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat 
Between Wars (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 19^1), p. 129; hereafter
cited as Wilson, Diplomat; Hugh R. Wilson, Jr., to Marvin Downing, March 3, 
1970, letter in possession of the author.
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He mixed well with people, displaying a mild disposition and 
geniality which was seldom marked by anger or a display of temper. He 
insisted on manners being an instinctive part of an individual's char­
acter, and he preferred them to sincerity if he had to choose between 
the two since proper etiquette made daily contacts pleasant. In all 
this, he possessed a stamina and competitiveness which he expressed
appropriately in parlor games, travel, and sports such as skiing, golf,
2fencing, and mountain climbing.
After graduation from Yale, he marked time for four years prior 
to deciding upon a diplomatic career. In 190?, upon returning from a 
pleasure trip to the Par East, he accepted employment with Wilson Bro­
thers of Chicago, the family company. The business, now under the stem 
direction of his Uncle Milton Wilson, held little attraction for him be­
cause he disliked the rigidity of office work and the commuting into 
Chicago; he felt that the daily routine failed to correspond with his 
real concern for books, acquaintances, and recreation. Thus, he began
to look elsewhere for something more compatible with his abilities and 
3interests.
Diplomatic activity appeared to be the opportunity for expres­
sion. It would afford him the advantages of personal study and the
%ilson. Education, pp. 90-91; Block, ed.. Current Biography,
pp. 926, 928.
Wilson, Education, pp. 1-3-
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cultivation of a taste for languages. Moreover, he could experience a 
few happy years in the Foreign Service and be an enriched person upon 
his re-entry into business. Besides, he had small reason for staying 
at home since both his parents were dead, and he had enough inheritance 
to do as he pleased.^
The announcement of his intentions evoked a mixed response.
Some relatives and friends of his father discouraged him by maintaining 
that diplomacy was the plaything of politics or politicians and that he 
would make little money. He mi^t have dropped the idea except for the 
encouragement of his oldest brother, Oliver, who advised him to do what 
he wished. Prom a boyhood friend, who had entered the diplomatic serv­
ice, Wilson learned, "You won’t get anywhere, but you will have a lot 
of fun going there." In a personal interview. First Assistant Secretary 
of State Huntington Wilson counseled the young man to attend the Ecole 
Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris to prepare for the service exams. 
He stressed the need of a thorough knowledge of French for maximum enjoy­
ment of diplomatic contacts and activities. In later years, Hugh Wilson 
acknowledged the Assistant Secretary’s advice to have been sound.^
Accordingly, he went to Paris, and at twenty-five years of age 
he was two or three years older than his classmates. Yet the French
Ibid., pp. 1, 6j H u ^  R. Wilson, Diplomacy as a Career (Cam­
bridge: Riverside Press, 19^1), p. 2; hereafter cited as Wilson,
Diplomacy.
Wilson, Education, pp. h-6, 8-11.
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students enjoyed an intellectual training superior to his, so he worked
hard to reach their level of attainment. From the learned faculty hs
acquired much information, the desire to express himself precisely, and
gradually he realized the relevance of his studies to the European po- 
6litical situation.
Then the preparation for the exams took an unexpected turn.
Edwin Morgan, the American Minister in Lisbon, asked him to become his 
private secretary. Wilson decided the practical experience would be 
more valuable than a diploma, so he went to Portugal where he had ample 
time to leam from the minister, study, and travel. He disliked Portu­
gal more than other posts, but he thou^t the stay assisted in his later 
adjustment to Latin American assignments.^
In the fall of I9II, Wilson prepared to take his examinations, 
the written portions of which were similar to university quizzes but 
the oral sections of which were decidedly more difficult. To bolster 
his confidence before the senior service men, he told himself, "They
can't eat me." The experience made a lasting impression on him and made
8him sympathetic toward candii^tes when he was on the reviewing board.
Wilson returned to Chicago to await the outcome. During a visit 
in January with a brother in Evanston, he finally received word in the 
form of a telegram from the Secretary of State which designated him the
^Ibid., pp. 14-15, 17-18. 
'̂Ibid., pp. 18-19, 21-22. 
^Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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Secretary of Legation in Guatemala. The excited family, ignorant about 
the country, rushed to an encyclopedia to read about it.
Then he proceeded to Washington, for orientation. In the process 
he met many established officials and new appointees, some of whom later 
became close friends and colleagues. Enthusiastic about his new assign­
ment, he received the commission and instructions and sailed for 
9Guatemala.
On March 11, 1912, Wilson assumed his duties in Guatemala where 
he served under two different ministersReynolds Hitt, the first of 
them, formally tutored the new secretary in the legation duties, and the 
Hitts entertained the young bachelor in their home frequently.Wilson
Ihad been in Guatemala a little over a month when he became charge 
d'affaires during the absence of Hitt who took a leave which lasted until 
January 6, 1913*^^ Consistent with custom upon the election of a new 
President, Hitt subsequently tendered his resignation; it was accepted, 
and he departed on March 4. The new minister. Dr. William H. Leavell,
Q̂Ibid., pp. 1, 31-32; Huntington Wilson, Acting Secretary of 
State, to Wilson, February 23, 1912, Decimal files. Record Group 39,
U. S. Department of State, National Archives, Washington, 123-W693/a; 
hereafter cited by the file number.
^^Reynolds Hitt, Minister to Guatemala, to Philander C. Knox, 
Secretary of State, March 11, 1912, I23.W693/I; Wilson, Diplomacy, p. 42.
^Wilson^ Education, pp. 38-40.
"Wilson to Knox, April 23, 1912, 123-H63/telegram #242; Knox to 
Wilson, June 14, I912, 123.H63/T3; Knox to Hitt, August 30, 1912, I23.H63/ 
74; Hitt to Knox, January 6, 1913, I23.H63/73; Hitt to Knox, January 29, 
1913, I23.H63/76; Hitt to Knox, March 4, 1913, I23.H63/78.
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a nonservice man and a Presbyterian minister from Texas and Mississippi, 
did not arrive until November 29, 1913* Consequently, for nineteen 
months Wilson had "a responsibility of which I was more conscious than 
of any I have subsequently borne.
Troublesome nationality cases caused Wilson the most difficulty. 
Many pregnant women of Central America, among them numerous Guatemalan 
citizens, traveled to the United States for the birth of their babies. 
Thereafter, the parents claimed American citizenship for their offspring 
in order to claim for them political immunity from some Latin American 
legal obligations, such as military duty. The government of dictator- 
President Manuel Estrada Cabrera naturally refused to accept those contra­
ventions of Guatemalan law. Although the United States did not extend 
such exemptions to foreign citizens within its boundaries, Wilson and 
his colleagues claimed the special status for those Central Americans, 
but their assertions were invariably denied.
A short time after Leavell's arrival, Wilson expressed his qualms 
about the problem. Dr. Leavell felt that the Guatemalan government, if 
pressed hard enough, would eventually accept the American position. To 
the new minister's astonishment, Wilson said that he, personally, would 
not agree to the United States argument if he were in the Foreign Office. 
In any case, he officially upheld Washington's, stance; he thought it 
permissible for him to work for State Department acceptance of his con­
trary line of reasoning until a policy had been firmly decided. At that
^^ilson. Education, p. 4%.
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point he was obligated, to support the official position or to resign.
Subsequently, the general question was unresolved, since Guatemala
111.strictly adhered to its position.
During the chargèship, Wilson gave considerable attention to 
protection-of-interest cases which primarily concerned the United Fruit 
Company, an American corporation. In 1912, the firm imported a large 
number of new workers from Jamaica who did not adjust well to working 
in the gangs and who, consequently, became restive. On June 8, 1912, 
a Jamaican Negro employee murdered a white American contractor on the 
company railroad. At first, the local police made little attempt to 
apprehend the suspect, and a few days later another Negro shot a company 
paymaster. Victor Cutter, the firm's district manager, believing that 
lax law enforcement would only encourage the criminal elements, requested 
Wilson to seek immediate and vigorous action.
Wilson acted promptly. He urged the Guatemalan Foreign Office 
to send an adequate military contingent and advocate the strict enforce­
ment of the laws. Consequently, the government dispatched soldiers to 
arrest the most dangerous men whom Cutter pointed out.^^
Under the circumstances, Wilson's moves were appropriate. Since 
most of the employees were Jamaicans, Wilson also discussed the problem 
with the British charge d'affaires, who thought Wilson had proceeded
^^Ibid., pp. 55-57.
^^Cutter to Wilson, June 13, 1912, 31^.H^Un3/6. 
^^ilson to Cutter, June 15, 1912, 3l4.HWn3/6.
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wisely to localize a potentially dangerous situation involving British
and American subjects. Cutter reported his satisfaction wi.th the steps
17taken, and the State Department approved Wilson's conduct.
To prevent future trouble. Cutter advocated the maintenance of 
a garrison in the troubled area. Wilson worked to have the temporary 
troops remain until the government could establish a permanent sta­
t i o n . I n  June, the Minister of War ordered the formation of an in­
stallation, but by October nothing had been done except to notify Cutter
that his company would have to pay the wages of the troops. The fruit
19company executive refused the suggestion as expensive and impolitic.
Then Wilson informally contacted the Foreign Office to present 
his ideas more fully. First, he expressed a belief that the Minister of 
War had not consulted President Cabrera on the matter. Surely the Presi­
dent realized that a foreign firm’s maintenance of armed forces would 
infringe on Guatemala's sovereignty which would cause significant domes­
tic and foreign criticism. The use and distribution of soldiers consti­
tuted an internal matter, and it would be more expensive to Guatemala 
to quiet an outbreak if it were not done early. Again, the government 
indicated its unwillingness to set a precedent which other companies
^^ilson to Knox, June 17, 1912, 31^*lH*-Un3/6j Cutter to Wilson, 
June 15, 1912, 31^-llton3/6; Wilson to Knox, June 24, 1912, 31^.H^Un3/7.
^®Wilson to Knox, June 2k, I912, ■31^-ll^Un3/7; Wilson to Don 
Guillemo Aguirre, Secretary of State ad interim for Foreign Affairs,
June 20, I912, 31^1lWn3/7.
^^Cutter to Wilson, October 29, 1912, 31^ « llWn3/l7.
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20use to have national soldiers protect their property.
Wilson made no further inquiries until an alternate plan was pro­
posed the following year. When more difficulties with Negro workers 
arose. Cutter explained to Wilson that to curh disturbances in Costa Rica 
the United Fruit Company had used a small police force which the local 
government had designated. . He indicated that he favored a similar plan 
in Guatemala if national officials would approve. Since the scheme 
offered a means of preserving order which, in his view, would be more 
satisfactory to the government, Wilson presented it to Dr. Luis Toledo 
Herrarte, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later the highest Guatemalan
authorities consented, and the provincial governor established the 
21force.
Wilson also participated in Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan's effort to promote the conclusion of conciliation treaties. The 
agreements stipulated that nations would submit their disputes to perma­
nent investigative commissions. Each party refrained from declaring war 
for a year which was the usual waiting period for investigations. Once 
the study had ended, the disputants could approve or reject the commis­
sion's evidence. Bryan hoped that the parties would reconcile their
^^ilson to Knox, October 29, 1912, 31^» ll4Un3/lTj Di'. Luis 
Toledo Herrarte, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Wilson, Oc'cober 26, 
1912, 31ij-.llton3/l7.
^^Wilson to Knox, October 29; 1912, 31^»H^Un3/lT; Kriox to Wil­
son, November 16, 1912, 31^.U4Un3/l7; Wilson to Knox, August 13, 1913; 
314.U4Un3/2I; Wilson, Memorandum of a conversation m t h  Toledo, August 
1; 1913; 3l4.1l4Un3/21; Toledo to Wilson, August 6, 1913, 3l4.1l4Un3/21.
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differences during that time and that world opinion would support peace­
ful settlement.
Charge Wilson contacted Dr. Toledo who indicated hearty agree-
22ment with the principle, the aims, and the object of the proposal.
Wilson sent him the Spanish text of the arbitration treaty with El Sal­
vador, the first of the conventions signed, and indicated American will­
ingness to modify the details to Guatemalan conditions since the State
2?Department was anxious to have Guatemala's participation. In early
September, 1913^ Guatemala City sent instructions and plenary power to
2kits minister in Washington for him to conclude a treaty. On September
20, the representatives signed the treaty, and a few days later a copy
25was dispatched for Wilson's information.
The most significant diplomatic event of Wilson's tenure related
to dollar diplomacy and the British interest in Guatemala. The Latin
American government had owed a loan debt for many years, and on various
26occasions Britain had attempted to force payment to its bondholders.
The tempo increased markedly when Sir Lionel Carden, the determined new
2%ilson to Bryan, July 24, I913, TII.OOI2/II6.
23wilson to Toledo, August 30, 1913, TII.OGI2/158.
2^Wilson to Bryan, September 3, 1913, 711"0012/147.
^5john E. Osborne to Wilson, September 24, 1913, 7H"0012/l58.
^^ilson. Education, pp. 59-60; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and 
Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, I90O-I92I (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 238^0; hereafter cited as Munro, 
Intervention.
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British minister, began pressing for fulfillment of Guatemala's obliga­
tions. President Cabrera continued the talks for some time as a stall­
ing technique to preclude payment and to avoid offense to the United 
States which regarded the Caribbean as its special province. Carden 
maintained contact with Wilson while other British representatives kept 
the State Department informed.
Iti April and May, 1913  ̂the matter moved toward a solution.
From Dr. Toledo, Wilson learned of Carden's demand for resumption of
installments within two weeks and threat of force for collection after 
28that. The British refused to grant additional time, and a British 
cruiser arrived in Guatemalan waters.Finding Britain unwilling to 
talk, Cabrera conceded. Thereafter, to Wilson's surprise, the Foreign 
Minister showed an optimistic tone about the settlement which was strik­
ingly different from the attitude Cabrera and he had previously dis­
played.^^ In this manner the Guatemalans had temporarily settled the 
problem of foreign debt payment.
Oucc Minister Leavell assumed responsibility for Legation affairs, 
Wilson increasingly wanted to return to the United States. For many
^Wilson, Education, p. 4-9; Knox to Hitt, February J, 1913, D. S. 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1913 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920),
p. 567,’ hereafter cited as F.R.
^^ilson to Bryan, April 29, 1913, F.R., p. 568.
,1son to Bryan, May 1, 1913, F.R., p. 569.
^^ilson to Bryan, May 13, 1913, F.R., pp. 570-571»
3lKonro, Intervention, p. 24-5; Wilson, Education, p. 60.
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months he had been away from home, so he wished to see the changes in the 
State Department under .the Woodrow Wilson administration. Besides, the 
legation secretary was planning to propose marriage to Kate Bogle, the 
daughter of a Michigan lawyer. Understandably, he sought to acquaint the 
nonservice minister with the legation duties and to make the Leavells 
"as comfortable as possible, as independent as possible, as quickly as 
possible."32 When Wilson asked for a leave, Leavell disapproved until 
he learned of the romance. Then despite Leavell's need for him, the 
minister realized that the young man, whom he considered capable, fit, 
and cordial, had likely gained what he could at the post.33 The Depart­
ment also approved the request, and on February 19, 191^, he left the
34country of which he had become fond.
The next weeks were full ones. When he was not at the Depart­
ment, he was visiting friends, making new acquaintances, and traveling 
around Washington. He found the State Department less calm and more 
informal than he remembered it under Secretary of State Philander C.
Knox. As no official seemed to know or care whether he would return to 
Guatemala or proceed to another post, he went to Europe to continue his
vacation and to visit his sweetheart, Katherine Bogle, whom he hoped to 
35marry.
^%ilson. Education, pp. 85-86; Leavell to Bryan, December 6,
1913, I23.W693/6.
33wilson, Education, p. 86; Wilson to Bryan, January 4, 191^,
I23.W693/5.
3^John Bassett Moore to Leavell, January 17, 191^; I23.W693/6; 
Wilson, Education, p. 87.
^^ilson. Education, pp. 92-94; Wilson to Bryan, April 3, 19%4, 
I23.W693/8; Bryan to Wilson, April I6, 1914, I23.W693/IO.
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The trip was most significant. On the steamer for France, Wilson 
conversed frequently with Hugh Gibson, a humorous, entertaining, and 
intelligent young man who at that time was the Secretary of Legation in 
Brussels. The two became lasting friends, correspondents, and sometime 
co-workers in subsequent disarmament conferences. Two days after Wil­
son's arrival in Paris, Miss Bogle, who was studying vocal music there, 
agreed to marry him, and on April 25, 191^, they were married at St. 
Peter's, Eaton Square, in London.
Again the matter of an assignment arose. Before the wedding he 
had requested appointment as Second Secretary in Spain. While he was on 
his honeymoon, two messages arrived. The first indicated the unavail­
ability of the Madrid post and named him the Third Secretary at London. 
About the same time his wife received a cable from a Washington friend 
and music enthusiast indicating that she could continue her voice study 
in London since Wilson was going to that embassy. But he did not want 
the insignificant job as a third secretary in a large post, and the com­
bination of events made him suspect interference by his in-laws in his 
personal affairs. In that frame of mind, he requested a cancellation of 
the London appointment, and the Department obliged by designating him
Wilson, Education, pp. 95-96. Wiiile Wilson was taking the 
Foreign Service exams in I9II, he met her at a friend's house. Obvi­
ously she impressed him exceedingly since he even recalled the songs 
she sang at their first meeting. Ibid., p. 31*
"̂̂ Bryan to Wilson, April 30, 191^, 123*W693/H*
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38the Second Secretary in Argentina. He was pleased at the prospect of 
going to Latin America; it would be a more relaxing assignment, and he 
thought the chances of having significant responsibility, and perhaps 
being a charge, were greater there.
On September 20, l$lh, Wilson arrived in Buenos Aires to begin 
what turned out to be an uneventful diplomatic tour. However, he did be­
come close with Frederic Stimson, the new ambassador, and thus established 
another lasting foreign service friendship. More than this, he had ample
time for studying Spanish, traveling, going to the horse races, and attend-
ij-0ing excellent opera. But he was unimpressed with his work there. The 
Spanish civilization of Central America appealed to him whereas a more 
modern one in Argentina seemed incongruous. Furthermore, the country's 
affairs were decidedly outside the stream of important events then occur­
ring in Europe. The world war would greatly influence the future of the 
United States, and he wanted to participate more fully and to make a 
greater contribution than he could in Buenos Aires. Moreover, his wife's 
illness in the form of a difficult pregnancy and the loss of their first 
child comprised a most unsettling influence, and when she suffered a
3^Wilson, Education, pp. 97-98; Wilson to Bryan, May 2, 191^, 
I23.W693/18.
3%ilson, Education, p. 100; Bryan to Wilson, August 6, 1$1^, 
123.W693/l8a; William Phillips to Wilson, July 17, 191^, 123.W693/l8b.
^%ilson. Education, pp. Ill, 117, 124-12$.
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severe post-delivery depression, Wilson started home with her in mid- 
April, 1916.̂ 1
The leave of absence brought about expected and unexpected re­
sults. Both the change in environment and the leisurely pace of travel
aided in the rapid improvement of his wife's health. Back in the states,
h-2she visited with her parents which was also most beneficial. While 
Wilson was vacationing in Illinois with friends and relatives in early 
June, 1916, he received a Departmental order to become the Second Secre­
tary of Legation in Berlin, as he was about to tee off at a golf course. 
He liked the prospect of going into the heart of Germany and European 
affairs, and Kate Wilson, now fully recovered, shared his excitement. So 
they began preparing for the new post, and on June 2k, I916, they sailed 
on the St. Louis.
Before arriving in Europe, he assessed his status. For him, 
Germany was an unfamiliar area and the assignment "was a jump into the 
unknown, somewhat awe-inspiring but thrilling." His knowledge and skills
^^Ibid., pp. Ik6-lk8;Stimson to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, 
December 1Ü, 1915, 123<w693/l9^ Stimson to Lansing, April I6, I91G, 
I23.W693/2O.
^^Wilson, Education, pp. I62-I63.
^^Ibid., p. 16k; Hugh R. Wilson, "Under Three Reichs," undated 
speech, Hugh R. Wilson Papers, Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, 
Iowa,* hereafter cited as Wilson Papers; Prank L. Polk, Acting Secretary 
of State, to Wilson, June 2, I916, 123*W693/22a and 28a. Among the pre­
parations was an appointment with Joseph C. Grew, the First Secretary of 
Legation, who had assisted the State Dep^tment in the selection of Wil­
son. The long friendship of Grew and Wilson dated from this time. Wil­
son, Education, pp. I65-I66. '
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meant that he vould be given nonpolitical matters. But he determined to
work hard and leam quickly as much as possible in order to qualify for
44more responsible tasks.
On July 6, 1916, Wilson reached Berlin and took up his duties, 
and at the embassy headed by Ambassador James Gerard, a wealthy Demo­
cratic lawyer from New York, life was different from any Wilson had 
experienced previously. Most staff members considered that German 
policy would eventually involve the United States in the fitting. In 
Gerard’s opinion German-American relations were so tenuous that he ad­
vised personnel to live in a hotel instead of leasing a house. Outside 
social activities were restricted because of the American sympathy for 
the Allied cause, but the Germans continued the excellent opera perform­
ances despite the war.^^
Wilson primarily handled passports, the most difficult problems 
being those of young men of military age with dual citizenship. Natur­
ally, the cases created emotional strain for him, but he consulted the 
ambassador about the most complex situations. After some time, Wilson 
found two fairly reliable criteria for making decisions: where the
applicant had been educated during his teens and where he had invested 
46his money.
^^Ibid., p. 169.
^^Ibid., pp. 171-173,175, I8I; Gerard to Lansing, July 7, 1916, 
123.G861/Ï3&T'
^^Wilson, Education, pp. I82-I83, I85.
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Thou^ passports occupied much of his time, he had other and
broader interests. On Sunday mornings, he and others gathered at the
chancery to discuss the overall work of the embassy and to exchange
ideas and suggestions. Gradually he developed greater understanding of
political events and the various pressures which influenced persons and 
kvnations.
When the United States broke diplomatic relations with Germany 
in February, 1917, Wilson became a sort of secretary in transit which 
gave him a feeling that he was a part of the general American effort. 
The Naval Attache and Wilson were charged with the task of burning the 
confidential papers and codes before closing the embassy. When they 
finished the job, Wilson departed for Berne, Switzerland, to await fur­
ther instructions.^® A month later the Department assigned him to 
Vienna where he again associated, socially and professionally, with 
Joseph C. Grew, the Counselor of Embassy and the charge, and where he 
made the acquaintance of Fred Dolbeare and Allen Dulles, both junior 
secretaries.With some advanced warning of an Austrian severance of 
relations, he and other staff members made arrangements for departure.
30a.
'̂Tlbid., pp. 185-186.
^Ibid., p. 202; Lansing to Wilson, February 13, 1917, I23.W693/ 
^^Lansing to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland, March 15,
1917, 123 .W693/30b; Frederick Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna, 
to Lansing, March 23, 1917, 123.W693/33*
19
Now that the United States was at war with Germany as of April 6, 1917, 
Wilson was once again going to Berne, Switzerland.^*^
Much responsibility fell to him there, since his rank as Second 
Secretary was the highest in the legation except for the Minister Pleasant 
A. Stovall. The latter, who had been a newspaper editor in Savannah, 
Georgia, was a political appointee with only a slight background in dip­
lomatic and Central European affairs.While the minister was away for 
consultation in Washington, between September, 19IT, and March, I918, 
Wilson was in charge of legation affairs at B e r n e .
Wilson demonstrated skill and efficiency in the Berne post. His 
six months' tour established him with State Department officers, and the
Department complimented him for the highly satisfactory political reports.
53and administration of the legation. Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
and Third Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips delayed the ex­
pression of commendation until after Stovall's return in order to 
strengthen the Second Secretary's position with the minister in future
5^work. Once back in Beme the minister, recognizing Wilson's execu­
tive ability and superior work, recommended a promotion to First
5*Vilson, Education, p. 220; Lansing to Wilson, Apiil 18, 1917, 
123.w693/38a.
^%ilson. Diplomat, pp. 11-12.
5%filson to Lansing, September 15, 1917, 123-W693/^5i Grew to 
Wilson, October 17, 1917, Joseph 0. Grew Papers, Harvard University; 
hereafter cited as Grew Papers.
^^Polk to Wilson, March 6, I918, 123*W693/^a>.
^^Phillips, Memorandum to Polk, March U, I9I8, 123*W693/^a.
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55Secretary. Subsequently, the State Department elevated him to Class 
Two in the Foreign Service.
Wilson had finally fulfilled his ambition to be an active par­
ticipant in the running of a legation. Switzerland's location served as 
a fine observation point, and the furnishing of reports on political, 
economic, and industrial matters relating to belligerent countries for 
decision-making and propagandizing in the United States constituted his 
primary jbb.^?
The entire legation staff participated in the task. Each man 
had a particular country to study and report on, with Wilson taking 
Germany since he had recently been there. Gradually the practice of 
gathering at the legation for five o'clock tea developed into a time of 
combining business and pleasure. The staff also met Friday afternoon to 
compile the weekly report to Washington, and anyone present commented or 
criticized the statements after which Wilson generally dictated the
58message.
The Swiss disliked the type of work the legations were doing. 
From conversations in the Foreign Office, Wilson learned of that
55stovall to Wilson, July 12, I918, 123-W693/5^-
^^Lansing to Wilson, August 29, 1918, 123-W693/55.a*
57Polk to Diplomatic and Consular Officers, July 21, I9IT, F.R.,
Supplement 2, p. IkO.
^^Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 29-30.
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government's sensitivity about and preoccupation with the maintenance of 
neutrality. The Swiss Chief of the Political Department indicated some 
anxiety in the country about American intentions and thought a statement 
to the effect that the United States would respect Swiss territorial 
rights would allay suspicions and even counter some German propaganda. 
AJLthough the chief suggested the plan informally, Wilson, feeling the 
need to reassure the Swiss government, complied.
From the time of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, until April, 
1919; Wilson divided his time between Beme and Paris. In the first 
weeks of the period, Wilson made frequent and brief trips to Paris carry­
ing political information which was gathered in Switzerland about general 
European conditions. Gradually American agencies in Prance supplied data 
more proficiently than Beme could, so the Berne legation concentrated 
more with persons who wanted to go to Paris for personal reasons but who 
were having difficulties getting to the French capital because of politi­
cal impediments. At the same time, Wilson conferred with many individu­
als who had ideas on peace which they wanted to present personally to 
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. Often secretary Wilson 
explained that the President could not possibly hear and consider the
projects of individuals, since he was so busy with the official peace
, 6 0  proposals.
^^Lansing to Wilson, November 30; 1917; F.R., Supplement 2, p. 
758; Ador, Chief of the Swiss Political Department, to Wilson, December 
12, 1917; ibid., pp. 758-759-
^^ilson. Diplomat, pp. 69, 72-73-
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Still Wilson traveled to the French capital often enough to 
gamer a general idea of the American delegation's progress. However, 
most of his knowledge on developments at the peace conference came from 
talks with Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson's private counselor 
and personal representative, to whom Hugh Wilson delivered the Swiss 
political information reports. From bits and pieces of intelligence 
which Wilson collected in Paris and at Versailles, he felt an element of 
futility and even apprehension about the peace of Europe under the pros­
pective settlement. Finally, he made an appointment with House and com­
plained that the President could not implement the Fourteen Points and 
that the League of Nations would be incapable of administering justice. 
Besides, American assent to the treaty would mean involvement in future 
European affairs and wars, so he wanted the American delegation with­
drawn which would allow the European delegates to resolve their own dif­
ferences . House replied that the President was convinced that he could 
accomplish at least part of his program by remaining in France, but Wil­
son went away from the meeting with the same misgivings he had previously
 ̂61 possessed.
In April, I919, Wilson, his wife, and Hugh Robert, Jr., their one-
year-old son, left for home. The serious epidemic of Spanish influenza
struck Wilson and developed into pneumonia, so his physician ordered him
62to take a leave and work no more until autumn.
^hbid.y pp. 74, 76, 79-80.
62.Ibid., p. 8I; Wilson to Phillips, April 5, 1919, 123*W693/6l.
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The previous three years had meant much to him. Wilson con­
sidered that the work constituted "the most engrossing experience" of 
his life to that time, and thereafter he possessed a lasting interest 
in Central European affairs. The respect with which he was held by the 
senior State Department officials bolstered his prospect of even more 
interesting assignments, so now he wanted to stay in diplomacy as a 
profession.^3
Once he recovered from the influenza, he accepted an unsatis­
factory assignment in the Division of Latin American Affairs in order to 
stay in the United States a little longer. From the beginning he dis­
liked the job because of the extreme partisanship in Washington and be­
cause of his now limited interest in Latin American conditions. Ellis 
L. Dresel, the American Commissioner to Berlin, and two assistants—
Fred Dolbeare and Allen Dulles--all friends of Wilson, knowing his de­
sire to return to Central Europe, contacted Department personnel and 
senators and representatives in his behalf. As a result, the Department
appointed him the Counsellor of Embassy in Berlin on January 2k, 1920,
6kand he eagerly departed for Europe on March 13.
Wilson possessed a profound interest in observing the German 
nation working to overcome war exhaustion and the Versailles Treaty 
restrictions. The American Commissioner's assigning him to political
^3wilson, Diplomat, p. 82.
^^Ibid., pp. 88, 9O-9I; Polk to American Commissioner, Berlin, 
January 26, 1920, 123.W693/T^b; Polk to Wilson, January 2k, 1920, 123- 
w693/t^c; Ellis Dresel, American Commissioner, Berlin, to Wilson, 
January 29, 1920, 123.w693/T5*
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and economic tasks made it easier for him to observe the evident hard­
ships and sufferings in the defeated country. Even years after his 
departure from Berlin, he vividly recalled the extreme shabbiness of the 
city and the runaway inflation. To leam more about the country, Wilson 
compiled voluminous notations on many aspects of German life. He even 
decided to write for publication, so he and Dolbeare talked about pro­
ducing a comparison between the effects of the Thirty Years War and World 
War I on Germany. He gathered many notes and read widely, but unfortu­
nately a new service appointment to Japan in August, 1921, and the acci­
dental destruction of his personal papers in 1923 ended the project.
Then Wilson was transferred to Tokyo as the Counsellor of Embassy. 
The long, lazy voyage over and the rest and relaxation restored him to an 
optimistic frame of mind which he had lost during his observation of 
struggle and despair in Europe. On the evening of December 12, 1921, 
Alexander Kirk and Jay Pierrepont Moffat of the embassy took him to the 
"Ho. 2 House" which signified that he ranked next to the ambassador. His 
first chief was Ambassador Charles Beecher Warren, a Detroit lawyer with 
some international judicial experience, whose disciplined and trained 
legal mind greatly impressed and influenced Wilson. From late January 
to mid-July, 1923, Wilson served as the chargé until Cyrus E. Woods, 
formerly the Ambassador in Spain, assumed the ambassadorship.^^ Wear
^^Dresel to Lansing, March 8, 1920, 123.W693/39; Polk to Wilson, 
June l4, 1920, 123.w693/91b; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 92, 107.
^^Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, to American Embassy, 
Tokyo, August 22, 1921, 123.W693/l02bj Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 128, I3O; 
Warren to Hughes, January 28, 1923; 123»w693/88.
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the end of Wilson's tour, he and all other embassy personnel contributed 
materially and tangibly to American-Japanese relations by cooperating in
67the relief operations after the great earthquake of 1923*
Wilson remained for only a part of the reconstruction. Prior to 
the disaster, he had asked for another post, and the Department granted 
his request on September 1, 1923, designating him the Counsellor of 
Embassy in Mexico City.^ Wilson -welcomed the chance to return to the 
United States so that they might replace their destroyed possessions, 
as well as to appeal his new assignment.In Washington he expressed 
to Third Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips a willingness to 
leave immediately for Mexico if the Department required it, but he actu­
ally had little interest in Latin America compared to Central Europe and 
the Par East. Phillips could offer M m  nothing but the position as Chief
of the Division of Current Information which Wilson accepted in early 
70March, 192k.
Initially, he was largely ignorant of the State Department's 
press section. Fortunately, he was aided by Assistant Chief Michael 
McDermott, a competent man who was fu3JLy aware of news problems and who
^Wilson, Diplomat, pp. Ikl-lk2j Wilson to Hughes, March 3, 1923, 
793-9k/lk22; Wilson to Hughes, April 11, 1923, F.R., II, 456-57; Hughes 
to Wilson, April 13, 1923, F.R., II, 457; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 142-143,
155.
68A couple of months before Wilson had requested a change for 
"urgent personal reasons." Hu^es to Woods, August 24, 1923, 123*W693/
123.
^^Wilson, Diplomat, p. I58.
T^lbid., p. 159; J. Butler Wright to Wilson, March 1, 1924, 123« 
W693/l36b.
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subsequently succeeded Wilson as Chief. The working hours were long,
hard, and demanding, especially since Wilson had to be available and
prepared at all times to brief reporters. Despite those conditions, he
enjoyed the compensation of attending high level meetings of which most
71chiefs were unaware.
The Current Information assignment "brought him into direct con­
tact with Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. The latter enjoyed 
considerable esteem among his colleagues althou^ he was sometimes caus­
tic, especially about superficial, sloppy, and incomplete work. Having 
heard those things, Wilson wondered about personal contact with a man 
who also changed moods quickly at times. He soon discovered that his 
admiration for the chief suppressed any apprehension he had held, so 
that he termed association with the judge "admirable training" and
"inspiring." In all his diplomatic work and personal travels, Wilson
72met no one who matched the wisdom and intelligence of Hu^es.
Most of Wilson's time as Chief of Current Information, however, 
was under Frank B. Kellogg who became Secretary of State in March, 1925* 
Possessing a violent temper which he frequently released, he was more 
difficult to work with than his predecessor. Most subordinates were 
touched by it at one time or another, but happily he became angry without
^\filson. Diplomat, pp. 159-61.
^^Ibid., pp. 162-63; Merlo J. Pusey, Chiles Evans Hughes (Wew 
York: Columbia University Press, I963), II, it-lh-15; hereafter cited as
Pusey, Hughes.
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73holding grudges. At their first business meeting Wilson told the Sec­
retary of the occasional need to make a statement to the press and then 
to check with him later because the advantages offset the one mistake 
which might happen in a month. Kellogg accepted the premise, promising 
to support the information chief before the public or the President, but
he warned of a possible private rebuke in case of an error. On more than
7^one occasion Kellogg acted as he had indicated.
One of the most significant intra-departmental changes during 
Wilson's tenure in Washington resulted from the passage of the Rogers 
Act in 192h to professionalize the Foreign Service by combining the dip­
lomatic and consular s e r v i c e s . The law, proposed by Congressman John 
Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts and fully backed by Secretary Hughes, pro­
vided for appointment and promotion strictly on merit, the same pay scale 
for consular and diplomatic officers, and interchangeable assignment of 
consular and diplomatic personnel.
Eventually the problem became one of determining the means of ad­
ministering the law and the degree of amalgamation. Representing the 
interests of the diplomats, Wilson proposed the appointment of one per­
son as the personnel chief. Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, 
the longtime director of consular affairs, suggested establishing a
73L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 
1925-1929 (New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, I961), 
pp. 7-8;hereafter cited as Ellis, Kellogg.
"^Vilson, Diplomat, pp. 7%-75.
^^Pusey, Hu^es, II, 4l9.
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board consisting of the Under Secretary, two Assistant Secretaries, a 
consular officer, and a diplomatic representative. Recognizing the 
political vulnerability of a personnel chief under the Wilson plan, 
Hughes compromised by appointing a board composed of the Under Secre­
tary, two Assistant Secretaries, and three voting Foreign Service offi­
cers. Wilson later recognized the weakness of his proposal and admitted
t6the wisdom of Hughes' decision.
Wilson participated reluctantly in the administration of the new
machinery. . He tried vainly to avoid being named Chief of the Personnel
Section and an ex-officio officer of the Personnel Board. He indicated
the fullness of his work load and the desire not to decide the future
status of his colleagues; he considered the position to be thankless and
even foreign to his disposition. Nevertheless, he served as the head of
77two physically separated and divergent divisions.
Criticism of the personnel board fulfilled all of his doubts. 
Consular officials correctly complained that the diplomatic branch had 
a disproportionate number of promotions compared to the consular divi­
sion. The Foreign Service Personnel Board examined the records of the 
diplomatic and consular services separately and a significantly greater
^^aldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew
and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1^66), pp. 105-loé; hereafter cited as Heinrichs, 
Grew; Wilson, Diplomat, p. l6g.
'̂’̂Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 170-171; Grew, Acting Secretary of State, 
to Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States, July 29; 1924, 
Box 8, Wilbur J. Carr Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D. C.; hereafter cited as Carr Papers.
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percentage of diplomatic personnel were promoted. Second, consular in­
dividuals alleged that the board showed preference and partiality toward 
diplomatic individuals and their friends in promotions and assignments.
To buttress their arguments, the critics pointed to the appointment of 
J. Butler Wright and Wilson, both board members, to choice posts in 
Hungary and Switzerland during the winter of 1927> and a short time later 
Under Secretary Grew, the chairman of the board, was named Ambassador to 
Turkey. This second general criticism was really unfounded, since Secre­
tary Kellogg himself had recommended Wright and Grew and since the latter 
had reluctantly taken the assignment. In Wilson’s case, Hugh Gibson, . 
who was moving from Switzerland to Belgium, had made the original recom­
mendation which Grew favored. Given those conditions and the prospects 
of working in Switzerland where American association with the League was 
increasingly interesting, Wilson enthusiastically gave up the most dis-
rjQ
tasteful position of his diplomatic career.
^^Heinrichs, Grew, pp. 116-117; Wilson, Diplomat, p- 172; 
Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State; A History of Its Organiza­
tion, Procedure, and Personnel (Hew York; The Macmillan Co. , 19^9); 
pp. 2Ü7-2Ü8; hereafter cited as Stuart, Department.
CHAPTER II.
SWISS-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE INTRODCCTION 
TO CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY
Wilson looked forward to years of service in Switzerland. The 
tenure was pleasant because his wife and he liked the charm of the coun­
try, its people, and the institutions.^ He had many friends in Berne 
with whom he wanted to talk after years of being separated from them, 
and, indeed, Fred Dolbeare, who worked with him in Japan, was the Coun­
selor of Legation.^ On June 11, Wilson was formally received by Presi­
dent Guiseppe Motta, and his official duties began.^
In the main, Wilson's contacts with the Beme government were 
routine, but those concerning the Kellogg-Briand Pact were momentous.
On August 27; 1928, the United States sent a text of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact to the Swiss government and asked the Federal Council to consider 
the chances of signing the peace arrangement. Motta replied that his 
government would favorably study a collective treaty so much in line 
with its traditional policy.^ To expedite mutual consideration, Wilson
^ugh R. Wilson, speech, March I3, /Ï9327, Wilson Papers; Wilson, 
speech, July 1927, 123-W693/l55-
%ilson. Diplomat, p. I98; Speech by Wilson to President Guiseppe 
Motta of Switzerland, June 11, 1927, 123.W693/l5^-
^Leon H. Ellis, Secretary of Legation, to Kellogg, June 18, 1927, 
I23.W693/154.
Sjilson to Kellogg, August 30, 1928, 711.$4l2Anti-War/2; Wilson 
to Kellogg, August 28, I928, 7II.9lt.l2Anti-War/4; J. Pierrepont Moffat, 




suggested that the Minister in Washington could sign the treaty if Swit­
zerland wanted to handle it in that manner. Motta declined the offer 
since he had already given a moral or juridical commitment which he con­
sidered similar to a signature of adherence. Instead, he preferred to 
leave matters as they stood until he could give definite consent. In the 
meantime, he expected approval by the Parliament shortly after his posi­
tive recommendation, but it was necessary, however, to wait three months 
after that in case 30,000 people desired a referendum. Anticipating no 
problem from any source, he incorrectly predicted final word by April, 
1929, so the Department accepted Motta's words in good faith and awaited 
the results of the constitutional procedure.̂  The Parliament acted more
slowly than Motta had expected, but the Swiss government decided to sign 
6the Pact of Paris.
But Wilson’s association with the negotiations for a proposed 
Swiss-American treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights was 
less fruitful. In September, 1927, he asked Paul Dinichert, the Chief 
of the Division of Foreign Affairs of the Political Department, whether 
his government was prepared to discuss the American draft which it had 
received on November 2, 1926. Although individual departments were still 
studying it, he expected officials to be ready soon. It was early
^Kellogg to American Legation, Berne, November 8, 1928, 711*5^12 
Anti-War/ll.
^Marc Peter, Minister of Switzerland, to Henry L. Stimson, Secre­
tary of State, October 29, 1929, 7 U »$4l2Anti-War/22.
^Gibson to Kellogg, November 2, 1926, F.R., II, 968; Wilson to 
Kellogg, September 12, 1927, 711-5^2/14.
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March, 1928, before Motta raised the subject informally with Wilson, and 
the Swiss official planned to propose to the Federal Council the negoti­
ation of separate treaties of amity and commerce. He thought that the 
arrangement might better clarify general problems and allow either gov­
ernment to denounce one agreement without affecting the other. Having 
a busy schedule, he preferred to delay discussions until after Wilson's 
return from the next session of the League's Preparatory Commission on 
disarmament. The Minister made no comment on the new proposal, as he 
was wi-thout instructions on the point.
Wilson favored joint consideration of the proposals. Since Beme 
wanted an American statement of respect for Swiss neutrality, he advised 
the negotiation of both treaties at one time. The idea was to use Ameri­
can acceptance of neutrality as a means of countering the objections
8which Wilson knew informally would be given to the Washington text.
Then Motta began implementing his idea of two agreements. On 
March l4, 1928, he delivered a draft of a treaty of friendship, jurid­
ical protection, and consular rights, the scope of which was less broad 
than the American proposals. Wilson learned confidentially that a dis­
agreement between the Political Department and the Department of Public 
Economy about some provisions accounted for his not receiving the treaty 
of commerce at the same time. He only partially examined the text at 
that time because he was preoccupied with a Geneva assignment.^
Wilson to Kellogg, March 8, 1928, F.R., III, 895-897. 
%ilson to Kellogg, March iB, 1928, F.R., III, 897-898.
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Upon returning to Berne, Wilson contacted the Foreign Office 
vhich arranged meetings vith several officials to clarify divergent 
points. Motta, vith whom he had the most meaningful contact, wanted 
to know whether the Swiss copy provided a basis for agreement. Wilson 
unofficially expressed doubt about his government's readiness to con­
clude an agreement which drastically restricted consular privileges. 
Motta was willing to hear criticism of the point in the preliminary 
text and to exclude any topic on which the two governments could not 
agree.
Ihen Wilson introduced the two major causes of Swiss-American 
difficulties for possible inclusion in future copies. The first was 
the different interpretation of nationality by which Americans were 
claimed as Swiss, eligible for military service. Motta saw little 
chance for reconciliation of the profound difference in concepts al­
though he was willing to discuss the subject. The second was the in­
terpretation of domicile which allowed cantons to tax American citizens, 
Motta thought that the national government might make a treaty which 
would limit the taxing power of the individual cantons.
Wilson continued the contact with Motta, Dinichert, and their 
advisers merely to discuss Swiss views, not to negotiate. On the ques­
tion of residence, Dinichert offered no hope for agreement, and he was 
less optimistic than Motta about concessions on property taxes. Con­
cerning consular matters, the Swiss official saw little chance of 
improving those provisions.
^^Wilson to Kellogg, April 4, 1928, F.R., III, 908-911.
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Thereafter only sli^t progress was made. Until the,Swiss clar­
ified their views on dual nationality and interpretation of domicile, 
Wilson could not present a specific proposal about the Swiss draft. To 
him, Swiss officials were proposing no more, and possibly less, than 
was contained in the Swiss-American Treaty of I850. After those con­
versations, Wilson doubted strongly the wisdom of further talks. Yet 
he wanted to wait until the Swiss had fully expressed themselves on the 
important points. The Swiss government did submit a draft for a commer­
cial treaty which was similar to the commercial clauses of the American 
text of 1926. But early in 1930, the State Department temporarily sus­
pended efforts since no immediate progress was being made.^^
In 1929, Wilson became associated with a Swiss-sponsored confer­
ence to revise the Geneva Red Cross Convention of I906 and to frame a 
code for prisoners of war. Wilson himself played an important part in 
the personnel arrangements for the American delegation. Since the con­
ference was not using League facilities and personnel, the planning was 
more difficult and expensive for each nation. Moreover, French was the 
official language and each delegation had to provide its own translators 
and interpreters. Subsequently, when the State Department assigned fewer 
workers than were necessary, Wilson feared possible embarrassment from a 
decrease in work quality. His staff needs clashed with the Department's 
attempt to fulfil the conference commitment without a congressional 
appropriation. Finally, Washington alleviated the personnel problem by
Wilson to Kellogg, April 2k, I928, F.R., III, 919-926; Stimson 
to Wilson, January I8, 1930, TH-5^2/26a.
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assigning more members of the Geneva consulate and by sending J. Pierre-
IPpont Moffat from the Division of Western European Affairs.
For a time, it appeared that Wilson would lead the American 
representatives. Indeed, one State Department official suggested that 
he be the only delegate and that other appointees be advisers. Gradu­
ally, the Department realized the importance of the chief’s possessing 
a national reputation and a humanitarian,; and military interest in 
prisoners of war. Since the conference was to be in two divisions, the 
Department decided on Eliot Wadsworth, a former Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury, to direct the group and Wilson to be a delegate.
At the assembly the delegates studied copies of two agreements 
drafted by the International Red Cross of Geneva. Wadsworth partici­
pated in the discussion of the proposed Red Cross convention which the 
first commission handled, and Wilson attended the second commission 
which considered prisoners of war matters. In fact, he became the 
chairman of a committee on juridical, diplomatic, and penal questions 
when the second commission began group study for simplifying the text 
and removing unnecessary details. On July 4, the second commission 
agreed that retaliation against prisoners of war was prohibited. like­
wise, the first commission reached a consensus, and the signing of the
Stimson to American Legation, Berne, May 1%, 1929, 5l4.2A12/37j 
Wilson to Stimson, May l8, 1929, 51̂ '2A12/4-0; Wilson to Marriner, May 30, 
1929, 51^'2A12/46; Memorandum, May 31, 1929, 5i^«2A12/46g; J. Reuben 
Clark to Hoover, June 1, 1929, 51̂ *2A12/i|-9a.
^^Memorandum, May 9, 1929, 51^ « 2A12/38&j James C. Dunn to 
Kellogg, undated, 5i4.2A12/57j Clark to Wadsworth, June I7, 1929, 
5l4.2A12/71a.
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two conventions at Geneva on Jtily 27, 1929, climaxed what Wilson termed 
"one of the few conferences which were happy episodes from start to 
finish.
During the 1920’s, the American Ministers to Switzerland in­
creasingly handled affairs which related to the League. When Wilson 
arrived, an uncertain relationship still existed between the League and 
the United States. Officially, the State Department remained cautious 
toward the organization although the number of contacts increased as 
the years passed. More and more, after 1925, the United States sent 
representatives to the meetings on economic, commercial, and arms prob­
lems. Generally, it accepted invitations to League-sponsored confer­
ences, and gradually relations with League bodies became cordial. Other­
wise, the American Minister at Berne and the Geneva consulate usually 
reported on League developments. During his ten years there, Wilson 
noticed changes in the relationship but his instructions invariably 
restricted him.^^
Most of Wilson's work in Switzerland concerned the League activ­
ities, especially several conferences on international problems of
^^Wadsworth to Kellogg, July 5, 1929, 51^-2A12/83j Wilson to 
Kellogg, August 2k, 1929, 51^-2A12/l4l; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 228-229-
^^Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and World Organiza­
tion, I92O-I933 (New York; Columbia University Press, 193#), pp. 219- 
222; hereafter cited as Fleming, The United States; Francis P. Walters, 
A History of the League of nations (New York: Oxford University Press,
1952), I, 3 4 Ü - hereafter cited as Walters, League; Wilson, Diplomat,
p. 212.
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transportation, trade restrictions, narcotics, and counterfeiting. 
Sometimes he handled preliminary arrangements until the Department 
officially designated someone else to assume the responsibility for the 
project. The expense of sending experts to the meetings was frequently 
prohibitive, so circumstances forced him to become acquainted with the 
subject in a short time. Since the topics varied considerably, he had 
to study and prepare continuously. At one technical gathering he 
chaired a commission, and most of his effort was designed to conceal his 
ignorance of the matter. Those early experiences caused him to urge the 
early appointment of American representatives to allow them ample time 
for preparations. Also American opinions were often decisively influ­
ential particularly if they were stated before positions crystallized.
In October, 1927, Secretary Kellogg, increasingly realizing that fact, 
indicated that Wilson mi^t be sent to many future meetings, and the
16following years bore that out.
One of the early assemblies which Wilson attended was the Third 
General Conference on Communications and Transit. League officials 
desired American representation to present information about procedures 
and to develop an information exchange s y s t em . F o r the United States, 
participation constituted a practical means of fostering some of its 
economic.policies. Since the conference did not intend to formulate any 
general conventions, the government could safely participate without
^^ilson. Diplomat, pp. 227-228; Kellogg to Wilson, October 3, 
1927, Wilson Papers.
^^Arthur W. Young, American Delegation to the Economic Conference, 
Geneva, Memorandum, "Conversation with Colonel Hiam, Mr. Haas, and Mr. 
Sweetser," June 2, 1927, 570*BS/l.
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3 Aworrying about commitment to any objectionable ideas.
Wilson directed American affairs. After preparing plans for the 
prospective work, he and his advisers called on M. R. Haas, the Director 
of the Communications and Transit Sections of the League Secretariat. 
Wilson indicated the scope of his instructions, and Haas invited Ameri­
can officials to attend whatever sessions they found relevant. Further, 
he presented the proposed plan for three commissions to consider the col­
lection and exchange of statistics, laws, and regulations of particular 
countries concerning transportation and communications media which might 
be of international interest, to identify documents for individuals of 
unknown nationality, and to revise rules which were presented at previous 
sessions. He asked Wilson to be the chairman of the First Commission 
since an American in that capacity would enhance the stature of the body.
Wilson contacted the State Department which to his gratification approved
19the offer, so he agreed to serve as the head.
Generally, the conference work in which Americans participated 
from August 23, to September 2, 1927, went smoothly. In the First
3 AMemorandum, Office of the Economic Adviser, "Forthcoming Con­
ference on Communications and Transit at Geneva," June 22, 1927,
570.B3/2J Kellogg to Coolidge, August 5, 1927, 570.B3/k; Castle to 
American Legation, Beme, August 11, 1927, 570.B3/9*
^%ilson to Kellogg, August 22, 1927, 570.B3/l8; Kellogg to Amer­
ican Consul, Geneva, August 23, 1927, 570«B3/l8. Wilson asked Castle 
informally about his relationship to the League, "whether I could feel a 
little freer in participation than I had previously felt it admissible." 
Castle cautioned against Wilson's conveying any impression that the Uni­
ted States was becoming involved with League political activities. So, 
if Drummond invited the Minister to a dinner for the League Council, the 
Department preferred him to stay home. Wilson to Castle, August 26, 1927, 
Wilson Papers ; Castle to Wilson, September 8, 1927, Wilson Papers.
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Connnission the only notable conflict resulted from some powers initially 
questioning the utility of establishing a system for collecting communi­
cations information, but they shortly withdrew their objections to its 
creation. Then Wilson divided the group into four subcommittees to 
study carefully the type of information of value to the Transit Section 
concerning parts and maritime navigation, inland navigation, railways, 
and road traffic and air travel. The subcommittees worked harmoniously 
and easily agreed that the data which was to be collected be of a general 
character and be supplied at the discretion of the individual govern­
ments. Likewise, the Second Commission submitted much the same results.
After adjournment, the United States sent pertinent information to the
20Secretary General of the League.
In 1927, Wilson participated in the more important Conference on 
the Abolition of Export and Import Prohibitions and Restrictions. He 
headed a delegation consisting of four experts and a secretary. The 
days and ni^ts were very busy for Wilson who had to familiarize himself 
with the conference draft quickly. He considered some Washington comments 
justified while he also recognized the greater merit of the other groups 
at times, but eventually he accepted modified instructions from Washing­
ton.^^
The large number of exceptions appeared to be the major diffi­
culty in the way of agreement. From other delegates, Wilson learned of
^^ilson to Kellogg, September 13, 1928, 5TO.B3/50.
2%ellogg to American Legation, Berne, October 8, 1927, 5^0.M2/ 
18; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 224-22$.
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the French and German determination to refuse agreement and to insist on 
more reservations if the British refused to give up their dye restric­
tions. In his opinion, most of the conference revolved around this 
point although it vas not formally debated. Soon the participants be­
came aware that so many amendments would be presented that the govern­
ments would have to reconvene in about six months to consider the 
changes. The situation left the conference vith two choices. After the 
exploration of all aspects, it could announce in plenary session that 
agreement was impossible, but it might conclude, however, an agreement 
which would permit reservations. The second alternative would accom­
plish something and be a step toward abolition of restrictions.^2
Faced with those two choices, Wilson thought that the United 
States needed to consider carefully its future plans, following one of 
three courses of action. Washington mi^t merely say that it would not 
sign because the draft would actually perpetuate current conditions. 
Also, it might refuse to sign the agreement until events showed the 
extent to which reservations would weaken the convention. Instead, Wil­
son opted for participation as an American gesture of willingness to 
eliminate international barriers. Besides, no statement had been made 
about automobiles, radio equipment, and films, and the United States 
would benefit perceptibly by the abolition of restrictions on those 
items. Furthermore, only signatories to the agreement would be eligible
^%ilson to Kellogg, October 20, 192?, 560.M2/43; Wilson to 
Kellogg, October 25, 1927, 560.M2/57*
lu
to receive information. Moreover, the government conld. use the conven­
tion provisions in further discussions with other signatories concerning 
prohibitions and restrictions. In addition, the American involvement 
would tend to strengthen the weak document and to encourage the Central 
European governments who genuinely wanted to remove trade obstacles.^3 
The State Department itself was somewhat unsure of the appro­
priate steps to take. Nonetheless, Robert E. Olds, the Acting Secre­
tary of State and Undersecretary, instructed Wilson to continue working 
for an agreement which would improve on the international situation. The 
United States deplored the apparent inclination to increase the number 
of reservations and urged him to work against that trend which mi^t 
defeat the conference's purpose. Confidentially, Olds informed him, the
Department would allow him to proceed along the line of the third alter-
2knative which he suggested.
Progress came only with difficulty. The French and Germans still 
opposed British efforts for retention of dye restrictions, and their 
efforts to exact a price from England resulted in no settlement of a 
sore p o i n t . M o s t  delegates agreed on the obligation to arbitrate 
legal disputes. Wilson worked for general optional arbitration, but 
Italy, Britain, and Germany refused to agree unless two particular
^^ilson to Kellogg, October 27, 1927, 3̂ 0.1/12/6k. 
^^Robert Olds to American Mission, Geneva, 560.M2/69. 
^^Uilson to Kellogg, October 29, 1927, 560.M2/71«
k2
articles vere exempted. Since their instructions vere "absolute," he 
requested orders from Washington because the action exceeded his instruc­
tions. The State Department saw no reason for him to object to the con­
ference decision after he had reasonably tried for noncompulsory appli­
cation.^^
Thereafter the conference drew to a close so rapidly that time 
ran out before Wilson could present a number of exceptions. He argued 
that Washington was not fully informed about developments because of the 
lack of direct telephone connections between Geneva and the United States. 
Also, the speed of negotiations in the final days had prevented the Amer­
icans from adequately developing their position. Consequently, the 
United States, lacking adequate time for reflection on the agreement 
and consultation among the government branches, abstained from signing
at the final session on November 8, 1927, when eighteen foreign govern-
27ments affixed their signatures.
After adjournment, Wilson evaluated the meeting. No other 
assignment to that time had been as complex and difficult as this one.
He was very sorry that he had failed to accomplish as much as Secretary 
Kellogg had wanted, but the late arrival of instructions constituted a 
decided handicap. His experiences and observations convinced him of
^^Wilson to Kellogg, November 1, 1927, 560.M2/77; Kellogg to 
American Mission, Geneva, November 3, 1927, 560.M2/78.
^*%ilson to Kellogg, November 7, 1927, 560.M2/lG3; Wilson to 
Kellogg, November 9, 1927, 58o.M2/l09&j Wilson to Kellogg, November 9, 
1927, 560.M2/llî.
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European eagerness to have the United States cooperate in the handling 
of world economic problems. In fact, during the conference several 
delegates indicated privately a willingness to alter the entire docu­
ment if the United States would sign it. Despite the lack of desired 
achievement, he noted the evident progress of significantly reducing 
the hundreds of reservations to only a few. Perhaps American goods 
would fare better once the convention eliminated actual or proposed
28restrictions.
On January 30, 1928, Wilson signed the convention and protocol 
of November 8, abolishing import and export prohibitions and restric­
tions. At the time, he indicated no American obligation under the 
agreement concerning the Philippine Islands and expressed other reser­
vations. The United States reserved restriction on exported items and 
the domestic handling of them as allowable under the conventions if the 
stipulations were not applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 
The American government stipulated that the convention did not alter the 
tariff arrangements, the treaty-making machinery of participants, or the 
means of countering unfair competition and practices. Because the State 
Department objected to parts of the final act which consisted of opinions
29and aspirations of the other delegations, Wilson did not sign it.
^®Wilson to Kellogg, November 9, I927, $6o.M2/l09i. 
^%Cellogg to American Legation, Beme, January 27; 1928,
560.M2/132.
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On July 3; 1928, the next session began for consideration of 
reservations and vays to implanent the agreement. Once again Wilson 
headed the delegation. He thou^t maybe this meeting would deal with
30more difficult matters than the one in the fall.
Almost immediately the delegations debated the conference's 
competence to interpret the provisions of the text. Wilson insisted on 
the assembly's ability to say whether a state's reservation was already 
included under the existing articles. Quickly, the President and the 
Secretariat opposed the suggestion because of a lack of readily avail­
able information on which to base a decision. The French delegate pro­
posed the compromise of allowing speakers to indicate the similarity of 
an exception to the terms of a specific article and then the conference 
voting on whether the exception could be included under a particular 
provision. The body approved the procedure, and, after the admissabil- 
ity of an item was established, the group examined the substantive 
merits of the exemption. Wilson, dubious about the technique, foresaw 
the possibility of governments' claiming more exemptions after ratifica­
tion unless the opinions of other governments could keep individual 
31states in line.
Naturally, the reservations themselves remained a major consid­
eration. By the voting process, the number of exceptions was reduced to
3^Wilson to Young, February 17, 1928, 56o.M2/l49* 
%ilson to Kellogg, July I8, 1928, 560.M3/7T*
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thirty-four on twenty products, and fortunately, no additional requests 
could be made after that action. In this area, the United States was 
most interested in the elimination of,-restrictions on the importation 
of cars and f i l m s . T h e  Portuguese voluntarily dropped the request for 
an exception on cars, but Czechoslovakia retained its item for a time. 
Wilson claimed that that limitation was inadmissible and would tend to 
increase the number of requests. He asked if that government considered 
the proposal so essential that it was willing to chance the undermining 
of the general agreement. The pressure proved enough to cause the Czechs 
to withdraw their provision. Concerning films, Wilson made a speech for 
removal of French restrictions, but he received a stinging rebuff from 
the French representative and little support among other European 
delegates.
Finally, general discussion ended, and the conference gave its 
attention to ratification. It stipulated that a minimum of eighteen 
states would have to ratify and specifically designated fourteen nations 
which would have to consent. The name of the United States which was 
included in the second group was placed in parentheses because the short 
session of the American Congress might delay approval. The delegations 
took that action despite Wilson’s strangely claiming that his government
^^Kellogg to American Legation, Beme, June 21, 1928, 5^0.M3/
23.
^^Wilson to Kellogg, July l8, 1928, 560.M3/77; Wilson, Diplomat,
p. 226.
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should not he included since it had no restrictions to abolish. Only
the French delegation gave him some support for removal of the United
States from the required list, and the Swiss, Germans, and Japanese
rejected the argument outright. Otherwise, Wilson talked little be-
cause he considered the problems primarily those of Central Europe."'
Before adjournment, all representatives except those of the
United States and Bulgaria signed the supplementary agreement and the
final act.^^ Wilson signed both documents on July 31, 1928. Despite
unsatisfactory provisions, he and the State Department considered the
agreements acceptable enough, and they worked to secure the benefits.
Unfortunately, few countries ratified the convention, so economic
37competition increased in the next months and years.""
Another world-wide problem of the twenties in which the United 
States and Wilson were less intimately involved concerned the League 
efforts to control the sale of narcotics. Usually, the State Department 
sent an unofficial representative to the meetings of the League Advisory
3Vilson to Kellogg, July 5, 1928, 560.M3/42.
^^wilson to Kellogg, July 6, 1928, 560.M3/46; Wilson to Kellogg, 
July 8, 1928, 560.M3/53.
3%ison to Kellogg, July 11, 1928, 560.M3/55.
37Memorandum, "Supplementary Agreement on Import and Export 
Prohibitions and Restrictions," Treaty Division, July 27, 1928, 
56o.M3/64j Wilson to Kellogg, July 31, 1928, 560.M3/72.
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Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. Washington 
also cooperated hy completing quarterly and annual reports on the
■30amount of drugs in the c o u nt ry .I t granted permission to the League 
Commission of Inquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East 
to study the regulatory system in the Philippines.^*^ American officials, 
fearful that their government might be required to pay the visitor’s 
expenses, authorized Wilson to state that the League would assume the 
bill. From the Secretariat he learned that the committee had intended 
from the first to pay its own way, so he withheld the message.
The State Department was less cooperative concerning membership 
in the League's Permanent Central Board of Control which also dealt with 
dangerous drugs. The Council invited Washington to participate fully in 
the appointment of members to the agency which was to be established in 
September, 1928. The government declined, since it considered the
3^Wilson, Diplomat, p. 227J League of Nations Association, An 
Eleven Year Review of the League of Nations with Supplement Covering 
the Events of 1931 (New York; League of Nations Association, Inc., 
1931), PP* Ü4-85;hereafter cited as League of Nations Association, 
Review; Walters, League, I, 428.
^%rew to Marriner, November 29, 1926, 500.C1197/43; Castle to 
Wilson, July 25, 1927, 500.01197/42; Nelson T. Johnson to Wilson, Janu­
ary 13, 1928, 500.C1197/229a; Johnson to Wilson, December 26, 1929, 
500.CII97/332.
Johnson to Wilson, 500.C1197/l43, #175; Wilson to Kellogg, 
September 7, I928, 500.CII97/216; Unsigned to Wilson, January 12, 1929, 
5OO.CII97/233; Wilson to Stimson, June 8, 1929, 500.C1197/297; Wilson 
to Stimson, September 4, 1929, 500.01197/308; Wilson to Stimson, Decem­
ber 19, 1929, 500.01197/334.
^4filson to Stimson, October I8, 1928, 500.01197/218; Wilson to 
Stimson, January 7, 1929, 500.01197/254.
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Geneva convention of 1926 on narcotics an unsatisfactory substitute for
the Hague Convention of 1912. It did promise, however, to continue
42sending information when the agency requested it. Before publishing 
the response, the Council asked Wilson about publicity. He indicated 
that the United States would allow other governments time to receive a 
draft prior to releasing this information publicly.Unfortunately, 
so many people obtained the information early that the League was forced
to release the complete text before the State Department had fully
. , .. 44received it.
The League still wanted an American member. Sir Eric Drummond, 
the League's Secretary General, was prepared to submit a name to the 
League Council without publicity if the United States had no objection 
to one of its citizens participating. Washington was not opposed in 
principle, but the government would not make any move which might be 
interpreted as a proposal or approval of an individual. Since it did 
not help in the selection of the board, it could not officially express 
an opinion.Later the Council appointed Herbert L. May of Pittsburgh
IlOM. M. H., Memorandum, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Septem­
ber 10, 1929, 500.CII97/306; Wilson to Stimson, September 17, 1929,
5OO.CII97/309.
^%ilson to Kellogg, September 7, 1928, F.R., I, 448; Wilson to
Kellogg, September 29, 1928, F.R., I, 448-449; Wilson to Kellogg, Decem­
ber 15, 1928, F.R., I, 452-453.
^Sjilson to Kellogg, December 17, 1928, 511.4A2A/34.
^5wilson to Kellogg, December 6, I928, 500.C1197/239; Kellogg to
Wilson, December 8, I928, F.R., I, 452.
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46on the nomination of New Zealand.
Wilson also participated in the negotiations for the proposed 
accession of the United States to the statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. Of course, the long-standing question was one of 
whether the United States would become a member of the Court. After 
1926, the major obstacle to participation remained the reservation that 
the Court could not give advisory opinions on any dispute concerning 
the United States without its consent. In February, 1929, Secretary 
Kellogg thought that the adherents of the Final Act of the I926 confer­
ence could informally arrive at a statement which would safeguard Amer-
47lean rights and interests.
The work of the Committee of Jurists, which met March 11-19, 
1929, helped clear the way for American membership. It essentially re­
moved the conditions to which the United States objected. Drummond un­
officially and personally expressed a willingness to have an American
representative at a special September conference to consider the com- 
18mittee's report. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson found that the 
draft protocol answered American reservations and provided an accept­
able foundation for approval. After the signatory states accepted the 
draft text, he planned to ask President Herbert 0. Hoover's
^^Nilson to Kellogg, December 11, I928, 500.C1197/247; Rand, 
American Consul, Geneva, to Kellogg, December 15, 1928, F.R., I, 452.
"̂̂ Ellis, Kellogg, pp. 226-227; Kellogg to Austrian Minister, 
February I9, 1929, F.R., I, 1-3.
^Gross, Third Secretary of Legation, Berne, to Stimson, July 18, 
1929, F.R., I, 21-22.
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authorization to sign and to propose submission for Senatorial con-
k9sent. Those opinions greatly pleased the Secretary General who prom­
ised Wilson to handle the information d i s c r e e t l y .^0 The State Depart­
ment wanted to name no one lest his attendance at Geneva lead to un­
founded assumptions that he was presenting official v i ew s . E ve n  
though Wilson was authorized to attend one or more sessions informally, 
he was hesitant since his inability to answer questions might produce 
embarrassment or more misunderstanding.
Instead, he had his own ideas for combatting hearsay. From the 
newspapers the public had received the impression that the draft was 
satisfactory. Similarly, the League Council members were probably mak­
ing their own interpretations since Washington had not officially an­
swered their inquiry about the Jurists report. Therefore, an authori­
tative declaration would cause little surprise and would end specula­
tion. Believing direct action to be most beneficial, he proposed that 
Drummond be authorized to read a formal statement to the Council. If an 
announcement by the Secretary General smacked of inappropriate associa­
tion with League affairs, Wilson mi^t personally deliver the message as 
the American Minister to Switzerland. The approach would foster approval 
of the draft with only a minlTnum of debate, but the State Department
^^Stimson to Wilson, August Ik, 1929, F.R., I, 22.
^Sîilson to Stimson, August IT, 1929, F.R., I, 23-
^^Stimson to Wilson, August 15, 1929, F.R., I, 22-23.
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disapproved of the plan.^^
In a closed session the Council gratefully accepted the American
views which Drummond judiciously stated were from "a dependable source."
Nevertheless, it deplored the indirect method by which the United States
had presented its answer. The body decided against a public statement
concerning American approval until Washington had released its own 
53account.
Ratification remained the most difficult obstacle. On September 
5, 1929, Stimson indicated publicly the acceptability of the Jurists’ 
report. He did not say that the submission to the Senate might be de­
layed as much as a year because other pressing international matters
would likely consume that body’s time and attention in the upcoming 
51session. Drummond wanted the fact kept quiet lest such news discour­
age the Council delegates, Wilson agreed because of the considerable 
weight given to American opinions and difficulties.55 About a month 
later, fifty states signed the agreement and on December 9, 1929, the 
United States also signed. A year afterwards. President Hoover sent the 
documents to the Senate which did not approve them.^^
^^ilson to Stimson, August 20, 1929, F.R., I, 2k; Stimson to 
Wilson, August 20, 1929, F.R., I, 25.
53Blake, American Consul, Geneva, to Stimson, September k, 1929, 
F.R., I, 27.
5I).Stimson to Wilson, September 5, 1929, F.R., I, 27-28.
55wilson to Stimson, September 7, 1929, F.R., I, 28-29.
^^ilson to Stimson, October 8, 1929, F.R., I, 29-31; Moffat to 
Stimson, December 16, 1929, F.R., I, k3; Clarence A. Berdahl, The Policy 
of the United States with Respect to the League of Hâtions (Geneva; 
liibrarie Kundig, 1932), p. 90; hereafter cited as Berdahl, Policy.
52
In 1929» Wilson also represented the United States in the highly 
technical monetary meetings which stemmed from the League's interest in 
sound currency. The International Conference for the Suppression of 
Counterfeiting Currency resulted from a Hungarian bogus franc incident 
and the work of the League Financial Committee which had studied the sub­
ject since I926. The League's Mixed Committee for the Suppression of 
Counterfeiting Currency drafted a convention and sent a copy to the 
State Department for its comments. Drummond intentionally postponed
the meeting till April, 1929, to allow participants time for considera-
57tion of American observations before the opening session.
When American personnel were selected for the meeting, Wilson 
was also in charge of this delegation. Elbridge D. Rand, the Consul at 
Geneva, was made an alternate delegate in case Wilson's work on the 
Preparatory Commission for disarmament necessitated his being away.
Also, William H. Moran of the Treasury Department acted as a technical
58assistant.
The conference worked primarily through committees. Originally, 
it established subcommittee "A" which discussed legal matters, and sub­
committee "B," which considered administrative and enforcement aspects. 
When the problems proved too unwieldy for group "A," a Special Subcom­
mittee was formed which handled most debates but which, strangely enough.
5Twiison, Diplomat, p. 228; League of Nations Association, 
Review, p. 78; Wilson to Kellogg, October 11, 1928, F.R., I, 39̂ *
5%ellogg to Wilson, March I8, 1929, 551.58B1/27j Castle to 
Wilson, March 22, I929, 551-58B1/35c.
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did not keep any minutes. Wilson participated in that group and also 
served on a committee of draft and coordination.
An early problem involved assurances that the conference's 
provisions would be implemented. The draft text obligated the signa­
tories to take appropriate steps to incorporate the rules into their 
legal and administrative systems. The United States knew that it could 
not agree to commit the legislative branch to particular laws by the 
treaty-making process. When the Rumanian delegate proposed an addition 
to read that the parties could recommend adoption of the rules to the 
legislatures, Wilson quickly seconded the motion. Then the matter went 
to the Special Subcommittee where he worked vigorously for its accep­
tance. The Eastern European states were doubtful of the good faith of 
other governments, so the members adopted a formula which made ratifi­
cation dependent on legislation conforming to the convention. He con­
sented since the American objections were satisfactorily met and Wash­
ington approved his action. 9̂
Accordingly, the United States Criminal Statutes required modi­
fication to prevent conflict with the draft text. The American laws 
against private reproduction of domestic currency were more severe than 
against duplication of foreign securities. As the treaty was finally- 
written, the State Department needed to consider a bill which would 
equalize the penalties. Otherwise, Wilson end Moran thought that the
59wilson to Stimson, April 22, 1929, F.R., I, Stimson to 
Wilson, April l8, 1929, 551.58B1/46.
only particular legislation which Congress would have to pass to comply
60with the convention stipulations.
In the course of debates the conference defined and delimited 
letters of request. The majority of the delegates evidently wanted a 
clarification because some countries used such means even in criminal 
cases. Some wanted a broad application to include requests for speedy 
action to preclude disposal of the evidence and petitions for provi­
sional incarceration and detention. The United States, adhering only 
to the usual uses of such letters, refused to approve modification, but 
Wilson believed the final wording of the article in line with the State 
Department's wishes. The agreement allowed each signatory to inform 
others of the method which it would follow concerning such correspon­
dence and required a government to grant letters only within the limi­
tations of its own internal legislation.^^
Extradition comprised the thorniest problem for the assembly and 
Wilson. In fact, this article produced one of the longest discussions 
of the meeting. According to the text, the procedure was to be governed 
by the domestic legislation of the country granting extradition. Yet 
American laws on the subject were narrow and did not include some
^^Milson to Stimson, April 20, 1929, F.R., I, 40k-405; Stimson 
to Wilson, March 22, 1929, F.R., I, 395.
^Vilson to Stimson, April 20, 1929, F.R., I, kO^-koS; Wilson 
to Stimson, April 11, 1929, 551*5881/42; Stimson to Wilson, April 18, 
1929, 551.58BI/42; Wilson to Stimson, April I8, I929, 551*58b1/1T; 
Stimson to American Mission, Geneva, April I8, I929, 551*58bi/4T.
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problems which United States extradition treaties covered. Also, the 
statutes did not allow surrender of a person except for a definite 
crime and in compliance with a treaty or law. The State Department 
wanted the offenses specified and proposed an article to meet the dif­
ficulty, but the practical effect of the convention would still be de­
livery of persons in all instances. Consequently, the United States 
would have to surrender its citizens whereas most other nations would 
not. So, it wanted a statement that a government would not be required 
to release its nationals under the convention’s articles. The Special 
Subcommittee suggested many different proposals and eventually agreed 
to several provisions which collectively were satisfactory to the State
62Department.
The conference moved toward an acceptable conclusion. When 
twenty-three states approved on April 20, I929, Wilson did not consent. 
Instead, he followed the usual United States procedure of temporarily 
withholding his signature. The ostensible excuses were the great dis­
tance from Washington and the difficulty of communicating with it. The 
real reason lay in the precedent of waiting to give the State Department 
ample time to study the text before making any official comments. He 
feared immediate approval might make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
secure future extensionsYet, he counseled the officials to act
^Wilson to Stimson, April 8, 1929, 551.58B1/39J Stimson to Wil­
son, April 9, 1929, 55I.58BI/39; Wilson to Stimson, April 20, 1929,
I, ho6.
^^wilson to Stimson, April 8, 1929, I, 402; Wilson to Stim­
son, April IT, 1929, 55I.58BI/53.
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favorably within a short time, if it intended to do so. His signing
■would demonstrate full support for the movement and allay any doubts
6kabout his government's readiness to cooperate in the project. Sub­
sequently, Wilson signed the convention on July 20, 1929, but withheld 
consent to the final act and the optional protocol because of objections
to some points. Thus, the machinery "was established for combatting the
65counterfeiting of currency.
After three years of conference diplomacy, Wilson almost re­
signed from the Foreign Ser'vice. During the fall of 1929, he vacationed 
in the United States, and in Chicago, Lee, Higginson and Company, a 
commercial banking firm, offered him a job in its Paris office which 
was to be opened soon. The prospect of a good private position in con­
trast to the modest government salary of which he could save only a 
small portion strongly tempted him to accept the offer. The idea ap­
peared so attractive that he visited several company locations in Eu­
rope, once he returned to Beme, but finally Wilson opted to remain
66where he could participate in the more absorbing events of Geneva.
6k .Wilson to Stimson, April 20, 1929, F.R., I, kOJ; Stimson to
Wilson, July l6, 1929, F.R., I, 408; Wilson to Stimson, July 20, 1929,
F.R., I, 409.
^^Lea§ue of Nations Association, Re~vlew, p. J8.
^4filson, Diplomat, pp. 231-234.
CHAPTER III.
PRELBUIIARIES TO A DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
Disarmament constituted one of the major recurring international 
topics in the interwar period. If World War I vas fought to end var, 
then armament limitation vas designed to implement that goal. The Wash­
ington Naval Conference marked one of the first steps in the drive to 
reduce competition, tensions, and expensive building programs. Also, 
the League of Nations concerned itself with the subject, and the United 
States sent observers or delegates to the conferences and meetings of 
the League's Temporary Mixed Commission which had handled disarmament 
problems since 1921. After 1925, American ministers became associated 
with such assemblies as the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 and the 
Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference.
On February 10, 1927, President Calvin Coolidge of the United 
States proposed that the League's Preparatory Commission consider the 
application of ratios to naval vessels not included in the Five Power 
Treaty of 1922. That convention, concluded at the Washington Confer­
ence of I92I-I922, had restricted only the building of capital ships 
and aircraft carriers, but, since the conclusions of that agreement, 
the armaments production had shifted to the unrestricted smaller ves­
sels. Thus the Washington Conference provisions had brou^t about only 
a temporary lull in naval construction. France declined to attend, 
contending that disarmament should be considered as a whole instead of 
singling out naval problems, and Italy used the French refusal as an
57 ■
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excuse to remain away. Still hoping for a new agreement, Britain, the 
United States, and Japan decided in March to hold a three-power confer­
ence in Geneva during June.
For more than two months, Washington officials considered appro­
priate personnel for its delegation. When Japan designated a distin­
guished group, headed hy Admiral Viscount Makato Saito, the Governor 
General of Korea, the Coolidge administration began searching for promi­
nent figures to designate. Having no success in that venture, it named 
the regular delegation to the Preparatory Commission which consisted of 
Hugh S. Gibson, the Ambassador in Belgium, and Rear Admiral Hilary P. 
Jones, a member of the General Board of the Navy. The only notable addi­
tion was Hugh Wilson as an adviser and the Secretary General of the 
conference. In rank, prestige, and experience, the American delegation 
was below that of Japan and .Britain which sent W. C. Bridgeman, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Jellicoe, the hero of the Battle of Jutland, 
and Lord Robert Cecil of Chelwood.^
On June 20, 1927; the meeting convened and differences quickly 
became apparent. Britain wanted to discuss capital ships, but the 
United States early refused since the conference was called to consider 
auxiliary vessels. Gibson indicated parity with Britain was fundamental 
to the position of the United States, a view he maintained throughout 
the talks. The tonnage of cruisers presented one of the thorniest prob­
lems due to divergent defensive requirements. Britain contended for a
^llis, Kellogg, p. 165; Kellogg to Gibson, June 2, 1927, 
I, 43-4$.
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large number of 6,000-ton cruisers vith 6-inch manually-operated guns
for its scattered empire while the United States wanted a small number
of 10,000-ton vessels with 8-inch manually-operated weapons to meet its 
2territorial needs.
On several occasions Wilson talked with British naval officers
ahout the difference over cruisers. They honestly believed the small
ship to be extremely practical and considered the Americans in error
for wanting only crafts with the large weapons. Like other civilian
colleagues in the delegation, Wilson counseled against firm adherence •
to Washington's position, as intransigence might mean the failure to
reach an accord. He attempted to impress on Admiral Jones the importance
of the British posture, but the naval delegate stubbornly rejected any
settlement which did not allow his country to construct its cruiser
?tonnage in the crafts that it wanted.-̂
Essentially, the representatives still maintained those diver­
gent points when the conference ended on August k. In the evening of 
August 3} personnel of the naval powers met at Wilson's residence in 
Geneva to assess general progress. Seeing the inability to conclude an 
agreement satisfactory to all parties, Gibson warned that public 
speeches would tend to make a future settlement more difficult, so he 
asked the delegates, especially the British, to refrain from contro­
versial addresses. When Jones thought fturther requests to be futile, 
Gibson ended his efforts, being unable to prevent additional impairment
^EUis, Kellogg, pp. I68-I7O. 
Wilson, Diplomat, p. 217-
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of Anglo-American relations. The next day at the final session, the 
British, American, and Japanese delegations presented speeches justify­
ing their national positions and issued a joint statement which returned 
the naval disarmament problem to each government for any additional 
action. The refusal of the two large naval powers to compromise brought 
Anglo-American cordiality to a temporary low ebh.^
At that assembly Wilson's primary responsibilities related to 
the Secretariat and press matters. Prior to the convocation Japan sug- 
tested Wilson, who still "was most pleasantly remembered in Tokyo," to 
be Secretary General of a body which consisted of one representative from 
Japan, Britain, the United States, and the League. Washington consented 
and Wilson assumed the position upon his arrival in Geneva. Among the 
group's other duties, at the end of each day's meeting the Secretariat 
issued a joint communique about developments; otherwise, each country's
representative on the Secretariat conducted press relations for his own
' i5delegation.
^Wilson to Kellogg, August 5̂  1927, Wilson Papers
^Castle, Memorandum of Conversation between Sawada, Counselor of 
the Japanese Embassy, and Castle, May 10, 1927, $00.Al^Al/228§; Castle 
to Wilson, June 3, 1927, 500.A15Al/2$9a; Wilson to Kellogg, June 5> 1927, 
500.AI5AI/263; Kellogg to Wilson, June 9, I927, 5OO.AI5AI/263. Admiral 
Jones later expressed his appreciation for the cooperation and cordi­
ality Wilson and others had shown him. Jones to Secretary of Navy,
August 17, 1927, P. W. $00.Al$Al/$68; Castle to Wilson, September 26, 
1927, 500.A15A1/568. Kellogg wrote Wilson, "What I wish to say to you 
is how deeply I appreciate your work and that of all the other members 
of the Delegation and their assistants. I think the conference was 
managed with great ability and you are all entitled to credit." Kellogg 
to Wilson, August I8, 1927, Wilson Papers.
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In disarmament affairs Wilson next became associated with the 
Preparatory Commission. The body originated in a League Council resolu­
tion of December, 1925^ to work for a draft convention and the eventual 
calling of a general conference on arms reduction and limitation. Presi­
dent Coolidge accepted the invitation to participate in a preliminary 
investigation which possibly might develop into concrete recommendations. 
By the spring of 192%, two draft texts were submitted concerning restric­
tion of land and naval armaments. Since full accord was not possible on 
any important item, the Preparatory Commission planned to meet in Novem­
ber to consider a single copy which was a summary of the two drafts.̂
In September, I927, the Ei^th Assembly of the League introduced 
a new element. The Assembly, genuinely concerned about the slow progress 
in disarmament, attempted to expedite a solution. The representatives 
saw the need for a thorough and technical analysis of security and arbi­
tration problems, the Assembly proposed the creation of a Committee on 
Arbitration and Security to be composed of participants on the Prepara­
tory Commission. Initially, the United States was excluded from the 
proposed group, but later the Assembly invited it to participate. Thus
Wilbur Lee Mahaney, Jr., "The Soviet Union, the League of 
Nations and Disarmament, 191T-1935" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 19^0), 
pp. 47-^9; hereafter cited as Mahaney, "Soviet Union;" Merze Tate,
The United States and Armaments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
194d), pp. 75-77; hereafter cited as Tate, A^aments; Benjamin H. 
Williams, The United States and Disarmament (New York: Whittlesey
House, 1931}, pp. 25O-252; hereafter cited as Williams, Disarmament.
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the Preparatory Commission was to talk ahout the establishment of the
7new body in the November session.'
A number of personnel from the League’s Disarmament Section 
genuinely hoped the United States would attend since its participation 
would help foster cooperation and understanding. Moreover, its pres­
tige would be of great assistance in itself and its experience in arbi­
tration, conciliation, and disarmament would help markedly. They 
believed that the mere stating of American opinions would contribute 
significantly. Besides, the committee would only be consultative and 
investigatory with no form of commitment. Their hopes were dashed when 
the State Department instructed Wilson as the chief American delegate
g
not to help organize the committee and not to accept membership on it.
The fourth session of the Preparatory Commission began under 
inauspicious circumstances. Some delegates and powers were suspicious 
of each other, and a large factor in their attitude was the presence of 
the Soviet Union for the first time. At the beginning, no one seemed 
especially concerned about the first item on the agenda which dealt with
"̂ Tuck to Kellogg, September 10, I927, $00.A15c/--; Tuck to 
Kellogg, October T, I927, 500.A15c/4.
8Tuck, speaking from a European vantage point, counseled the 
practicality of an American's presence even as an observer. Tuck to 
Kellogg, October 7, 1927, $00.A15c/4. Gibson, who headed the delegation 
to the third session of the Preparatory Commission, favored an American’s 
sitting with the Committee on Arbitration and Security only to give 
opinions when asked and to observe events. Gibson to Kellogg, October 
27, 1927, 500.AI5C/5. Kellogg to American Embassy, Brussels, November 8, 
1927, 500.A15c/5; Kellogg to Wilson, November I5, 1927, F.R., I, 210.
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the progress of the commission's work until Maxim Litvinov, the chief 
Soviet delegate, spoke up belatedly. He accused the capitalist nations, 
the League, and the Preparatory Commission of working slowly and insin­
cerely, and then he proposed the complete elimination of land, naval, and 
air forces.
Joseph Paul-Boncour of France, feeling a need to answer the accu­
sations, denied that the group deserved such scathing criticism. He 
wondered if the Russians appreciated the problems of bringing about arm­
ament reduction, and he assured them of the delegates ' sincerity of pur­
pose. Wilson intended to protest that the proposition was a definite 
deviation from the official program but to abstain if a roll-call vote 
was taken. He did not have to make any statement because the commission, 
despite Soviet insistence on immediate action, postponed deliberations
until the next session. The delegates seemed much relieved, as they
9really did not want to discuss it.
Then President J. J. Loudon, the delegate from the Netherlands, 
asked about American representation on the Committee on Arbitration and 
Security.Wilson answered that the United States was both physically 
and politically separated from strictly European difficulties and that 
Washington's record on arbitration, conciliation, and consultation was
^Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 57-63; Wilson to Kellogg, November
30, 1927, 500.AI5/602.
^^ilson to Kellogg, November 3O; 1927, 50O.AI5/603.
6k
evident in the Pour Power Treaty of 1922 and other pacts. For those 
reasons his government could not accept membership in the new committee ; 
it would evaluate the committee proposals to the Preparatory Commission 
according to traditional policies. After Litvinov declined active mem­
bership and promised to appoint a spectator, Loudon asked Wilson to in­
form Washington of the Soviet action and the commission's desire to have 
the United States name an observer. As he had promised, Wilson relayed
the message, but the American officials refused to change the instruc- 
11tions.
On December 3> the commission met to set a date for the fifth 
session. Litvinov and Count Johann H. A. von Bernstorff of Germany 
wanted a convocation as early as possible. All the other delegates 
chose March 1$, 1928, and the fourth session ended on that note.
Wilson felt that the attendance of the Soviets and the deter­
mined German push for an immediate second reading of the draft conven­
tion kept the commission meeting from being routine. Loudon treated 
Litvinov and Bernstorff with courtesy, and the other representatives 
cordially endured their near filibuster. Perhaps the German achieved 
some success, but the Russian did not impress the commission. Likely 
his recommendations were stated primarily to affect the radical news 
media of the world. Although Wilson was not sure that the maneuver was
^^ilson to Kellogg, November 30, 1927, 500.Al$/602; Wilson to 
Kellogg, November 30, 1927, 5OO.AI5/603; Kellogg to Wilson, November 
22, 1927, F.R., I, 211-212; Kellogg to American Mission, Geneva, 
December 1, 1927, 500.Alk/463a.
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correct, he was positive that the Soviet official had failed to provoke
a general discussion, if that was his secondary purpose. Anyway, Wilson
12intended to observe his actions in future gatherings.
In a despatch to the State Department on December lé, 1927, 
Wilson evaluated the overall Merican relationship to the Preparatory 
Commission. Such an inventory was necessary, he said, to formulate 
future policy because of the Soviet participation and the establishment 
of the Security Committee. Concerning the Soviet resolution, possibly 
the United States should consider whether it would definitely oppose the 
recommendation in the next session. If Washington wanted to have only a 
minor part, it might say that the form of the proposal would not permit 
American discussion or voting on it. That action would not isolate the 
United States because other European governments, really more involved, 
would oppose the Soviet approach. Yet, the meeting would offer a good 
chance to present views if the State Department so desired.
Wilson also included his comments about the nature of the March 
15th meeting. He doubted that the Preparatory Commission would hold a 
long session primarily because the Security Committee probably would not 
have definite proposals to make. In that case he expected the German 
and Russian delegations to work for prompt consideration of the draft 
convention. Other representatives certainly could not ignore the insis­
tence of the small powers in the League Assembly for a definite and 
speedy progress on disarmament. He expected the Preparatory Commission 
to resolve itself into frequent Security Committee meetings.
^^ilson to Kellogg, December 7, 1927, 500.AI5/629.
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Then he gare his opinions on the composition of future American
Idelegations. Most, if not all, technical questions had been analyzed 
thoroughly, and the American experts bad fully presented their comments 
on those topics. Thus, the Preparatory Commission would engage in the 
diplomatic work of negotiating and harmonizing political needs and 
views. Under those circumstances he counseled eliminating the large 
number of ranking advisers and designating an individual spokesman who 
could operate without hindrance. Accordingly, he thought a few knowl­
edgeable junior officers capable of making a more definite contribution 
whereas a big staff would be hard to handle and would draw attention to 
themselves which Wilson hoped to avoid.
He observed what the American attitude mi^t be if the discus­
sion became more than routine. Surely the United States had nothing to 
add constructively if it had no concessions or modifications to make. 
With little to offer in substance or procedure, it might be accused of 
obstructionism, as it had been in the third session. To avoid that 
charge again, he proposed active participation on important points.
Early in the next session the delegate might relate American thoughts 
on how the United States could be most helpful in reaching an agreement. 
Its army was small enou^ that any accepted plan would allow the country 
considerable room for development. Consequently, it could refrain from 
talks on that problem and hope the other large military powers could 
arrange a plan themselves. Accordingly, the governments most concerned 
might solve their own difficulty, and then the United States would de­
cide whether it could subscribe to the scheme. Wilson was prepared to
6t
elaborate if the State Department believed his policy approach worthy.
On naval limitation, he thought that Washington should thoroughly 
consider its attitude on limitation of navies since its position might 
possibly isolate the United States from the other conferees. He felt 
that the Japanese wanted to maintain the 5:5:3 ratio without further 
building, whereas the British appeared most concerned about additional 
construction. Consequently, the British interest in maintaining that 
posture rather than limitation by tonnage brought the British, French, 
and Japanese fairly close. Although Wilson genuinely believed in the 
soundness of the American thinking on naval construction, still he ad­
vised. the State Department to study the possibility of isolation and 
ways of continuing its stand without being charged with obstruction. 
Perhaps Washington might deliberate on whether it could bargain for 
mutual concessions.^3
By February l6, 1928, the provisional agenda for the Preparatory 
Commission was taking shape. It called for discussion of the work of 
the Committee on Arbitration and Security, the Soviet resolution, and the 
progress of the Preparatory Commission. On the last point, there would 
be debate on whether to conduct the second reading of the draft conven­
tion. In order to prepare for that meeting, Gibson and Wilson needed 
Washington's response to Wilson's recommendations of December l6. The 
two men were especially concerned about the attitude toward the Russian 
proposal and proceeding with the second reading. Unless directed other­
wise, they hoped to be silent about the text until necessary to comment.
^^Milson to Kellogg, December l6, 192T, 500.AI5/633.
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If pressed to act, they would go along with the majority, hut they pre­
ferred not to make a proposition.^^
The State Department definitely wanted no statement at the open­
ing of the session. The proposed naval program modification by the 
House Committee on Naval Affairs dictated that. Besides, a preliminary 
policy address seemed unnecessary since essentially the same personnel 
remained on the Commission. Also, any United States move might convey 
the impression of a need to defend or apologize for its disarmament 
stance. The Secretary anticipated no British criticism on naval matters 
without provocation, and, indeed, no nation would have such an opportu­
nity before the naval sections of the text. The impractical and drastic 
Soviet plan was unworthy of debate, so the delegation should support the 
convention’s provis ions.
If the other nations decided on a second reading, the American 
attitude on security was well stated in the diplomatic exchanges on the 
Briand proposition, the extension of arbitration agreements, and the 
statements of the representatives at the Havana Conference. Of course, 
if American attitudes were specifically criticized, then the delegation 
would vigorously defend them by referring to the statements at the 
Geneva Naval Conference and in the altered naval program. Accordingly, 
it should speak candidly in the event of adverse comment. In naval 
affairs, it appeared that the French mi^t modify the Boncour proposal 
on tonnage while still holding for the idea of total weight in principle.
l^Wilson to Kellogg, February l6, 1928, 500.A15/642; Tuck to 
Kellogg, February 25, 1928, 500.A15/6^5; Wilson to Kellogg, February 27,
1928, 5OO.AI5M 6.
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The Navy Department felt the plan acceptable in principle, and it might 
be a genuine step toward eventual accord. Otherwise, the instructions 
on land and air armaments remained the same from the third session.
On March 12, Gibson and Wilson talked about the meeting with 
Erik Andreas Colban, the Chief of the Disarmament Section of the Secre­
tariat. Colban predicted Preparatory Commission acceptance of the 
Security Committee report, but he saw divided opinion on the Russian 
resolution and two ways of disposing of it. One means was an immediate, 
complete consideration to show public opinion the impracticality of the 
measurej another was close subcommittee study in order to point out its 
shortcomings and to delay the second reading. Feeling was practically 
unanimous among participating delegations that it would be unwise to 
hold the second reading before the completion of a thorough attempt to 
harmonize views by direct contact among the governments. Colban fore­
saw a mild German demand for prompt discussion and a German willingness 
to accept a proposal for the Assembly's Third Committee on disarmament 
to analyze the status of the work in September. Probably that body 
would invite the United States, Russia, and Turkey to participate.^^
The American delegation remained essentially unaltered for the 
fifth session. Gibson again headed the group because of his previous 
experience and the anticipated importance of the meeting. He had 
strongly recommended full delegate status for Wilson since it would add
^^ellogg to Wilson and Gibson, February 28, 1928, 500.A15/646. 
l^Glbson to Kellogg, March 12, 1928, 5OO.AI5/661.
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to his prestige in other conferences and since other countries had two
representatives; the State Department gave no reason for assigning him
his usual advisory role. Rear Admiral Andrew T. Long replaced Admiral
Jones who was ill, and the rank and numbers of A m y  and Uavy personnel
were significantly decreased. Generally, the chairman was gratified
17over the quality of the personnel.
Between March 15 and 2k, 1928, the delegates took up three top­
ics. The Committee on Arbitration and Security submitted three model 
drafts concerning arbitration and conciliation and three regarding secu­
rity. Even after several days of discussion, the commission reached no 
conclusion about them. Four days after convening, the body began to 
discuss the Soviet resolution for immediate disarmament. Britain's 
critical remarks about the Soviet government and the proposal were 
accepted by most other representatives, including Gibson who commented 
about the unacceptability of the drastic recommendation. Of the nine­
teen delegations that spoke, only Germany and Turkey supported it, so 
the commission postponed a decision on that item. Also, it delayed the 
second reading because most governments had not fully explored all parts 
of the text. Subsequently, on March 2k, the meeting adjourned with the
^^Gibson to Kellogg, February J, 1928, ^OO.Al^PkS/lpki Olds to 
Gibson, February 6, 1928, 500.A15Pk3/l9^a; Olds to Wilson, February 6, 
1928, 500.A15Pii-3/l93b; Kellogg to Gibson, 500.A15P43/194; Kellogg to 
American Legation, Berne, February 23, 1928, 500"A15P^3/l99a; Gibson 
to Kellogg, February 28, 1928, 500.A15P̂ J-3/202; Jones became ill and was 
replaced by Long. Kellogg to American Legation, Beme, February 28, 
1928, 500.A15P43/20iva.
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1Adate of the next session to he set by the President.
Nine months later, Nils on and Drummond talked about the pros­
pects of the sixth session and their fears of a possible quarrel between 
Britain and the United States at that time. With the Russians in atten­
dance it was nearly impossible to avoid publicity and debate on naval 
aspects. Drummond reasoned that it would be strategically important to 
summon a short February gathering and attempt to omit naval problems 
from the program. Thus, the time for a meeting on all matters, includ­
ing naval questions, could be scheduled far enough ahead to permit the 
two big naval powers to work out an accord.
Wilson favored another approach. Loudon had proposed a post­
ponement of the session, and the minister urged the following of that 
plan. Surely nothing could happen in the Preparatory Commission that
19was more important than cordial Anglo-American relations.
Basically, the Drummond scheme was followed so it was necessary 
to decide on a date. At the League meeting in Lugano, Britain, France, 
and Germany favored a convocation between April 8 and April 15? 1929- 
They were indefinite about the date because delegates traveling from the 
United States might, want to observe Easter before their departure. Wil­
son assured Drummond that he would secure an informal State Department
^fehaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 67-78; Tate, Armaments, pp. $4-96; 
Williams, Disarmament, pp. 258-263; League of Nations Association, Review, 
p. l48.
^^Eellogg to Wilson, December 15, 1928, 500.A15/835a; Wilson to 
Kellogg, December 6, 1928, 500*A15/822; Wilson to Kellogg, September 28,
1928, 500.AI5/808.
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opinion on the most convenient date. The response indicated a readiness 
to despatch personnel at any time, and Loudon set the session for 
April 15.20
The Washington decision came quickly because of a i*umor. On 
December 8, a Hew York Times writer reported an American Minister in 
Europe as saying that the discussion of naval disarmament had to be de­
layed until President-elect Herbert C. Hoover and his advisers had time 
to study the problem. According to the journalist's account, the dip­
lomatic officer requested also that the Preparatory Commission meeting 
should be deferred a month or two to allow the chance for Anglo-American 
talks to bring results. Supposedly, he had rejected the idea of instruc­
ting Loudon to call a consultative gathering of the big naval powers 
because of that difficulty. Five days later, a similar article named 
Wilson as the official. To counteract those allegations, Coolidge 
denied any American desire for postponement and reiterated a readiness 
to cooperate with the commission.
Naturally, the State Department contacted Wilson about the situ­
ation. It knew that he had not made such comments and told him so. 
Actually, Washington genuinely wanted a delay in the date, but the
President's public position had to be firmly upheld since the govem-
21ment could not afford for its real attitude to be publicized.
Wilson to Kellogg, Decanber 28, 1928, 500*A15/839; Kellogg to 
American Legation, Beme, December I7, 1928, 500.A15/83̂ ,* Wilson to 
Kellogg, December I8, 1928, 500*A15/835s Wilson to Kellogg, December 17,
1928, 500.A15/83ii-.
2%ellogg to Wilson, December 15, 1928, 500.A15/835a; Castle to 
Wilson, December 17, 1928, Wilson Papers.
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The agenda was a source of concern for weeks before the meeting. 
In a private and informal conversation with Wilson, Colban, who had 
traveled to the major European capitals to secure views on various top­
ics, indicated major items which he expected to comprise the program.
He anticipated taking up the remaining work of the Security Committee 
which could be handled in one day by the Preparatory Commission. Also, 
the Russian recommendation on progressive reduction of armaments would 
receive attention. Colban predicted that the commission President would 
urge the treatment of individual parts of the Soviet proposition as 
amendments to the relevant articles of the draft convention. Wilson 
imagined that the Russians would eagerly accept that procedure because 
the whole plan would be killed otherwise. He predicted that the Colban 
plan would provide the best propaganda situation which the Soviet Union 
had yet found. In addition. Count Bernstorff's proposal for publica­
tion of arms production statistics which he presented in the fifth 
session would occupy the attention of the delegates. Furthermore, they 
would discuss the second reading of the draft convention which included 
questions about poison gas, budget limitations, war material in reserve, 
land effectives, and naval problems.
From the standpoint of American naval policy, Wilson saw a very 
practical value in the agenda order. The League Secretariat had already 
estimated that it would take about three weeks to progress through the 
items to war materials in reserve. By then the representatives would be 
prepared for adjournment in the face of the major matters ahead of them. 
He ventured that the Preparatory Commission mi^t designate another time
7^
for resumption of talks and adjourn.
Colban also brou^t up the question of whether naval advisers 
would be included in the American delegation. Although the minister was 
without instructions, he assumed that the contents of the program would 
make their presence necessary. That news was gratifying to the League 
official who hoped the naval personnel would find a solution to the 
naval deadlock in informal discussions. Here Wilson expressed his per­
sonal skepticism that technical personnel alone could solve such a polit­
ical subject. In his opinion only hi^ political officials could effec-
22tively sponsor an agreement and make the necessary concessions.
On February 26, 1929  ̂the two men talked about Colban's second 
trip to the European cities. The League official found no opposition 
to his proposals but encountered a markedly noncommital attitude except 
in Germany. So he really had little to add about political postures, 
and his agenda ideas remained the same. Since the plan was solely tenta­
tive, he especially desired an American statement of preference on pro­
cedure which he could use discreetly in conversations with other repre­
sentatives. Wilson presumed that a statement might be adopted because
23most other delegates were displaying a negative attitude.
The State Department was less responsive than Colban had wished. 
It felt the general design to be sound and logical and permitted Wilson
^%ilson to Kellogg, January 23, 1929, 500*A15/852j Wilson to 
Kellogg, February 9, 1929, F.R., I, 65-67.
^%ilson to Kellogg, February 27, 1929, F.R., I, 68-69.
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to inform him so. It refrained from any recommendation ahout proce­
dure.^^
The United States sent a small delegation to the first sitting 
of the sixth session. Gibson was the chairman, and Wilson, Admiral 
Jones, and Major John W. Greely were the diplomatic, naval, and mili­
tary advisers, respectively. Moffat and Commander Harold 0. Train
25acted as the technical assistants.
On April 15, 1$29, the convocation convened. Loudon-informed 
the assembly that no second reading of the draft convention would occur 
because too many questions remained unresolved, so he suggested a dis­
cussion of the Soviet draft on armaments reduction. If that was dis­
approved, then the delegates might consider some individual points of 
the 1927 draft text. Only three delegations favored the Russian plan, 
and the others decided to follow the 1927 proposal.
On April 22, during the discussion of armament limitations, 
Gibson stated the general American policy on disarmament in the hope 
of moving the powers toward an agreement. Only the large powers could 
inaugurate moves toward abridgment, and the United States advised 
reduction rather than merely restriction. Further, he indicated a 
readiness to concede enough on land armaments to bring about an accord. 
On the primary problem of interest to his government, he still
^^ellogg to Wilson, March 1, 1929, F.R., I, 69-
^^Kellogg to American Legation, Beme, March 27, 1929, 500•A15 
P43/229e; Kellogg to Gibson, March 23, 1929, F.R., I, 70.
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maintained that limitation of tonnage by categories constituted the most 
practical route to control, but he would agree to the French naval pro­
posal of April, 192T, as a basis for discussion. Also, the United 
States would study any other procedure that would bring about tonnage 
reduction. He concluded that an effective avenue toward disarmament 
would have to come not only from methods of limitation but also from an 
altered attitude concerning the role of force in international quarrels. 
Although several delegates complimented the ambassador on the concilia­
tory tones of his remarks, the commission made no progress on the dis­
armament issue.
The group did reach agreement on some less controversial points. 
Within a short time, the delegates prohibited the use of lethal gases 
and bacteriological agents. After protracted discussion, they excluded 
from their text the problem of limitation of trained reserves. Both 
the United States and Britain favored such a restriction, but they 
dropped their insistence in order to promote harmony. The participants 
were unable to choose between an indirect control by budgetary means 
and a direct method of limiting the materials of war in stock and in 
service. Gibson spoke against the indirect methods for constitutional 
reasons and substituted full disclosure of expenditures for armament. 
With agreement apparently impossible otherwise, they accepted the 
alternative.
Adjournment occurred shortly after reaching the question of 
naval armaments. The representatives of the five large sea powers 
moved that the commission delay study of the matter until the interested
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governments had time to analyze fully Gihson's recommendations of April 
22. The Preparatory Commission deferred the problem until another 
time.̂ ^
During the sixth session, Wilson divided his time between the 
Preparatory Commission and the Counterfeiting Conference, an arrangement 
which kept him especially busy. One evening during a hectic week, he 
arranged to play bridge with Dolbeare, but at 8:10 Wilson was still in­
volved in currency matters. At that time he learned that Gibson, who 
had gone to bed ill, wanted him to represent the American delegation at 
a Preparatory Commission meeting. Wilson hurried over only to find that 
group adjourning from 8:30 to 10:00 that ni^t. His bitterness and 
frustration showed in his remark that the simultaneous assignment to 
two conferences should be ended. "In fact, one of the first rules of 
limitation and reduction should be limitation and reduction of the num­
ber of conferences." Once both convocations ended, he welcomed the 
chance to sleep more and to enjoy the relatively calm routine in 
Beme.
In spite of those feelings, he was happy about the results of 
the Preparatory Commission. He classified it as one of the most inter­
esting and fascinating that he had attended, particularly because of
Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 79-80, 83-85. In September, 
Wilson reported that no resumption of the session was likely in the near 
future. Wilson to Stimson, September 2k, 1929, P.R., I, 110.
^"^Wilson to Dolbeare, April I8, J-929, Wilson Papers.
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the progress. "All hands and the cook, with the exception of the, 
Russians and the Germans" and possibly some small northern countries, 
appeared gratified over the accomplishment. Actually, some Europeans 
might have been scared at the likelihood of a disarmament conference.
In addition, the United States had given a good account of itself 
largely because of Gibson whom Wilson credited with adding spirit and
optimism to what initially appeared to be a rather deadlocked gather-
. 28 mg.
The Preparatory Commission, therefore, was beginning to achieve 
some of the movement that League members and the United States expected. 
The London Naval Conference and the Preparatory Commission's second 
sitting of the sixth session were to remove other obstacles in the way 
of a general disarmament conference. Before considering those develop­
ments, it is necessary to understand the League's efforts in 1928 and 
1929 to control the private manufacture of arms and Wilson's role in 
I that attempt.
28Wilson to Dolbeare, May 9; 1929, Wilson Papers; Wilson to 
Marriner, May 9, 1929, 500--A16/122.
CHAPTER IV.
AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE PRIVATE 
MANUFACTURE OF ARMS
In an era of disarmament meetings, the League deliberated on the 
related topic of private manufacture of arms, ammunition, and implements 
of war. The organization brought up the subject under Article 8 of the 
Covenant which called for Council action on the problem. In 1921, the 
League's Temporary Mixed Commission rejected absolute prohibition as a 
means of regulation. Reasoning that civilian production would be a 
less dangerous factor if the arms and munitions trade was adequately 
supervised, it recommended a world-wide arrangement which relied heavily 
on a system of licensing. Since an international agreement was essen­
tial to make control effective, the League next concentrated on an arms 
traffic accord. A large number of the League members contended that 
such a convention woUld not be completely effective without including 
non-government production. The United States disagreed with the idea 
and the proposals to implement it because private companies did most 
American arms manufacturing. Besides, the Washington government could 
not constitutionally regulate private production since it was not inter­
state commerce. Yet, in June, 1925, several nations signed an Arms 
Traffic Convention in Geneva, though they did not ratify it for several 
years.
Then the League created a Special Commission to establish a 
method of management. Although Washington considered the draft
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convention an inadequate ’basis for discussion for the above reasons, 
still the State Department participated to prevent speculation that the 
United States was unwilling to cooperate. During the committee’s first 
session in March, 1927, the nations accomplished little, and they reached 
no agreement on the publishing of government and private output.̂
Since the second session was set for August 27, 1928, the State 
Department planned its approach. It needed to know the feelings of 
delegations in Geneva in order to determine an appropriate course. In 
response to a State Department request, Wilson reported the general 
opinion that the second session would be both short and simple. It prob­
ably would consider only the alteration in the Italian and Japanese views 
on aims production. Then the commission would establish a small sub­
committee of rapporteurs to develop a proposal which would be sent to 
the participants. After each nation had expressed its comments and 
criticism, the draft would become the basic document for a conference in
1929. If the commission worked in that manner, a tentative American
2text could be given to the rapporteurs.
During the time that the State Department was assessing those 
opinions, it designated Wilson to represent the United States with
^rew to Gibson, February 28, 1927, 500.Al6/21a; Gibson to 
Kellogg, April 21, 1927, 500.Al6/2l̂ .
%arriner to Wilson, July Ih, 1928, $00.Al6/34d. On May I9, 
1928, Italy and Japan both indicated their agreement in principle to 
publication of information about government production of arms. Kellogg 
to Wilson, August 9, 1928, F.R., I, 293,* Wilson to Kellogg, July 26,
1928, 500.AI6/37.
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Elbridge D. Rand, the Consul at Geneva, to be the technical assistant.
In addition, two military and naval officers in the Paris Embassy were 
ordered to be ready in case the Minister required their assistance. 
Wilson was delisted with the assignment and the flexibility of the 
personnel arrangement.̂
On August 9, 1928, the State Department speculated about pros­
pective action at the second session. Most governments seemed ready to 
discuss the application of publicity to public and private manufacture 
while they also appeared to want the convention limited to information 
about production. So the commission would probably fulfill its purpose 
of formulating a text for a general agreement. Under those circumstances 
the United States could approve unless the final document called for an 
unequal amount of publicity for government and private manufacture and 
a system of supervision, control, and inspection.
Washington also sent Wilson a draft which was satisfactory as 
a foundation for accord. The text designated the arms, ammunition, and 
implements of war intended for either military and civilian purposes or 
land, sea, and aerial combat specifically. Further, it allowed each 
contracting party to issue publicity in accordance with its own domestic 
statutes. The State, War, and Navy Departments intentionally made the
^Kellogg to American Legation, Beme, July 25, 1928, 123*W693/ 
I8I; Castle to Wilson, August 3> 1928, 500.AI6/36; Wilson to Kellogg, 
July 26, 1928, 500.A16/37- Basically, the instructions were the same 
as those of the American delegate at the first session. Grew to Gibson, 
February 28, 1927, 50G.Al6/21a,* Castle to Wilson, August 3, 1928, 
500.AI6/36.
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provisions like those of the Arms Traffic Convention in order to pre­
clude the introduction of new points and to streamline the execution of 
the two agreements. Wilson was not to present the material at the be­
ginning of the convocation unless he thought the circumstances favor­
able. Preferably, he was to observe the tenor of the debate to see if 
the American text would be accepted as a whole. If not, he could intro­
duce individual articles in the hope of gaining approval of as many as 
possible. Thus the Minister could use his own judgment about the best 
time and method of presenting the recommendations. He was not to par­
ticipate in any report to the League but to despatch the results to 
Washington.^
Events moved rapidly in the three-da^- meeting. The limited 
amount of time prevented Wilson's closely consulting the State Depart­
ment about strategy. So, at every opportunity, he attempted to advance 
the policies contained in his instructions and to introduce exceptions 
where necessary.
Though Wilson fully meant to recommend acceptance of the Ameri­
can draft, that intention soon went by the boards. Despite the optimism 
which pervaded the commission upon its convening, the delegates were as 
far apart as before on the amount of publicity for public manufacture. 
Consequently, with little hope of more than a rehash of previous argu­
ments, Wilson withheld the proposal. Because of the lack of unanimity, 
the commission chose to draw up a text and attach individual réservations
^Castle to Wilson, August 23, 1928, F.R., I, 301-302,* Kellogg to
Wilson, August 9, 1928, F.R., I, 292-29k.
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as the states wanted to add them. By the end of the second day, he fore­
saw the likelihood of adjournment shortly after the composition of "an 
inconclusive and contradictory report."^
Wilson found Article 5 of the American text unclear ahout avia­
tion. The provision seemed to include civil aircraft among those pro­
duced under military specifications; if that was the intention, then 
the wording was contrary to the Arms Traffic Convention. The difficulty 
necessitated a clarification from Washington and the summoning of the 
military adviser to Geneva. Washington firmly opposed requiring publi­
cation of information on all privately manufactured American airplanes 
and engines since to admit such a condition was a move toward limitation 
of materials as potentials of war. Consequently, the State Department 
directed him to work for the inclusion of only aircraft and engines made 
according to military stipulations. If that was unacceptable, Wilson 
might designate only aircraft and engines prepared for armed forces of 
the particular countries. Subsequently, he and the military adviser 
decided on a reservation against admission of all aircraft and airplane 
motors as instruments of war.^
The delegates extensively discussed a licensing system and pub­
licity. On the first topic, Wilson inserted a remark about the American
^Wilson to Kellogg, September 10, 1928, F.R., I, 311; Wilson 
to Kellogg, August 28, 1928, 5OO.AI6/55.
Wilson to Kellogg, August 27, 1928, F.R., I, 301; Castle to 
Wilson, August 28, 1928, F.R., I, 301-302; Statement by Wilson in the 
Fourth Meeting, August 29; 1928, F.R., I, 303; Wilson to Kellogg, 
August 29, 1928, 5OO.AI6/56.
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constitutional inability to regu].ate civilian producers although he par­
ticipated little otherwise. The second subject evoked even more debate. 
Italy, Japan, and Britain worked for publication according to the value 
of the item only, and the other delegations contended for publication 
according to and including number and wei^t. Wilson stressed the need 
for complete disclosure and equal handling of state and private con­
struction. The representatives were unable to reconcile their views,
7but the Minister thought that the American position was well covered.
Wilson also submitted an amendment to Article 6 on naval con­
struction. The commission's article provided for publication of in­
formation about proposed or actual construction of naval vessels. His 
modification called for disclosing the number and calibre of guns and 
torpedoes and the number of bomb throwers and machine guns at the time 
of delivery. No one objected to the principle, but Japan was unwilling 
to include battleship data in the provision. The British had no in­
structions on the point, so they did not give their consent. In gen­
eral, the delegations wanted the article to conform to a similar state­
ment in the Arms Traffic Convention.
Ratification and deposit of ratification were briefly considered. 
The French did not want their government designated the place to send 
approval and notification. Instead, they wished the League Secretariat 
to receive the documents. The American did not object to the point since 
the French declined to serve and since the State Department had earlier 
authorized him to sign a convention which was left with the Secretariat
"̂ Wilson to Kellogg, August 27, 1928, 500.Al6/$4.
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General. Concerning the number of approvals for the agreement to come 
into effect, the delegate from Salvador suggested fourteen* Wilson 
opposed the proposition as untimely because so little had been decided 
and because the conference of plenipotentiaries would also consider it.8 
The session had mixed results. The report to the Council ad­
mitted the failure to resolve fundamental differences and thus the inabil­
ity of despatching a single draft to it.^ Yet, Wilson considered the 
willingness of some governments to accept a measure of publicity about 
state manufacture an accomplishment. Previously, those countries had 
rejected any such disclosure.^®
The scheduling of the next session for December 5; spurred Wash­
ington into investigating the general circumstances. The Department 
asked Wilson if the deadlock persisted and if any better chance for 
agreement existed.
Wilson to Kellogg, September 10, 1928, F.R., I, 313; The State 
Department ordered Wilson not to encourage efforts to make the League 
the depository if another place could be designated. Also, Washington 
wanted the decision delayed until a convention assumed a more definite 
form. Kellogg to Wilson, November 22, 1928, F.R., I, 320-321.
%ilson to Kellogg, August 30, 1928, 500.AI6/58.
^®The commission chairman was unable to predict a date for an 
international convocation, so the report was sent to the Council which 
could decide the matter. Wilson to Kellogg, September 10, 1928, F.R.,
I, 313-314.
^^Wilson to Kellogg, October 2, I928, F.R., I, 314; Wilson to 
Kellogg, October 2, 1928, 500.AI6/76; Kellogg to Wilson, October 4, 
1928, F.R., I, 314.
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other than some sli^t optimism among the members of the League’s 
Third Committee on disarmament, Wilson replied that he saw no change 
since August. He doubted that the commission would accomplish anything 
worthwhile. Indeed, he believed that disarmament advocates had called 
the meeting in order to mollify public opinion and to uphold the League's 
stature.
In a despatch of October 12, he related his ideas of what the 
State Department mi^t do. It could courteously inform the Secretary 
General that the United States would not send a delegation since its 
position had already been stated clearly and definitely. Wilson be­
lieved that the presence of American officials might impede progress 
toward a construction program which Washington earnestly wanted formu­
lated. When the other countries reached an agreement, the United States 
would carefully compare it with its own position. Wilson was aware that 
his government mi^t be held accountable for the commission's failure,
but he thought the point of less consequence in a technical session
12than a political one.
The State Department chose not to follow his plan. Like the 
Minister, it frankly thou^t that the chances of a tangible accomplish­
ment were nil; nonetheless, it needed a delegation there and cited 
several reasons for attending. The first and chief one was the fear 
that the government might receive the blame for failure because, in all 
likelihood, the news media and the public would not distinguish between
^^ilson to Kellogg, October 12, 1928, F.R., I, 315■
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a political and a technical meeting. The second was the possibility of 
comparing American action with the Russian refusal to attend. The press 
had given little attention to the commission, but withdrawal might pub­
licize the futility of the proceedings which would strengthen the Soviet 
thesis about the project. The third was the possible accusation of try­
ing to undermine the body if Washington objected to a draft. Upon re­
ceiving those arguments, Wilson concurred that the Department's general 
considerations were more basic than the benefits which might be felt 
only in Geneva.
Generally, the American arrangements for the December session 
were the same as for the one held in August. Officials in Washington 
thought of sending Rand as the only delegate, but Gibson persuaded them 
to despatch Wilson because of the other representatives' rank. The fun­
damental position remained the same, but the instructions were a little 
more flexible on some points. Concerning reservations, the United States 
was willing to accommodate other views if the approach would lead to a 
broad understanding. Also, Wilson could work for the adoption of his
recommendation on naval information though he did not have to insist on
ihit, if the other governments continued their opposition.
^Clark to Gibson, October l6, 1928, 5OO.AI6/72; Wilson to 
Kellogg, October 20, I928, 500.Al6/7k; Gibson agreed with Wilson's 
comments concerning the effect in Geneva which was the only phase he 
considered himself qualified to comment on. He did suggest a small 
delegation unless the prospects for agreement improved. Gibson to 
Kellogg, October 18, 1928, 500.AI6/73.
^^Clark to American Embassy, Brussels, October I8, 1928, 5OO.AI6/
73j Gibson to Kellogg, October 22, 1928, 500.A16/75; Kellogg to Wilson,
November 22, I928, F.R., I, 318-320.
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A subcommittee did most of the work in the third session which 
lasted from December 5 through December 7* During the first meeting 
Count Bemstorff, the chairman, proposed a general debate, but the par­
ticipants were reluctant to hold one. So he called for the convening 
of the small group which had operated in the second session. Thus, 
representatives of Germany, Salvador, Italy, Belgium, Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, Japan, Spain, and the United States took up the prob­
lems.
The discussion of Article 1, concerning the five categories of 
arms, ammunition, and implements of war, set the tone for the meeting. 
The personnel first considered Remark No. 1 by the Belgian delegation 
which proposed more study of the classifications. Immediately, Wilson 
perceived that no agreement would result from this session and that each 
article of the draft might be discussed again. Despite the opposition 
of others, the Belgian declared the inability of his government to sign 
a document without a complete analysis of those divisions. Then the 
French delegate stated that he would have to know the exact contents of 
Article 1 before he could formulate his response to Article 5* Quickly 
the participants realized that they lacked instructions or advisers for 
further consideration of the point, and they saw the necessity for 
experts to confer on the problem about March 1, 1929« Wilson saw no 
need for inserting the American view if the Belgian reservation was 
not fully considered.
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Next the committee took up the American remark on aircraft and 
aircraft e n g i n e s T h e  European military powers and Japan, generally 
aligned as they had in the Preparatory Commission on potentials of war, 
immediately voiced strong objection to retaining the amendment. Simi­
larly, Wilson's readiness to restrict the category to machines for armed 
forces use found little favor. Indeed, his two proposals were lightly 
dismissed because of the alleged impossibility of differentiating between 
civil and military aircraft. Of the major powers only Britain agreed 
with the American approach, so, with no hope of consensus then, Wilson 
stated his willingness to maintain the reservation but move on to other
■ 4-points.
The most heated comment occurred on Article 5 which dealt with 
annually reporting the value of total production by private industry.
The same arguments had been stated so many times before that the Minister 
did not bother to summarize the discussion for Washington. The Dutch 
delegate and Wilson tried persistently and unsuccessfully to obtain an 
explanation why France, Japan, and Italy declined to publish information
The German delegate withdrew his Remark No. 2 which allowed 
the subcommittee to proceed to Remark No. 3 of the United States.
Wilson to Kellogg, December 13, 1928, 500.A16/97-
^^Someone in the Western European Division attached a "Confiden­
tial Informal Comment" to the effect that Wilson should have discussed 
commission disposition of aviation in more detail in his report because 
of the great importance the State Department gave to the point. In 
reply, Wilson reiterated that the delegates did not take up the intrin­
sic worth of the proposal, but settled for the inability to define 
civil aircraft. So they proceeded no further. He was sorry that the 
manner of the debate did not allow him to relate the basic arguments of 
those opponents of the American amendment. Wilson to Kellogg, March 7,
1929, 50O.AI6/II7.
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fully. In a vote on the equal handling of public and private production, 
only Italy voted against the principle, and the French representative 
abstained until he had the text of the article. Wilson thou^t that the 
nations would concur in the principle only if the stipulation was "very 
limited publicity," a basis on which the Japanese rested their case. 
Finally, the delegates adopted an altered wording which constituted 
merely a minimum of agreement, but even the proponents of full disclos­
ure, including the United States, and the adherents of a distinction 
between public and private manufacture offered amendments.
Wilson noted some movement on Article 6 about naval construc­
tion. The British agent agreed to the American remark, but the Japanese 
initially did not. The Minister desired to conciliate the Japanese if 
necessary and requested him to ask if his government could change his 
orders. At the last meeting the Japanese delegate removed the objection 
and allowed the inclusion of the opinion. In a related development, a 
commission subcommittee of naval experts from Italy, France, and England 
redrafted the provision analogous to the Washington Treaty of 1922. The 
American acceded but reserved the right to confer with his naval authori­
ties on the question.^^
On December 7, Wilson expressed his views on full publicity for 
the record. He found the move necessary when he realized that the sub­
committee's report would not be sent to the commission. He noted the 
progress toward agreement, especially in the subcommittee, and he spoke 
of what the nations could do until the Special Committee met again.
"̂̂ Wilson to Kellogg, December 13, 1928, $00.Al6/97'
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The marked divergence of views on complete publicity for public and 
private construction, a vital point to his government and the effective­
ness of the convention, caused him to doubt the benefit of accepting the 
minimum of agreement. Promoting the United States' belief that complete 
disclosure would foster peace and eliminate distrust, he called for 
opposing delegations to explain why they objected to adequate publica­
tion. In conclusion, he urged them to examine the text in the light of 
the large number of delegates wanting publicity for removing false hopes
and moving toward peace. Advocates of more information were highly
10gratified by the address.
Six days later, Wilson transmitted his thoughts about future 
meetings to Washington. Since the other countries laiew well the Ameri­
can opinions about the major items, especially publicity, perhaps the 
United States should now concentrate on the minor issues, such as the 
Belgian amendment to Article 1. If. Americans attended the experts' 
meeting, they could participate in single provisions without accepting 
the responsibility of designating any alteration as inadmissible. If 
the other states rejected the Belgian modifications, then the American 
personnel could join them. Wilson's purpose was to prevent the com­
mission's having to choose between American and Belgian participation.
1 ODeclaration by Wilson in the Second Meeting of the Third 
Session of the Special Commission, December 7, 1928, F.R., I, 321-323* 
Since many delegates had to go to Lugano for a League meeting, the 
commission members had too little time to consider the subcommittee's 
report, and it informed the Council so. Wilson to Kellogg, December J,
1928, 500.AI6M.
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a non-menibër and a member state, respectively, for either way the Ameri­
can stance would be disliked.
Furthermore, he included a tactic for disposition of civil avia­
tion. He was dissatisfied with the French statement that no distinction 
could be established between aircraft constructed for military uses and 
that for other application. He recalled the commission's voting down the 
Dutch proposal for the experts to decide the difference. In order to 
expedite the discussion of the problem, he worded a draft which stated 
the incongruity of placing civil aviation in the convention and listing 
private and military aircraft in the same category. He ventured the 
opinion that the commission's views would be unchanged by the time of 
the fourth session; therefore, he advised the presentation of a state­
ment which would place the United States with the majority. If the 
government could do that, then it could devote its efforts to pub­
licity.^^
The State Department's opinions were stated in the orders to 
the experts. They were not to support the Belgian reservation, espe­
cially on small arms munitions, unless a good chance of its being 
adopted existed. The United States primarily opposed the proposition 
for fear that it would be a tool for a new discussion of categories and 
the submission of other objectionable alterations. The representative 
could withdraw his objection if the other delegates accepted the reser­
vation and if he understood that all classification changes were com­
pleted. On aviation, the delegation was to secure as much support as
^%ilson to Kellogg, December 13, 1928, 500.A16/97j Wilson to 
Kellogg, December 13, 1928, 5OO.AI6/98.
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possible for inclusion only of aircraft and airplane engines manufac­
tured under military specifications. The officials vere to make others 
understand that they had only expert capacity and that the government 
would send its decision through its commission delegate.
Next, the State Department designated the representatives. By 
mid-February, 1929, the other countries planned to have only technical 
men, so Wilson advised the sending of an army officer with staff exper­
ience and a naval officer in case naval matters arose in association 
with the categories discussion. Subsequently, Washington named a navy 
captain to be chairman, two army majors to comprise the technical 
authorities, and the Consul at Geneva to advise the group. Before the
meeting of March 11, Wilson conferred with the personnel and discussed
21their instructions with them.
Several weeks afterwards, the idea of a session of the Special 
Commission cropped up. Bemstorff related orally his intention of call­
ing one for August 26, mainly to discuss acceptance or rejection of the
experts' report. He expected no general debate, but participants that
22wanted to make statements would have the opportunity.
^^Eellogg to American Legation, Berne, February 27, 1929, 
50O.AI6/IO9.
^Vilson to Kellogg, February 12, 1929, 5OO.AI6/IOI+; Kellogg to 
American Legation, Beme, February 27, 1929, 500.Al6/l09b.
^^Wilson referred to the group as the Committee for Manufacture 
of Arms, but he evidently meant the Special Commission. Wilson to 
Marriner, May 9, 1929, 500.Al6/l22.
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From that conversation, Wilson projected three courses which the 
government might pursue. One, it mi^t continue to insist on full pub­
licity and equal treatment. Two, it might state the American position 
on the first day. Here it could indicate that it certainly was no ob­
stacle to the conclusion of a treaty to control private arms construe-. 
tion. It would not, however, ink a treaty with less than complete dis­
closure and equal treatment. American failure to sign might make little 
difference to the other nations since the country already released in­
formation fully and since it could not constitutionally control pro­
duction. Consequently, those governments might formulate a treaty on 
their own because the United States would be silent unless its opinion 
was sou^t. Third, he counseled the following of the recommendation 
which he suggested on October 12, 1928, except to deliver the message 
to the Secretary General by letter. With the alteration of the general 
situation by the Preparatory Commission, he advised that the plan be 
considered.
Again, the State Department rejected his idea, and in the fourth 
session of August 26-29, 1929, Wilson based his conduct on two criteria. 
First, he doubted that the meeting would produce anything tangible since 
the December differences on publicity persisted and since the April 
Preparatory Commission convocation increased the importance of defining 
publicity. Therefore, the Special Commission members would delay their 
consideration for the Preparatory Commission. Second, he kept in his
^^Wilson to Marriner, May 9, 1929, 500.Al6/l22. Gibson concurred
on the third point. Wilson to Marriner, May 21, 1929, 500.AI6/123.
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memory the Department's order that he might make a statement of with­
drawal from the gathering, if necessary. Oircnmstances placed the 
United States in the majority rather than the minority, so it was un-
gl).necessary to deliver the address.
The discussion of categories opened the debate. The first item 
was the report on the Belgian reservation to Article 1. The Commission 
accepted the changes and also adopted other minor alterations of the 
provision. The only point of interest to the United States consisted of 
the German proposal to transfer the provision on aviation manufactured 
for the armed forces of various countries to another category. Wilson 
stated his readiness to vote for the amendment and remove the American 
remark if the German amendment was accepted. Only the Netherlands, 
Germany, and the United States supported the unsuccessful move. Basi­
cally, the commission handled the reservation as it had a similar one 
by Wilson in the third session.
Then the commission took up Article 5 on publicity. The chair­
man was interested in whether any modification had arisen which might 
open the way to an accord. The French delegate declared the close con­
nection between publicity and the Preparatory Commission resolution of 
May k, on publication about material in stock. Plainly, he was unable 
to decide prior to a more definite Preparatory Commission stand. There­
after, proponents of separation and supporters of association of the 
two recommendations engaged in a lively exchange. The Japanese delegate
^^Stimson to Wilson, July 25, 1929, 500.Al6/l21.
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importuned so strongly on the need to re-discuss the fundamentals of the
problem that the majority finally gave in. The body talked an entire
day without any change which merely confirmed the initial reluctance to
conduct a futile debate.
Finally, the Special Committee looked at reports. It approved
the subcommittee statement of December as amended in the fourth session
and adopted a report on the status of the commission's work. Although
Wilson abstained from voting on the account to the Council, he really
thought that it could have been markedly "more decisive. " It mentioned
nothing about a future session, but it would have been more candid to
25admit the uselessness of an assembly in the immediate future.
^%ilson to Stimson, September 4, 1929, 500.Al6/l27*
CHAPTER V.
FURTHER PRELIMinAEIES TO A GENERAL 
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
In 1929  ̂events opened the way for a conference on the limita­
tion of naval aimaments. Both President Herbert C. Hoover and Secretary 
of State Henry L* - Stimson were committed to the idea of controls similar 
to those of the Washington Conference. Obviously^ the United States and 
Britain would have to reach some understanding on sea power in order to 
increase the chances for a successful assembly. In April, Gibson sug­
gested the reduction of naval crafts at the Preparatory Commission, and 
the following month Hoover declared for action to implement the ideal­
ism of the Pact of Paris. Duly impressed with the President's message. 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin of Britain explored avenues of contact 
until he was replaced in June by Ramsay MacDonald who had even more 
interest in arms restrictions. After some maneuvering, MacDonald and 
Hoover met in October at the Rapidan Conference where the two men basi­
cally agreed that their governments would cooperate toward achieving 
limitation. Concurrent with the Prime Minister's visit, London formally 
invited the major naval countries to a conference in England the next 
year, and all responded positively.^
In January, 1930, the United States sent a large delegation to 
the meeting. Stimson himself headed the group which included such
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression; 
Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 ("Yale Historical Publications, 
No. 17/' New Haven: Yale University i^ess, 1957), PP- 68-69, 73-7^, 86;
hereafter cited as Ferrell, American Diplomacy.
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diplomatie personnel as Charles G. Dawes, Dwi^t W. Morrow, and Hugh S. 
Gihson, the Ambassadors to Britain, Mexico, and Belgium, respectively. 
Charles Francis Adams, the Secretary of the Wavy, was the ranking 
official from his department, and Senators Joseph T. Robinson of Arkan-I
sas and David A. Reed of Pennsylvania represented Congress. A total of
nine advisers from the State, Wavy, and War Departments assisted the
delegates. In general, the personnel were as distinguished a group as
the United States had despatched to an international assembly in more 
2than a century.
Wilson was ordered to help at London. In early December, 1929, 
he was designated as an adviser, and shortly Stimson assigned him to 
handle contact with journalists. Press representatives had come from 
the State Department, but they had little working knowledge of techni­
cal aspects of naval matters. Wilson qualified to fill the position 
because of his acquaintance with some newsmen. Upon their request, 
Wilson received the job, so his work was primarily with the press.^
Evidently, he had more trouble with the American delegates than 
the reporters. The personnel who usually granted personal interviews in 
the United States continued the practice in London which made it
^Ibid., pp. 87-88. The advisers included Wilson, Admiral William 
V. Pratt, Rear Admiral Jones, Arthur Wilson Page, J. Theodore Marriner, 
the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Ray Atherton, the 
Counselor of Embassy in France, George Rublee, Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
Burnett. F.R., 1930, I, 1.
^Stimson to American Embassy, London, December 3, 1929, 50O.AI5A 
3P^3/76; Stimson to Wilson, December 17, 1929, 500.A15A3Pk3/lkl; Wilson, 
Diplomat, pp. 2kl-2h2.
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difficult to achieve a common front, an essential in negotiations. Con­
sequently, the newspapers contained divergent reports of American, views 
and opinions. On one occasion, Stimson told Wilson explicitly that no 
advanced information was to appear about a conversation which the Secre­
tary and Aristide Briand of France had held. Accordingly, Wilson cir­
cumspectly answered various inquiries about the contact, but, to his 
amazement, a New York newspaper published a detailed story the following 
day. On learning from a journalist that Senator Robinson had given him 
the account, Wilson met the solon to explain the need for presenting the 
official position with one voice. Besides, such indiscretions gave rise 
to jealousy among the newsmen and embarrassed Wilson in his relations 
with them. The Senator apologized and promised not to speak freely in 
the future.^
Gradually, the conference took up its work. On January 21, 1931, 
the opening day, it accomplished little except for the selection of 
MacDonald as the permanent chairman and the delivery of perfunctory 
speeches by some chief delegates. In early February, the delegates pre­
sented tentative recommendations for control, and the assembly estab­
lished committees and subcommittees to study technical problems. Those 
experts became so enmeshed in their technical controversy that they gave 
little attention to political problems, usually showing a greater
\filson. Diplomat, pp. 242-2^3. As usual, Wilson was quite 
busy. During a recess occasioned by the absence of the French repre­
sentatives from London, Wilson welcomed the break, "for I certainly 
need it." Wilson to Grew, February 19, 1930, Wilson Papers.
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interest in details than actual limitation and reduction,.
Finally, at the beginning of February, Stimson and other chiefs, 
weary over the lack of technical achievement, turned to informal dis­
cussions outside the plenary sessions.^ Soon Briand injected the idea 
of a security convention, and thereafter the problem of French national 
welfare underlay the entire effort to obtain an agreement. By the end 
of March, the Secretary had given up hope for a security pact, a solu­
tion to German-French rivalry, and a five-nation sea power treaty. In­
stead, he was willing to accept an accord involving only Britain, Japan, 
and the United States.^
By mid-April, the private discussions produced the London Naval 
Treaty which a plenary session adopted on April l4, and which the powers 
signed a week later. The document continued the holiday on capital 
ships and the limitation of tonnage for cruisers, destroyers, and sub­
marines until 1936. The agreement contained an "escalator clause" which 
allowed a nation to disregard the restrictions of its nei^bors ' con­
struction adversely affecting its security needs. Also the provisions
^Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 88-90, 92-93*
^Ibid., pp. 9!+, 96-98, 100. Senator Reed and Tsunco Matsudaira, 
a Japanese delegate and the ambassador in London, agreed on the Reed- 
Matsudaira compromise for heavy cruisers which allowed the principle of 
10:10:6 for Britain and the United States and 10:10:7 for Japan. Wilson 
congratulated the Senator and remarked that he had "never seen a nego­
tiation which was carried through with more patience, good humor and 
ingenious resources than that which you undertook with Matsudaira." 
Wilson to Reed, April 3, 1930, Wilson Papers.
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7regulated the replacement, scrapping, and conversion of ships.
The conference actually accomplished little positive action.
It did publicize and fulfill the intent of the Rapidan Conference. Japan 
accepted a 10:10:6 ratio on large cruisers and really got a 10:10:7 pro­
portion for which it had worked years before that meeting. French and 
Italian relations were worsened because of the airing of their political 
and naval differences. Thus, the assembly aggravated previous problems 
and introduced a small amount that was new, although, whatever its limi­
tations, it did reaffirm faith in the control of armaments.
The London Naval Conference helped to clear the way for another 
meeting of the Preparatory Commission, and in May, several delegates 
spoke for resuming that work. Wilson anticipated that some technical 
accomplishments of the recent treaty would assist in the writing of 
naval clauses which the body had vainly debated for five years. Loudon 
contacted members informally about that possibility. He felt that grave 
material problems precluded a summer session, a position which Wilson 
and others presented to him, so the official set November 3; 1930, as 
the date for the convocation.®
In September, the Eleventh Assembly of the League felt that the 
session would constitute the first definite step toward disarmament.
Since the major naval powers had developed some consensus at London, the
7Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 102-103.
®Ibid., pp. lOU-105; Mahaney, "Soviet Union,” pp. 33-3^; Wilson 
to Stimson, May 10, 1930, 500.AI5/1056; Wilson to Stimson, May 10, 1930, 
500.A15/l057i Wilson to Professor Ernst Bovet, May 7, 1930, Wilson Papers.
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body should meet again in November. The Assembly resolved that the 
commission should complete its job in the fall which would allow the 
Council to summon a general disarmament conference shortly thereafter.^
On Septanber 9̂  Wilson and J. Theodore Marriner, the Chief of 
the Western European Division, conversed with French representatives in 
Beme about the prospective meeting. René Massigli, the Chief of the 
League of Nations section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was 
visibly annoyed by the Italian accusation that the Paris government was 
trying to delay the next session. Understandably, the two Americans 
made no effort to discuss details with him, especially since Wilson ex­
pected to see him after the Third Committee debates.
Then Wilson and Marriner contacted ranking Italians. The Min­
ister attempted to leam from Dino Grandi, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and Angusto Rosso, the Director General of the League section 
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, how they would handle their general 
reservation on publicity. Wilson and his colleague showed that all gov­
ernments really subscribed to that amendment because the Commission con­
sidered nothing final until the disarmament conference established defi­
nite figures. Actually, Wilson wondered if Rome would be satisfied 
merely to submit the exception without elaboration or debate which Grandi 
could not do because he would not jeopardize his government's stand 
vis-a-vis France.
%ahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 88-90.
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Generally, delegates felt the need for the Preparatory Commission 
meeting to he the final one. In a survey Wilson found them unanimous 
that the session should he the last one regardless of the outcome. Also, 
they agreed that it should convene on the date scheduled.
Thereafter, Wilson was summoned home for consultation on the 
prospective gathering. The State Department wanted Gihson and him to he 
in Washington at the same time and to return to Europe together. ' Along 
the way hack, they participated in pertinent discussions involving Brit­
ish and Japanese ambassadors.
In mid-Octoher, the American approach hegan taking shape. The 
State Department designated hoth as delegates, and five advisers and 
two technical assistants from the State, Army, and Wavy Departments 
assisted them. Washington hoped for a solution of agenda items and the 
conclusion of a final draft in order to do practical work. Accordingly, 
it instructed them to use every opportunity to promote general disarma­
ment. On naval problems, they were to accommodate the small nai.'y coun­
tries as much as possible without making alterations which would under­
mine the London Naval Treaty. The position on civil aviation remained 
unchanged except that it was permissible for individual states to attach 
their views by a resolution. The representatives coul.d not make any con­
cession on the budgetary limitation of military spending. Instead, they
^^Wilson to Stimson, September 10, I93O, 300.Al$/f8l; Stimson 
to Wilson, September 23, 1930, I23.W693/25O; Norman Armour to Stimson, 
October 2J, 1930, 123.W693/26o.
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were to indicate the impracticality of direct budget controls and to 
emphasize that the United States disclosed its expenditures, numbers, 
weights, and units of material. Regarding publicity, the Department, 
expecting new French and British proposals, was willing to cooperate 
internationally in any exchange of information and elaboration which 
would contribute to peace. Concerning emergency derogations, it sugges­
ted a broad statement which simply declared a nation to be released from 
the obligations after a public announcement of the reasons for thinking 
its security threatened.
On November 6, 1930, the second sitting of the sixth session 
convened. Loudon recommended no general talks on disarmament but pro­
posed a study of the draft convention. The delegates agreed that the 
text submitted to the disarmament conference should retain the outline 
of the 1927 draft.
Some changes on material were approved. Some delegates felt that 
the mere publishing of data about land war material offered a very weak 
means of discouraging the construction of armaments. Besides, they had 
supported the measure in 1929 only because a majority had not favored 
direct limitation or indirect restrictions. Lord Cecil presented a 
proposition which the body adopted. It urged the most possible exchange 
of figures among signatories and recorded the wish of most members to
The advisers included Moffat, then the First Secretary of Lega­
tion at Beme, Pierre de L. Boal, the Assistant Chief of the Division of 
Western European Affairs, Lieutenant Colonel George V. Strong of the Army, 
and Captain William W. Smyth and Commodore Thomas C. Kincaid of the Navy. 
Stimson to Gibson and Wilson, October 16, 1930, F.R., I, i8T-189*
■^^ahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 90-91*
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have a more precise means of control than only publicity. Furthermore, 
it recorded the majority's acceptance of budgetary limits while acknowl­
edging the preference of some members for direct action through enumera-
13tion and others for a combination of methods.
On naval equipment, the commission adopted the direct approach 
of the Washington and London Conferences. Lord Cecil again moved for 
budgetary allowances, but the American and Japanese representatives ob­
jected. Then the British and Italian personnel claimed that final 
approval was contingent upon the attitude of the other sea powers. Con­
cerning air armaments, the delegates directly restricted the number and 
horsepower of planes. Although the Americans and the Germans objected 
to budgetary measures on the overall expenditures for land, sea, and air
forces, their colleagues included such a provision in the draft conven-
. . Ih tion.
The commission also established a Permanent Disarmament Commis­
sion at Geneva. In 192J, the French text proposed the creation of an 
international agency to oversee disarmament work. Initially, both the 
Americans and the British opposed such surveillance, but by 1930 they 
concurred in an arrangement for inspection. The board consisted of 
members who were appointed by their governments but who did not repre­
sent their country's official position. It was to supervise the admin­
istration of the convention provisions, to collect and compile armaments
^3iT3id., p. 92. 
^^Ibid., pp. 92-96.
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data, to receive complaints about the operation of the agreement, and to 
submit a report on disarmament progress to the League annually-
The commission also considered derogations for which an American 
resolution was the basis of discussion. The purpose of the article was 
to provide a means of adequate defense preparation in case circumstances 
developed which a government considered threatening to its security. In 
that situation, a state could temporarily suspend all or a portion of 
the convention if it informed the other signatories of the modified con­
ditions which necessitated the action. Once the emergency passed, the
16suspending party was to comply with the accord again.
Heated debate occurred on whether the draft convention affected 
existing treaties. The British moved that the text would not alter pro­
visions of previous agreements on the limitation of land, sea, or air 
armaments. The intent was to make sure that the Washington and London 
treaties were not altered. The statement would have been harmless enough 
had not France wanted the inclusion of the Treaty of Versailles obliga­
tions, which meant German compliance with those armament restrictions. 
Seemingly, the amendment was the French price for its cooperation in the 
future conference. Immediately, Bemstorff responded with a wholesale 
criticism of the disarmament program to that time. Lord Cecil replied 
that the commission had accomplished much despite the lack of German
cooperation. After more discussion, the commission approved the French 
17reservation.
^^Ibid., p. 27. 
^^Ibid., p. 98. 
^^Ibid., pp. 98-101.
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Also, the personnel considered a date for the disarmament con­
ference. Bernstorff proposed the meeting for November 1931, a move 
which was influenced hy the growth of Nazism in his country and the 
realization that several nations were impatient over the slow work of 
the Preparatory Commission. If the countries were not ready by that 
date, ten years would he inadequate time for preparation. The delega­
tions from Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Japan, and Yugo­
slavia displayed quick and strong opposition. Then Lord Cecil suggested
that the League Council designate a date in its next session, and the
1 ftdelegates approved the recommendation.
At the last meeting on December 9, various delegates gave criti­
cal evaluations of the session. At one extreme, Russia and Germany 
totally rejected the draft; at the other. Lord Cecil spoke optimistically 
about the framework for a treaty which materially offered the prospect 
of progress. Taking a middle position, Gibson expressed both a disap­
pointment and a hope. Frankly, the text was much less than the United 
States had expected and anticipated, especially since it did not include 
many provisions which Washington firmly believed were essential to 
reduction. Althou^ it did not contain the assurance of immediate arms 
decrease, he was happy about the degree of accomplishment. He sincerely 
believed that a suitable foundation had been constructed if the machinery 
could be implemented by the formal convocation.
Gibson thought that perhaps the conference would achieve more.
If it did, the progress could come because the governments were more
^^Ibid., pp. 101-102.
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willing to make concessions there than in the Preparatory Commission and 
because the conference improved on the commission's work. Gibson cau­
tioned the other delegates not to mislead their public into thinking the 
agency had actually accomplished a great deal; instead, they should 
inform their people of the accomplishments in moderate tones. They 
should candidly indicate the imperfections of the draft and the prelimi­
nary work which was necessary to insure the success of the disarmanent
19conference.
Running concurrently with the disarmament discussion, the strained 
political relations between France and Italy comprised one of the major 
impediments to international agreement on disarmament and aims control. 
Basically, Rome was miffed because Paris would not allow Italy naval 
parity in all categories. Both countries emerged from the London Naval 
Conference with worsened political relations as indicated by their re­
fusal to sign the naval ratios portion of the treaty. In the months 
following the London meetings, Wilson was among the many diplomats who
20
worked for resolution of the French-Italian naval construction problem.
In mid-May, 1930, Wilson grew curious about the state of affairs. 
About that time, newspaper accounts stated that Italy and France were 
negotiating to finish the work of the London Naval Conference. On May 
15, he went to Geneva where he interviewed several British, French, and 
Italian officials to the League to ascertain whether the facts justified
^%ibson to Stimson, December 4, 1930, F.R., I, 201-203. 
^^errell, American Diplomacy, pp. IO3-IO5.
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the reports. He learned that Briand and Grandi had decided to defer the 
naval problem for the time being until they could resolve their political 
difficulties. They considered different means of contact, but decided 
to conduct talks through regular diplomatic channels. Grandi felt that 
the question of the Tripoli frontier and the nationality problem of Tunis 
could be solved in a friendly manner. In fact, if Paris would make a 
conciliatory gesture regarding Tripoli, then the drastically changed re­
lations would greatly enhance the chances of naval harmony. Briand 
promised to study the contents as a possible step toward a settlement. 
Wilson also learned confidentially that Rome was considering an "Italian 
yardstick" which would achieve parity by a comparison of the number of 
ships instead of tonnage. Basically, he thought that the diplomatic
climate had improved although no specific accomplishment could be 
PIreported.^
The British officials were as greatly concerned as other inter­
ested outside parties. Wilson was informed that Arthur Henderson, the 
British delegate in Geneva, was using every opportunity to stress the 
importance which his government attached to those discussions. He was 
anxious for France and Italy to become signatories of the London Treaty 
in order to relieve British apprehensions about their naval building.
More important, the American Minister discovered that MacDonald had 
recently asked Grand! why his government had announced a large program 
after the London Conference. Grandi answered that the London partici­
pants were cognizant of Italy's intent to construct at the same level
^^Wilson to Stimson, May l6, 1930, 500.A15A3/931*
110
as its neighbor which meant that the Italian plans for 1930 and 1931
were in line with the French projection. While the two countries were
trying to settle their difficulties, Rome was prepared to restrict its
construction to the identical degree that Paris was. According to Wil-
22son's source, MacDonald was satisfied with the Italian response.
By August, 1930, enough obstacles having been removed, Massigli 
and Rosso began French-Italian formal talks. On September Iv, Rosso in­
troduced a plan which called for nine cruisers with 8-inch guns and a 
maximum tonnage and number of units for cruisers with 6-inch weapons 
and destroyers. By combining the two types of vessels into one class, 
Paris would possess more tonnage, and Rome would have ec[uality in num­
bers. Concerning submarines, the French government would finish its 
construction for I93I, and a naval holiday would be observed, a move 
which would give France approximately T7,000 tons and Italy about $0,000 
tons. Massigli believed some of the provisions worthwhile and promised 
to convey them sympathetically to his superior. The contact ended on 
September $, and the Frenchman went to Genéva.^^
By September 10, when Wilson and Marriner checked on the situa­
tion, less reason for optimism existed. Massigli, noticeably depressed 
and definitely silent about details, seemed intent on demolishing what­
ever hope had been built up by Rosso's proposals. He was more concerned
^%ilson to Stimson, May I6, 1930, F.R., I, 132.
^%orman Davis to Stimson, August 11, 1930, F.R., I, 132-133,' 
Walter Edge, Aaibassador in Paris, to Stimson, September 6, 1930, F.R., I, 
133; Wilson to Stimson, September 10, 1930, $00.A1$A3/I08I.
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about the size of the figures being discussed and ■whether Britain -would 
approve them without exercising the escape clause of the London Treaty.
In response to his prompt statement that Britain had repudiated its 
option for eighteen 8-inch cruisers, the two Americans indicated that 
the renunciation applied only to the limitations which Britain, Japan, 
and the United States had established. Besides, London was the judge of 
its own naval welfare, and the Washington government had no right to 
question its invocation of the escalator provision. Like-wise, Grandi was 
not optimistic although he had shown a willingness to talk -with Briand 
whenever the latter wanted to hold fruitful talks. Wilson and Marriner 
presented the danger of the tonnage figures becoming large enough to 
upset the treaty equilibrium, and the Foreign Minister reiterated the
2kcontinuing Italian hope for lower figures.
When rumors spread of progress in the naval negotiations, Ameri­
can newspapers, especially the New York Herald Tribune, were publishing 
such information. Unfortunately, Wilson saw little reason for such 
statements, although one incident possibly accounted for the reports.
On September 15, Rosso and Massigli had conversed, and the latter par­
ticularly objected to the parity in tonnage figures which Rosso felt 
were the heart of the Italian plan. For some reason, then Rosso par­
tially outlined his scheme in a sanguine manner to American reporters
25who apparently developed their accounts from those remarks.
^Sfilson to Stimson, September 10, 1930, 500.A15A3/108l.
^%ilson to Stimson, September 19, 1930, 500.AI5A3/108I.
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On September 25, Wilson was back in Geneva to talk with personnel 
at the League session. He heard, that Massigli had submitted a counter­
proposal to Rosso which contained two types of surface vessels not in­
cluded in the Washington Treaty. They were ships with 8-inch guns and 
craft of smaller size and caliber of which an undesignated portion would 
be less than 3,000 tons. Submarine construction was also separated into 
divisions above 2,000 tons and those under. Furthermore, the two coun­
tries were to have parity in the number of craft without any stipulation 
concerning tonnage. The Italians, viewing the suggestion as a step 
backward, were reportedly disillusioned. They reasoned that the French 
position on vessels with 6-inch weapons would disrupt their current 
practical equality in that class and place France ahead by a three-to-two 
margin in 193^* The offer was so unacceptable that Grandi abruptly 
ordered the talks to end. Later Briand contacted another Italian member 
of the League Council and convinced him to concur that both parties had 
temporarily interrupted the discussions. Wilson, seeing little hope for 
an improvement during that League assembly, predicted that the irritation
26would continue unless Cabinet officials resumed the contact.
At this point, the United States began making its own diplomatic 
moves. Since France was supposedly about to announce its building pro­
gram for 1931, Stimson wanted unilateral efforts by Britain, Japan, and 
the United States to maintain the construction levels of the London 
Treaty free of disruption by the two European naval powers. Purtheimore,
^^Wilson to Stimson, September 26, 1930, F.R., I, 133-13^«
113
he wanted to preclude their complicating the Preparatory Commission 
work by inserting their naval difficulties into the agenda. So, London, 
Tokyo, and Washington should urge Paris and Rome to discontinue their 
attempts toward gaining diplomatic triumphs over each other on parity 
and postpone that discussion until 193 *̂
In the interim, France and Italy could independently declare 
their plans which the major powers hoped would not necessitate the in­
vocation of the escalator clause. Stimson emphasized to the French and 
Italian ambassadors that their governments' attitudes created instabil­
ity and not security. Also, a large French increase which would mean 
a change in the 1930 treaty level might cause an adverse public reac­
tion among the British, Japanese, and Americans. Thus, Stimson sou^t 
to impress upon the two European capitals that the naval question was 
one of international interest.
While Gibson and Wilson were in Paris en route from the Washing­
ton consultation in October, they discussed the French-Italian problem. 
They found that the London and Tokyo governments had misinterpreted the 
Secretary's proposal to be only a protest against the French naval plan 
for 1931» In a private meeting, they explained away the British ambas­
sador's mis conceptions. They indicated that the proposed French building
^Stimson to Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador in London, October 15, 
1930, F.R., I, 137-138; Stimson to Cameron Forbes, Ambassador in Japan, 
October 16, 1930; F.R., I, 138-1^0; Stimson to Edge, October 16, 1930,
F.R., I, lUO-lJ+l; Stimson to Garrett, Ambassador in Italy, October I6, 
1930, F.R., I, IÛI. The British, thinking the United States had in mind 
joint statements, declined to cooperate until the matter was explained 
otherwise. Stimson to Dawes, October 23, 1930, F.R., I, 14-5-146; Dawes 
to Stimson, October 2k, 1930, F.R., I, 1^7.
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comprised a further reason, not a determining one, for action before the 
difficulty was intensified by the announcement of its program or by 
debate in the Preparatory Commission. Then the Ambassador saw the wis­
dom of the American recommendation and astonished Gibson with the opin­
ion that Premier Andre Tardieu of France would possibly consider it 
favorably within a short time. likewise, a conversation with the Jap­
anese Ambassador also removed his misgivings. Thereafter, Gibson went
to Brussels to prevent press conjectures about his prolonged visit in
28Paris, and Wilson remained in the city.
later, Wilson learned the French view of the developments from 
the British Ambassador who had visited the French Foreign Office. The 
Ambassador commented on his government's concern over the interruption 
in the negotiations and indicated his government's readiness to help 
through mediation or other ways whenever the two disputants wanted 
assistance. The French official responded that Massigli's offer at Gen­
eva was the last move made which Italy had not yet answered, but Rome 
had stated that the talks were open. Subsequently, the Fascist Grand 
Council had passed a resolution for parity which altered the relations. 
Thus, as things stood then, Italy would have to initiate the resumption 
of contact, and the gesture might be productive only if Rome modified 
its position on parity. Unfortunately, Benito Mussolini, the head of 
the Italian government, felt that his country had been the last one to
148-149.
^^Gibson and Wilson to Stimson, October 25, 1930, F»R«, I,
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offer compromise measures, so Paris would have to be willing to make
29concessions first.
On October 27, the controversy was somewhat clarified. On that 
day, Gibson discovered that the French government completely misunder­
stood Stimson's maneuver. In fact, Tardieu was highly annoyed that Paul 
Claudel, the Ambassador in Washington, had misinterpreted the intent and 
purpose of the proposal. Once the American explained the Secretary's 
viewpoint, the Premier, who was impressed that Gibson would make a simi­
lar explanation in Rome, became calm and receptive. Tardieu predicted 
that the two governments could agree on terms in less than an hour if 
Italy accepted the American recommendation and if the parity problem was 
circumvented. Because developments seemed so promising, Gibson and 
Norman Armour, the American charge in Paris, asked Wilson to stay there
until Gibson could contact him after talking to Grandi in Italy.
For a time, Tardieu hesitated to tell Gibson one important point. 
Confidentially, the primary impediment was one of determining levels 
which would be satisfactory to London. When that stage was reached, 
agreement With the Italians would be comparatively easy. He hoped that
the talks with the British officials which had been held for several
days would markedly clarify conditions. Initially, he recommended that 
Gibson stay in Paris pending a settlement, but later he agreed that it
^%ibson and Wilson to Stimson, October 27, 1930, F.R., I, I5I- 
152; Memorandum by Castle of a Conversation with the Italian Ambassador, 
October 28, I93O, F.R., I, 15O-I5I.
SOgiBson to Stimson, October 27, 1930, F.R., I, 153-155*
ll6
31woiald "be better for the Ambassador to proceed to Rome.
On October 28, the Japanese Ambassador related much the same 
thing to Wilson. The preceding evening he had asked Philippe Berthelot, 
the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, if there was 
any way to end the French-Italian deadlock. The Frenchman opined that 
the three big naval powers could talk with France about fixing a level 
in auxiliary ships which would satisfy them and France. A success in 
that would greatly simplify the Italian difficulty.
As promised to Tardieu, Gibson and Wilson related the develop­
ments to Massigli. The latter, apparently happy about the prospects, 
asked Gibson to infoi-m the Italian government of the desire to take up 
talks momentarily. He followed with an outline of a tonnage arrangement 
in auxiliary ships which he had discussed with the British Ambassador.
In the main, the plan provided for the French construction of 8-inch gun 
cruisers to replace similar craft and Italian abstention from correspond­
ing building. If so, then the total French-Italian strength would con­
form to the British standard. Regarding submarines, he projected a pos­
sible decrease in French crafts which would improve the English standing 
by 1936. Throu^out the conversation, Massigli often stressed the Paris 
government's sincere wish to dispose of the vexing difficulty. The com­
ment reinforced Tardieu's remark about serious matters so besetting him 
that he would be most happy to settle that one problem which was more
3^ibson to Stimson, October 27, 1930, F.R., I, 155*
^%ibson to Stimson, October 28, 1930, F.R., I, 155-15^.
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bothersome than its real value warranted.
In Rome, Gihson essentially heard the opposite side which basi­
cally named France as the obstacle to a settlement. Grandi informed him 
of the French suggestion that Rosso return to Paris to resume the talks. 
Italy had declined to send him a second time, but promised to have him 
or some other representative in Geneva for the Preparatory Commission. 
Grandi stated frankly that the government needed to save face and. had 
really relinquished the essence of parity earlier in the year.^^ The 
Italian interest rested more in continuing the semblance of equality 
than the expenditure of large sums. In the final analysis, the Foreign 
Minister doubted the possibility of concluding an accord satisfactory to 
Paris.
Then the American press complicated its government’s efforts by 
publicizing Gibson’s work. Wilson reported the Paris branch of the 
New York Herald Tribune as saying that the United States had given Gib­
son freedom to reconcile the negotiators and possibly to visit Rome. 
Wilson declined immediate comment and asked Washington if he should 
state anything. He really considered it proper to leave unless the 
State Department had a specific assignment for him there. Stimson
^^Gitson to Stimson, October 27, 1930, F.R., I, 15^-155i Gibson 
to Stimson, October 28, 1930, F.R., I, 159-l60.
2^Grandi's reference was to the material that Wilson referred 
to in Wilson to Stimson, May l6, 1930, F.R., I, 132.
^^Gibson to Stimson, October 30, 1930, F.R., I,
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counseled Armour to say as little as possible about the matter and Wil- 
son to return to Switzerland.
On November 5# Gibson, Wilson, and other members of the Ameri­
can delegation to the Preparatory Commission reflected.on a way to bring 
about a solution in Geneva. Primarily, the need was to harmonize the 
French aim of superiority in auxiliary vessels with the Italian goal of 
ostensible parity. Gibson and his colleagues thought of distinguishing 
between new construction and replacement by terming a large part of the 
French building reconstruction because so many of its ships in operation 
were old. Thus, France might announce the restoration program to stop 
in 1936 and thereby have a situation almost tantamount to a holiday on 
construction. Since the representatives of Paris and Rome were still 
negotiating, the Americans intended to hold the proposal until the op­
portune time for making an informal offer. Stimson believed the dis­
tinction completely acceptable if the levels remained within the
37figures which the London Naval Treaty established.
Word circulated that the American representatives might be an 
instrument in reconciling the two disputants. Various sources spread 
the French opinion that the Americans could favorably influence the 
negotiations. Because the point was passed so freely, Gibson's group 
felt that Paris had sent such orders with its experts. Likewise, the
3^Armour to Stimson, October 3O; 1930, F.R., I, I6O; Stimson
to Armour, October 30, 1930, F.R., I, 160.
^^Gibson to Stimson, November 1930, F.R., I, I7I; Stimson
to Gibson, November 6, 1930, F.R., I, 17^-175•
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Italians had expressed hope that the United States delegation vould 
asstme a conciliatory role. Consequently, the Americans themselves 
might play that part whenever the circumstances permitted, hut until 
then, they were stating that the United States did not want to mediate 
or use its good offices. They really thought, however, that direct
q O
contact between the two parties constituted the optimum approach.
Within a week, Gibson, Wilson, and their advisers had misgivings 
about the chances of a reconciliation. Rome became nervous about press 
accounts that France mi^t possibly adhere to the London Treaty when it 
found a building level satisfactory to London, Tokyo, and Washington. 
Assuming that happened, Italy felt that its rival might veto or stipu­
late prerequisites for Italian membership. If the southern government 
wanted admission at a comparable weight level, the American delegation 
anticipated possible embarrassment for the big naval three. Should that 
trio allow a French rejection of Italian entrance, it might appear to 
Italy that they favored France by judging the parity problem themselves. 
Yet, they mi^t be charged with partiality by pressuring Paris to allow 
Italian participation. In case direct agreement was unsuccessful, the 
Americans foresaw no way that Paris could approve the London Treaty with­
out worsening relations with its southern neighbor. Certainly, it was 
important to gain adherence to the 1930 naval convention, but they con­
sidered it a mistake to forget the long-held American view that naval
^^Gibson to Stimson, November 7, 1930, F.R., I, 175*
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limitation was an unceasing process. Thus, they also needed to remember 
the overall interest in getting all of the major sea powers to future 
conferences voluntarily. The delegation reported those apprehensions 
to Stimson only in order to submit all the facts garnered from their 
Geneva conversations.39
During the Preparatory Commission session, England assumed a 
more active role in the naval problem. It became increasingly obvious 
that the two competitors favored the use of Robert L. Craigie, the head 
of the League Department of the British Foreign Office, as an intermedi­
ary instead of direct negotiations. When Massigll submitted a plan which 
was noticeably inferior to his government's recommendation at the London 
Conference, the Englishman proposed a substitute. Basically, it offered 
a naval holiday in construction of 8-inch gun cruisers and submarines
and replacement only for cruisers with 6-inch weapons and destroyers.
hoAfter some discussion, the French official accepted the plan.
Thereafter, a couple of factors caused significant delays. First, 
the illness of both Craigie and Rosso curtailed the negotiations. Second, 
a French Cabinet crisis, a larger obstacle than the first one, necessi­
tated the formation of another government. In the main, the situation 
remained largely unchanged when the Preparatory Commission, adjourned on 
December 9* At that time, Craigie, Massigli, and Rosso thought that the
^^Gibson to Stimson, November 13, 1930, F.R., I, 179-l80.
^Aoibson to Stimson, November 20, 1930, F.R., I, iSO-lBl.
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chances of an accord were better than in November, and once the French
government machinery was operative again, they expected to resume their
efforts. In'the meantime, they all recognized and appreciated the ini-
hltiative of the United States in getting the talks renewed.
In mid-December, Wilson saw Craigie in Berne. The Britisher
thought that the single important remaining difference between Paris and 
Rome concerned the letter's demand for 8,000 additional tons of subma­
rines. Rosso had promised to discuss the matter with Grandi in the Ital­
ian capital and let Craigie know whether he could profitably travel to 
Italy. To await that word and enjoy a brief vacation, the Englishman
decided to stay in Switzerland temporarily. He informed Massigli of the
Italian Minister's mission, but the Frenchman withheld comment because no
Cabinet yet existed in his country. Soon the invitation arrived, and
1+2Craigie went to Rome.
Thereafter Wilson was seldom associated with the negotiations.
At the end of 1930, the overall positions remained much the same with 
Craigie thinking that problems were being removed and that eventual 
accord was nearer as a result of diplomatic exchanges. The problem car­
ried over into 1931 still hampered by the instability of the French 
government. By September, the talks were in a critical last stage of
^^ibson to Stimson, December 9> 1930, F.R., I, 183-184.
^%ilson to Stimson, December 15, 1930, 500.A15A3/1317J Wilson 
to Stimson, December l6, 1930, F.R., I, l84.
^^Armour to Stimson, December 23, 1930, F.R., I, 185; Wilson to
Stimson, May l6, 1931, F.R., I, 4l7-4l8.
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having to he settled then or he sent to the General Disarmament Confer-
^5
kkence in Fehruary, 1932. Nothing materially was accomplished there.
and negotiations dragged along until their collapse in January, 1932.
^Wilson to Stimson, September 20, 1931, F.R., I, ^30; Wilson 
to Stimson, September 7, 1931, 500.A15A3/l63k; Wilson to Stimson, 
September 17, 1931, 500.A15A3/l637j Wilson to Stimson, September l8, 
1931, 500.A15A3/i61̂1̂.
Stuart Hughes, "The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism, 
1922-1932," eds. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats: 1919-39 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), P* 231*
CHAPTER VI.
1931, THE DESIGNATED YEAR OF PREPARATIONS 
FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
Throughout 1931# American officials made preparations for the 
General Disarmament Conference. Even before the last session of the 
Preparatory Commission adjourned, Gibson vas already sending his thoughts 
on the prospects. He saw little hope for other than a minimum effort to 
limit armaments and forecast the continuation of construction. He viewed 
Berlin and Rome as two specific obstacles to agreement. Probably Germany 
would try to abolish the Versailles Treaty military clauses which attempt 
the continental powers would definitely resent and resist. Also, Italy 
would present a big problem unless it could settle the naval trouble with 
France. Possibly Rome might continue its move toward conciliation with 
Germany, Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey which meant that the 
European governments would proceed to the assembly divided into two 
camps. Nonetheless, some step had to be taken to accomplish as much 
progress on disarmament as possible.
Actually, the United States armaments were so limited and low 
already that its situation would figure little in the conference out­
come, but still Americans needed to be present and active. The chief 
of the delegation would be expected to represent his country in the full 
sessions, sit with the political committee, and possibly meet with a 
steering committee which was being contemplated. For the committees on 
air, naval, and land equipment, the delegation required personnel who 
were fully aware of technical problems. Althou^ the War and Navy
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Departments needed some time to outline their plans and moves, the politi­
cal representatives would devote many more hours to studying the attitudes 
and stands which nations had assumed in the Preparatory Commission. Since 
the future debates would largely revolve around those discussions, it was 
essential to decide upon the membership early enough to allow for the 
necessary preparations.^
Because the League figured prominently in the preliminary work, 
the State Department wanted events observed as they occurred. After it 
appointed Wilson to be available for consultation at the Council's 
January meeting, he despatched his comments on possible developments at 
that time. He expected Eduard Benes, the Czechoslovakian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to be the chairman of the General Disarmament Confer­
ence. After his selection, that official would ascertain the general 
situation in European relations and reconcile positions as much as pos­
sible. In that light, both Gibson and Wilson believed Benes an excel­
lent nomination because of his conciliatory disposition and his many 
years of public service. Likely, he could promote harmony better than 
any other individual. Concerning the date, the Minister thought that 
the conference would convene at Geneva in February, 1932. Some persons 
had spoken about the expediency of holding the meeting in another place, 
but he foresaw the Secretariat's objecting to the impractical!ty of re­
locating itself. The schedule was convenient, for the time would allow 
the Secretariat to devote its attention to the armaments discussion
Gibson to Stimson, December 6, 1930, F.R., 1931, I, kjl-kj6.
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2from February until the Assembly met in September.
Early in January, I931, he heard of a movement to choose an Ameri­
can as Vice President of the conference. Evidently, Germany and the other 
former Central Powers exerted some pressure in that direction, but the 
Minister had no idea how seriously that preference would be promoted. In 
informal conversations, Wilson stated that the choice would be unwise for 
two reasons. First, the designated person would be obliged to spend 1931 
working toward the convocation, and his assignment would primarily deal 
with the reconciliation of European differences. Second, the American 
chosen might be a citizen whom President Hoover could not in good con­
science appoint to the delegation.^
Subsequently, Stimson sent orders to scotch the attempt. He 
decided against cooperation in that manner because he considered the 
general preparatory procedure to be both inadequate and futile. It was 
especially so in view of the conference’s importance and the significant 
impact that it might have on the world. He preferred direct contact 
among the nations which were most concerned about land armament restric­
tions. Since the United States had nothing either to insist upon or to 
concede, it was less involved in the matter.
Consequently, American assumption of the primary responsibility 
for preparation might become detrimental to itself and others. While 
American acceptance might mean less involvement by those governments
%ilson to Stimson, December 7, 1930, F.R., 1931, I, k'jS-hTT̂
3wilson to Stimson, January 8, 1931, 500.A15A4/7.
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whose participation was essential, it might mean that Washington would, 
receive "the hlame for the ultimate inevitable failure." Althou^ the 
Preparatory Commission had dwelt on technical aspects and methods, it had 
not considered the fundamental problems of principle nor had individual 
governments expressed opinions about their disarmament obligations. Under 
the best of circumstances a successful conference would be most arduous, 
and Washington believed one utterly impossible without a readiness of the 
European diplomatic officials to discuss directly beforehand. By early 
1931, France, Italy, and Germany, the powers most affected by land dis­
armament, had indicated no intention of personally confronting the vital 
problems. Thus, to remove obstacles, the principals needed to meet as 
Britain and the United States had prior to the London Naval Conference.
For those reasons, Washington declined to participate in any preliminary 
action officially or informally until European powers undertook essential 
steps.
Wilson reported considerable confusion in Geneva about the Secre­
tary's position. The British representatives contended that he objected 
to officers from the small governments and the Council's nomination of 
officials. They inferred that conclusion from their discussions of Ameri­
can participation, and they desired a procedure completely satisfactory
Stimson to Dawes, January, I93I, F.R., I, kSl-h82} Stimson to 
Wilson, January 10, 1931# $00.Al$A4/9; Wilson to Stimson, January I6,
1931# 500.A15A1+/i6; Stimson to American Legation, Berne, January 16, 1931# 
500.A15A1i-/i8; Wilson to Stimson, January 17# 1931# 500'A1$A4/20.
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to the United States. Acting on misinformation from Washington, Julius 
Curtins, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested to Arthur 
Henderson, a British delegate, that the concerned powers name the per­
sonnel in direct talks. Also in doubt, the French ordered Paul Claudel 
the Ambassador in Washington, to inquire about the matter. Those who 
advocated the original plan insisted that the designation of persons for 
preliminary activities was in line with Stimson's views. In addition, 
feeling existed that the Council should delete disarmament from its 
agenda of January 20, pending the Secretary's clarification. Moreover, 
Germany and Ita]^ were opposed to the naming of Benes, but Wilson ex­
pected only limited objection unless Stimson, whose judgment on all these 
problems was expected to be the decisive element, opposed that nominee.^ 
Stimson remained aloof about the conference's personnel, con­
tinuing adamantly against American representation and refusing to state 
a preference about the nomination procedure.^ With that information, 
Wilson countered erroneous opinions about the Secretary's attitude, and 
no one expressed opposition to Stimson ' s ideas. Everyone with whom Wil­
son conversed agreed that direct contact constituted the best way to 
handle matters of principle. Upon hearing Wilson's statements, the 
Council restricted disarmament discussion to speeches about adoption of 
the Preparatory Commission's report. Further, it allowed more time to 
consider future plans concerning conference organization. In general.
Wilson to Stimson, January l8, 1931, F.R., I, ^3-48$.
^Stimson to Wilson, January 19, 1931, F.R., I, 48^.
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the Comicil talked about ways to initiate the talks and methods of apply­
ing pressure on the negotiators. Once he had presented the American 
ideas, Wilson returned to Berne rather than to risk the possibility of
his being publicly or profoundly enmeshed in the transactions. In the
7meantime, the Secretariat promised to relay information to him.
Progress continued to be slow, however, because of misinterpre­
tations of the American policy. In a secret session, Quniones de Leon, 
the rapporteur, accurately conveyed the material which Wilson had ver­
bally given him. The German delegates denied the reliability of those 
comments, contending that Stimson objected to immediate organization. 
After more wrangling, the Council ordered Joseph Avenol, the League's 
Deputy Secretary General, to contact Wilson for elaboration, and the 
Minister's brief response resembled his previous replies to similar 
inquiries. The same day, the Irish delegate nominated General Charles
G. Dawes of the United States for chairman of the conference. For a
g
short time, the press gave most of its attention to that suggestion.
Finally, the Council decided some points and deferred others.
It set the conference convocation date for February 2, 1932, and re­
served Geneva as the place if enough facilities were available. With 
Henderson working against the selection of a President then because of 
the German and Italian opposition and the alleged American reluctance.
^Wilson to Stimson, January 21, 1931, F.R., I, 485-486.
^Wilson to Stimson, January 23, 1931, 500.A15A4/29j Wilson to
Stimson, January 23, 1931, 500.A15A4/31.
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it postponed the nomination until a later session. The rapporteur recom­
mended direct negotiations, hut a majority voted against the proposal.
The opponents stressed the need for a mediating official or government to 
prevent the possibility of deadlocks occurring which would cause the par­
ticipants to enter the conference thinking that nothing could be accom­
plished. The opposition certainly did not rule out the possibility of 
direct contact if an outside party scrutinized developments. At every 
opportunity, Wilson emphasized the vital necessity of such meetings.
Instead, the Council delegated the preparatory measures to the rapporteur
9and the Secretariat at least until May.
In April, Wilson transmitted to Stimson points of which he gar­
nered from a conversation with Secretary General Drummond. Drummond be­
lieved that he could no longer support the nomination of Benes because 
London opposed the Czech nominee. In that case, the Council would make 
the choice without the Secretariat's advice. In the meantime, Henderson 
had become concerned about the chairmanship, had tried unsuccessfully to 
draft Briand for the position, and, finally, became interested in it him­
self. Anyway, he planned to promote the appointment of a committee of 
two or three members to assist in the conference preliminaries. Since 
Drummond made no mention of an American for that office, the Minister 
concluded that everyone completely comprehended the stand taken by the 
United States.^®
^Wilson to Stimson, January 2k, 1931, F.R., I, 488-489; Mahaney, 
"Soviet Union," p. 105*
lOUiison to Stimson, April 17, 1931, F.R., I, 492-493*
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At the May session, Wilson observed more concern for economic 
depression than for disarmament. He doubted whether a comprehensive 
account of the Council's activity would indicate "the uniqueness and 
strangeness of this meeting." The static European economic positions 
were precipitately altered by the possibility of a German-Austrian 
Customs Union. Subsequently, the conditions were so fluid that only a 
prophet could foretell what the outcome would be. Of course, Wilson saw 
the potential effect of preferential conventions on cereals being con­
trary to the American most-favored-nation agreements. So apprehensive 
and embarrassed were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs that they were 
reading their speeches on economic subjects rather than using their 
usual extemporaneous delivery. Their comments resulted from the demands 
of their excited publics for some action to alleviate matters. The Amer­
ican ventured that the economic depression might have the beneficial 
effect of bringing about genuine concessions on disarmament.
Most delegates were apprehensive about the prospects of the 
General Disarmament Conference. They looked upon disarmament as an 
explosive topic which mi^t "go off in anyone's hands." Furthermore, 
they were fully aware of the evasive debates in the Preparatory Commission 
and of the disagreeable nature of the facts which would be presented to 
the future assembly. Also, they were convinced that the conference would 
test the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Most were ready to 
delay the meeting indefinitely, but the German insistence on immediate
^^Wilson to Stimson, May 26, 1931^ F.R., I,
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consideration was too strong to allow such a suggestion. According to 
Wilson, their governments were "between the hammer of a public demand 
for reduction and the anvil of a public demand for security."
The exception to that mood was the British, who, i*n contrast to
most other personnel, were enthusiastic and optimistic. Perhaps the 
most delighted of that group was Henderson, concerning his appointment 
as the President of the conference. In order to show the public the 
gravity of the effort, he, wanting as many outstanding persons as pos­
sible at Geneva in the early days of the convocation, hoped to have
12MacDonald, Mussolini, and Stimson there for the first sessions.
In May, the sixty-third session of the Council also considered
other old business. The body accepted the report from the Committee of
Experts on Budgetary Questions which was established to find a means of 
limiting war materials expenditures by restricting purchase, manufacture, 
and maintenance. The proposition provided for governments to submit 
expense reports for all their armaments, so the general problem could be 
fully considered at the Disarmament Conference. In addition, the League 
received a subcommittee statement on problems of air armaments limita­
tion by horsepower. Those specialists submitted a plan even though the 
method was agreed on merely because it contained fewer disadvantages
than other formulas. Also, the Council chose Geneva as the site and
13approved Henderson as the President.
Îbid.
^^Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 105-106.
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The body took up a related disarmament problem. At the January 
meeting it decided to secure information about armament positions and 
all data which would assist the conference in drafting specific recom­
mendations. Accordingly, Drummond began making the contacts about that 
lUmaterial. The British and the German governments sent him recommenda­
tions for a uniform form in which arms figures should be despatched, and 
the former urged the completion of the blank tables which were appended 
to the draft convention. The German note which provided for a question­
naire with information about trained reserves and war material in stock 
caused much anxiety in League circles. The apprehension was accentuated 
by the Secretariat's inability to ascertain what Berlin would propose in 
May. In general, Wilson and others presumed that country would ask for 
new tables which would require more information than the English measure. 
Drummond expected Germany to be completely alone when that part of the 
agenda was reached. At the May session, the Council adopted the British
procedure because the other plan might bring up technical problems about
15which the Preparatory Commission had previously decided.
The United States elected to participate in the program. By early 
May, American figures were already compiled, but Wilson suggested that 
they be withheld pending his report on the Council's decision. In case
^^Ibid., p. 107; Wilson to Stimson, February 19, 1931, 500-A15A4/ 
56; Wilson to Stimson, February 19, 1931, 500'A15A4/82.
^^Wilson to Stimson, March 20, 1931, 500*A15AV8^; Wilson to
Stimson, April 17, 1931, 500«A15A4/l20; Wilson to Stimson, May 3, 1931,5OO.AI5AV126.
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foreign representatives wanted his views during the Assembly, Wilson pro­
posed to say that the tables represented years of effort and compromise 
and that the short time was too brief for formulating another form.^^
After the May Council meeting, Wilson proposed a plan of action. 
Previously, Russia had submitted armament figures in a sealed letter to 
the Disarmament Conference with the stipulation that the Secretariat was 
not to examine them.^^ Considering the Soviet approach, the Minister 
felt that the United States could beneficially present its data with the 
reservation that the Council would not circulate it before mid-September 
and only then to those nations which had submitted figures. Further, 
Washington could publicize its transmission of the material, including 
the budgetary figures. That portion could be accompanied by a statement 
which called attention to the American attitude in the Preparatory Com­
mission. The maneuver would preserve the stance and still allow public­
ity about armament figures. If the Department concurred, Wilson might 
give Drummond the information and say that budgetary and horsepower
18statistics would be delivered later.
To Wilson’s gratification, Stimson was willing to go further by 
authorizing the Secretariat to publish the figures. When asked for his
^^ilson to Stimson, May 2, 1931, 500.A15AV126.
ITEarlier, Wilson had characterized the Russian data as "very 
scanty." For some reason the Secretariat opened the material which was 
reportedly fantastic and did not conform to the draft convention tables. 
Wilson to Stimson, May 2, 1931, Jay Pierrepont Moffat Papers, Houghton 
Library, Harvard University.
^®Wilson to Stimson, May 26, 1931, $OO.Al$A^^/lT^.
13^
vievs atout this approach, the Minister telegraphed his hearty agreement 
and recommended possible steps. He stressed the desirability of making 
the most of the submission to avoid the appearance of the act being 
merely routine. Of course, the United States could say that it did not 
object to the public release of figures if Drummond felt that move would 
have the beneficial effect of encouraging the other powers to publicize 
their details. As a means of emphasizing the importance of the Secre­
tary's proposed communication, Wilson later offered to hand it to the 
19Secretary General.
On June 6, the State Department sent the note which Drummond
was to receive. It contained material on armaments and budgetary
expenses which was only for information and publicity uses. The United
States withheld its report on the horsepower of airplane engines to see
whether it needed to revise those figures which were compiled before
the arrival of the Experts' Committee plan. For a time, Wilson thought
the Secretary's request for publicity so strong and definite that
Drummond might be embarrassed if the Council resolution prohibited the
release. The problem constituted only a slight difficulty, and both
20Stimson and Drummond arranged for publication on June 15. By
^^Stimson to Wilson, May 28, 1931» 500*-A15AV17^» Wilson to 
Stimson, May 29, 1931, 500.A15A4/179; Wilson to Stimson, June 3, 1931, 
500.A15A4/194.
^^Stimson to American Legation, Berne, June 6, 1931, 500.A15A1)-/ 
199; Wilson to Stimson, June T, 1931, 500.A15A4/201; Stimson to American 
Legation, Beme, June 8, 1931, 500.A15A4/206; Wilson to Stimson, June 9, 
1931, 500.AI5A V 207. Drummond desired no release before June I5, which 
would divert attention from the impact of the account. Subsequently, 
Wilson was embarrassed because the Paris editions of the Chicago Tribune
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September l8, I93I, Wilson reported that twenty-two nations had complied
with the resolution, and, eventually, fifty-five governments submitted 
21reports.
Shortly after the May Council session, word circulated that 
Stimson favored a delay in holding the General Disarmament Conference. 
According to Avenol, the French Foreign Office felt that the Secretary 
wanted a postponement, and another source told Wilson of Italy's desire 
to persuade Stimson that success would be more likely after a deferral. 
Also, the American Minister heard that the Paris and Rome governments 
would propose that the United States, a government separate from Euro­
pean problems, initiate such a movement.
Wilson saw serious consequences for his country if it took that 
action. In such an instance, the government would be vulnerable to the 
censure of Germany and the press of those nations which most desired a 
delay. Probably it would also be burdened with the blame for obstruct­
ing disarmament progress. To Wilson, the difficulty of timing was a 
distinctly continental matter for which those powers had to assume the 
responsibility. Consequently, he suggested a definite restatement of
and the Wew York Herald Tribune printed complete reports early. The 
State Department had prohibited the newspapers inside the United States 
from carrying the story that morning, but the papers, taking advantage 
of an instructional loophole, ordered publication by their European 
branches. Stimson to American Legation, Beme, June 13; 1931, 500’A15AV 
218; Wilson to Stimson, June 16, 193I, 500.A15A4/224; Stimson to Ameri­
can Legation, Beme, June I7, 1931, 500.A15A4/231.
^Vilson to Stimson, September I8, 1931, 500*A15AV393; Mahaney, 
"Soviet Union," p. 107•
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the neutrality which the Secretary had previously implied in news con­
ferences . That maneuver might preclude any foreign diplomatic inquiries 
which would lead to disappointment.^^
Despite American countermoves, rumors continued that the confer­
ence would meet later than originally scheduled, and the number of press 
accounts increased in August due to old and new developments. France 
had long been an advocate of delay, and possibly England currently pre­
ferred to give full attention to economic restoration. Besides, Hender­
son, now only a party leader instead of the Foreign Secretary, might be 
reluctant to be away from England for so long. Disapproving of such 
thinking, the State Department informed the press in Washington and in­
structed Wilson to use every appropriate occasion to deplore the re- 
23scheduling idea.
On September 8, 1931, an important new element in the conference 
preparations was introduced. That day, Dino Grandi, the head of the 
Italian delegation to the League, addressed the League Assembly about 
the possibility of a temporary cessation in arms building. He proposed 
that the governments which had accepted conference invitations agree to 
an armaments truce during the preparatory and conference periods. By 
prompt action they could end the construction of new items, which
^^Milson to Stimson, June 10, I93I, 500.A1$A4/210.
^%emorandum by Castle of a Conversation with President Hoover, 
August 28, 1931, F.R., I, 52O; Castle to Wilson, August 28, I93I, F.R., 
I, 52O-52I. Stimson expressed the same position two weeks later. 
Stimson to Wilson, September 10, 1931; F.R., I, 522-523-
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progress would indicate a spirit of goodwill and foster a wholesome 
milieu that might effectively move the conference toward success.
Wilson considered the address as significant. He ascertained 
that Grandi was still trying to formulate the plan more definitely, but 
that the Italian Minister really preferred to know foreign responses 
before he acted further. If enough support generated for the sugges­
tion, then he would submit a resolution. The American requested the
State Department to send along counsel for his use in conversations
2kabout the proposition.
Wilson observed considerable interest in and support for the 
speech among the other representatives. Perhaps most obvious was the 
enthusiastic Scandanavian attitude toward the step. Lord Cecil, a 
British delegate, placed his government squarely behind the idea of an 
arms truce and hoped that the proposition would be submitted to the 
Third Committee on disarmament. He expressed a dislike of postponing 
the conference and a desire for Germany and France to effect a genuine 
rapprochement which he felt would eliminate most of the world's politi­
cal restiveness. Stimson was delighted and showed his sympathy by 
directing his Minister to assure Grandi confidentially of the Secretary’s 
interest. He was to relate the conviction that the General Disarmament
^Sfilson to Stimson, September 8, 1931, F.R., I, kkO', Wilson to 
Stimson, September 10, 1931, 500.A15Ak/366«
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25Conference should not be bothered by continued arms building.
Later Wilson spoke with him about the prospects of the plan.
The Italian told him informally that the truce proposal would likely be 
discussed in the Third Committee on September l8. The backing had been 
less enthusiastic than he desired, and he fully expected Japan and 
France to oppose the abridgment in army material and naval increase, 
respectively. Despite that prospect, he planned to continue in the 
hope that the nations would accept some approach. Basically, Grandi's 
simple plan prohibited the construction of new ship keels, the increase 
of outlays for land equipnent, and the building of aircraft except for 
the replacement of old ones. He feared that opponents mi^t obstruct 
the plan by arguing that the nonparticipation of Russia, Turkey, and 
the United States precluded the possibility of a truce. To counter that, 
he might move that the Third Committee order Drummond to obtain their 
opinions or attendance at the committee meeting. Wilson promised to
26ask the Secretary of State for his advice.
^^ilson to Stimson, September 10, 1931> F.R., I, kk2; Stimson 
to Wilson, September 11, 1931; F.R., I, kh2-kk3^ Briand was less respon­
sive to the idea, and in a long address in the Assembly he ignored the 
proposal. He did, however, indicate that his government objected to 
postponement. Wilson to Stimson, September 11, 1931, 500.A15A4/371.
^^ilson to Stimson, September 16, 1931, F.R., I, 4^5-446. The 
Danish proposal, or the Scandinavian resolution, as Wilson most often 
referred to it, was introduced on September 10. It asked the Council 
to influence Disarmament Conference attendants to refrain from any step 
which would increase armaments beyond their current level and as a con­
sequence increase their expenditures for that construction. Wilson to 
Stimson, September 11, 1931, F.R., I, kkk.
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Stimson favored the ideas which Grandi had advanced. Depending 
on the effective date of the truce and the extent of foreign approval, 
the State Department considered the three points a satisfactory founda­
tion for debate. Certainly the United States would accept a League in­
vitation to sit with the Third Committee on the aims recommendation. He 
felt that his government would do so because of its concern for disarma­
ment and because of a definite and fresh proposition for consideration. 
Likely a naval truce would mean a greater loss to the United States be­
cause of its slow construction of cruisers than the other governments, 
but Washington would accept it in order to support Grandi's effort. 
Wilson would have to make clear to the foreign representatives, however, 
that the United States was letting contracts for destroyers which were a 
vital portion of the Hoover administration's employment program. Natur­
ally, the government would have to resolve that difficulty and retain
the economic recovery features, so Stimson asked the Minister for any
27proposition that he might have in mind.
In reply, Wilson offered a possible solution. Certainly, the 
United States should participate in order to bolster the powers which 
supported Grandi's design and possibly to persuade the reluctant govern­
ments to consent, also. Undoubtedly, the American posture would be 
stronger if the destroyer problem could be solved at home. If the Secre­
tary wanted a solution in Geneva, the Minister cautioned against weaken­
ing the State Department's position by making a reservation at once.
^^Stimson to Wilson, September l8, 1931# F.R., I, kkB-kkJ.
i4o
So, the representative could merely indicate a sincere agreanent with 
the Italian measure and the existence of minor problems which could be 
overcome later, an approach which would maintain the influence of Ameri­
can approval. Also, possibly by listening to the difficulties of other 
countries, Washington might be able to resolve its problem without any 
reservation. Perhaps an agreement that new contracts would not be issued
for naval units instead of the laying of keels might eliminate the
p8dilemma.
Stimson elaborated on the construction situation before he advo­
cated a more straightforward approach. His earlier reference to destroy­
ers meant'the replacement of old ships. The Wavy Department had received 
the bids for new crafts, but the contracts would not be assigned for a 
week or two which meant that the keel laying would not start for a month 
or even six weeks. Subsequently, when Wilson addressed the Third Com­
mittee, he was to indicate particularly the circumstances concerning 
those vessels. While the United States wanted to foster the adoption 
of the Grandi truce, it wished to avoid the contradiction of asking 
other governments to accept the holiday and of maintaining exceptions 
to be requested later. Hence, he was not to minimize the American in­
tention of constructing the destroyers. In the matter of substituting 
naval units for the laying of new keels, Stimson preferred the other 
delegates to advance the scheme which Wilson would support, but the
^®Wilson to Stimson, September l8, 1931, F.R., I, 414-7-4L8.
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Minister could propose it if necessary.
Then the Third Committee took up the matter of invitations to
nonmemhers. Initially^ it considered only those states which had been
members of the Preparatory Commission, so the chairman recommended that
Drummond contact those powers about participating in the debate. The
idea was cordially discussed without modification until Salvador de
Madariaga, the Spanish representative, successfully urged the inclusion
of all outsiders in the invitation. Later, the Third Committee referred
the matter to the Assembly's General Committee which invited those
states to attend the sessions in a consultative capacity. Subsequently,
the State Department ordered Wilson to participate only in the discus-
30sion of the Grandi proposal.
Once the nonmember states were present, the Third Committee 
resumed its formal consideration of the truce proposal. General Alberto 
de Marinis, an Italian representative, urged each power to announce 
formally its observance of the holiday. In the main, the personnel from 
Hungary, Austria, India, Denmark, South Africa, Greece, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Germany declared for it. The last delegate explained 
that Berlin regarded the measure as a stopgap move which did not obviate 
the responsibility to reduce armaments. The Japanese delegate urged a 
delay until the conference convened so that experts and data would both
2%timson to Wilson, September 20, 1931, F.R., I, ^51*
3^Vilson to Stimson, September l8, 1931, F.R., I, li-48-449;
Stimson to Wilson, September 19, 1931, F.R., I, 1^9*
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be available for proper discussion. Then Wilson delivered the comments
upon which Stimson and he had agreed, and, because of the Japanese stand,
he also stressed the salutary aspects of quick action. Likewise, Lord
Cecil spoke for prompt application in order to preclude the stockpiling
31of arms and to improve the international political environment.
At this point, the Third Committee became concerned about unanim­
ity. Althou^ Madariaga would support any motion to which the rest of 
the committee would agree, he recommended a flexible plan that the Assem­
bly ask all General Disarmament Conference participants to reduce their 
arms budget by ten percent for a year. If the plan became a resolution, 
Wilson was prepared to oppose it on the basis of the government's posi­
tion on budgetary'limitation in the Preparatory Commission. Then the 
French delegate criticized the technical facets of the Italian sugges­
tion before he offered his own pattern. He urged those nations in 
January, 1932, to transmit statements of the way that they would adhere 
to the Italian measure, and early in the conference those declarations 
would be debated to find an agreement if enough states were favorable. 
Wilson assumed that many exceptions would be attached to the announce­
ments. When the delegates divided in favor of the Scandinavian, Italian, 
Spanish, and French propositions, the group chose a drafting committee in 
what Wilson termed "the remote hope" of achieving a consensus.
3%ilson to Stimson, September 21, 1931, F.R., I, 4-52-453; Wilson 
to Stimson, September 22, 1931, F.R., I, 453-454; Wilson to Stimson, 
September 22, 1931, F.R., I, 453; Wilson to Stimson, September 23, 1931, 
F.R., I, 454-455.
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Wilson met with that committee as a consultant. World economic 
conditions were responsible for some tendency to prohibit the enlargement 
of the expenditures or armaments. Thereupon, Wilson reminded the members 
of the American attitude on budget limitation in the Preparatory Com­
mission. Since he was unsure of Stimson's opinion on the association of 
those restrictions with a truce, he presented his own suggestion, urging 
the avoidance of steps which mi^t cause higher allocations and which in 
turn might raise the arms level. Generally, his listeners favored the 
approach.
Initially, draft committee opinions diverged too greatly for the 
entire French or the Italian proposal to be the basis for a truce. Cecil 
was dissatisfied with the Scandinavian measure which required no announce­
ment to observe the holiday, and he required a declaration no matter how 
general it was. Wilson concurred in that contention because it repre­
sented the most that could be accomplished, but, despite the varied 
opinions, he anticipated that approval could be secured to prohibit 
an armaments increase. Although not fully satisfied with the suggested 
general proposal, Wilson thought that it constituted the maximum which 
could be accomplished then. He felt that it was possible to agree on a 
method which "would create an excellent psychological effect," and he 
hoped that the United States might consent to it.33
3%ilson to Stimson, September 2k, 1931, F.R., I, ^55-^5^; Wilson 
to Stimson, September 2k, 1931, F.R., I, k^6.
33wilson to Stimson, September 25, 1931, F.R., I, k^S-k^J.
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On September 25» Stimson was less enthusiastic about the drafting 
committee's action. He saw no holiday in the Minister's wording because 
governments could extensively scrap and replace naval vessels. Perhaps 
the provisions would even prevent the United States completing the cruis­
ers which were currently underway. Frankly» Stimson preferred no holiday 
rather than a draft which the powers might circumvent disingenuously. On 
expenses for land forces » Stimson would acquiesce even though it was not 
a practical way to handle the air and naval areas. Instead» the Secretary 
acknowledged a preference for countries halting the building of a new 
naval craft after October 1, except for those vessels which were already 
contracted. In addition» the governments would not exceed their current 
standing in land and air armaments, which procedure would allow replace­
ment construction in air and land equipment and possibly remove the need
34for a destroyer reservation.
Wilson was unable to alter the draft in line with Stimson's 
position. In the draft committee and in private talks, he expressed the 
Secretary's opinions on the weaknesses of the text, but most delegates 
viewed the draft as the most likely measure to produce unanimity. In 
fact, the majority of the group believed that the weak draft proposal 
was a valuable move for the European governments. Furthermore, European 
public opinion would view its acceptance as an act of good faith and a
Stimson to Wilson, September 25, 1931» F.R.» I, 457-458. 
Stimson wrote those comments before Wilson had sent the draft texts to 
him. The texts permitted the United States to continue its cruiser and 
destroyer construction already initiated. Wilson to Stimson, September 
26, 1931, F.R., I, 458-460.
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means of creating a favorable environment for the conference. With the
feeling running so strong in that direction, the United States vould be
isolated or grouped with France and its continental allies in opposition
to the majority. Every effort to consider a definite declaration was
confronted with such formidable technical arguments that it was hopeless
to make further gestures. Consequently, no chance existed of pursuing
•55the formula Stimson indicated on September 25»
For a fleeting moment it seemed that unanimity might be attained. 
At least that was the appearance until Grandi learned that the French 
text would allow the Paris government to keep building according to its 
five-year plan and would prohibit new construction by other governments. 
With the refusal of the Italian to accept the resolution, Wilson pre­
dicted no unanimity except on the Scandinavian resolution.
To Stimson, the latest developments were unsatisfactory. Wot 
only was the failure to adopt the Italian proposal disappointing, but 
also the Scandinavian approach was inadequate because it might preclude 
the construction of craft already underway and allow unrestricted naval 
replacements. Therefore, he instructed Wilson to meet \ri.th Grandi and 
Massigli about the possibility of their writing an acceptable draft.
He was to indicate the unacceptability of the Danish resolution and the
^^ilson to Stimson, September 26, I93I, F.R., I, 460-46l.
3^ilson to Stimson, September 27, 1931, F.R., I, 66lj Stimson
to Wilson, September 27, 1931, F.R., I, 461-462; Wilson to Stimson,
September 27, 1931, F.R., I, 46^
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French proposal, if it allowed Paris to continue its five-year program 
during the truce. The latter provision would undermine the entire holi­
day idea, and the Secretary would not accept such a sham. Subsequently,
37Wilson tried unsuccessfully to bring France and Italy together.
On September 29, Wilson spent a full day on the resolution work. 
When it appeared that opinion was shifting to the Scandinavian proposal, 
Wilson stated the American objectives and advocated continuing the effort 
to produce a more tangible result. In the drafting committee the major­
ity favored the interpretation which would allow replacement, and the 
Minister noted the impossibility of complete prohibition of that right. 
Wilson pointed out that the interpretation would place his government at 
a disadvantage compared to Japan and Britain, so Washington would closely 
examine the point. Later, he had the statement deleted from the sub­
committee report because each country would naturally decide the issue 
for itself. Wear midnight of September 28, the Third Committee approved 
a resolution which basically was the French text. Although the draft 
was okay, the interpretations were unsatisfactory, so he refrained from
38any statement of American responsibility.
Thereafter, arms truce developments progressed smoothly. The 
next day, September 29; the Assembly accepted the Third Committee’s
37stimson to Wilson, September 27, 1931, F.R., I, k6Si Wilson to 
Stimson, September 29, 1931, F.R., I, ^63.
^^Besides, Cecil indicated in the formal and later private dis­
cussions that the three countries could negotiate directly or possibly 
that London mi^t ask Japan to give up replacement privileges during 
the holiday. Wilson to Stimson, September 29, 1931, F.R., I, h6S-h6h.
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resolution and report. So, the Council was directed to request the par­
ticipants of the Disarmament Conference to indicate hy November 1, 1931, 
if they would ahide by the truce for one year. Accordingly, the informa­
tion was sought, and the United States and fifty-three other governments 
return affirmative responses along with accompanying interpretations.
On November It-, the Council President, having received no formal opposi­
tion to the measure, declared it effective as of November 1.^^
For the remainder of the year, disarmament preparations claimed 
Nilson's and the State Department's attention. Gibson suggested that 
his colleague be called home to give an account of the Geneva situation 
and other recent developments before the arrival of French Premier 
Pierre Laval in Washington for a state v i s i t . O n  October 2, Wilson 
left for Brussels and Paris, and six days later he sailed from England 
on the George Washington. I n  the United States, he conferred with 
State Department officials, and by December 1̂ -, he was once again in 
charge in B e r n e .^2
That month's events moved toward the selection of the Disarmament 
Conference delegation. Since MacDonald had published the names of some
^^Drummond to Stimson, November 1^, 1931, F.R., I, 4-T0-4T1; 
Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 107-108.
^^Gibson to Stimson, October 1, 1931, 123.W693/288.
^%ilson to Stimson, October 1, 1931, I23.W693/29I,’ Dawes to 
Stimson, October 6, 193I, 123 .W693/292.
^%ilson to Stimson, December 1^, 1931, 123 .W693/31^»
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British representatives, the press had importuned President Hoover to 
reveal the names of his choices. Before the disclosure, Wilson requested 
that his rank he the equivalent of his foreign colleagues vho were usually 
in Geneva and who were to attend the conference since to have less status 
than they would he repugnant even thou^ a title would not affect his 
work.̂ ^
On December 29, Wilson learned of the appointments. Charles 
Dawes was made the chairman, hut he was replaced by Stimson on January 19, 
1932, when the Ambassador became the President of the recently established 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia, 
a member of the Senate Naval Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Dr. Mary Fmrna. Wooley, the President of Mt. Holyoke College, and Gibson, 
who handled the chairman's duties in the absence of Stimson, rounded out 
the list of regular delegates with Wilson as an alternate. So, Hoover 
appointed an unusual combination of two Democrats, two professional dip­
lomats, and a woman whose party affiliation was unknown to Wilson. Thus,
44the delegation was constituted for the work of 1932.
^^Moffat to Wilson, December $, 1931; Moffat Papers. When Wilson 
made the inquiry about rank, he thought that the delegation might be 
announced before Moffat received the Minister's letter in the Division 
of Western European Affairs. Wilson to Moffat, December 21, 1931,
Moffat Papers.
^^Stimson to Wilson, December 29, 1931, F.R., I, 534-535; Wilson, 
Diplomat, pp. 268-271,' Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 205-206.
CHAPTER VII.
THE GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 
AND BUREAU MEETINGS OF 1932
General world conditions worked against the prospects of a success­
ful conference with economic depression still burdening all nations in 
February, 1932. The financial distress was particularly evident in Ger­
many where the Communists and Fascists had secured a notable advance in 
the latest election. The extreme Ri^t government of French Premier 
Andre Tardieu was expected not to accommodate the moderate Berlin regime 
of Chancellor Heinrich Bruening. In addition, Japan and China continued 
their hostilities after September, 193I. Arthur Henderson, no longer the 
British Foreign Secretary, was handicapped as chairman by an illness which 
was eventually fatal. Wilson and other diplomats knew that those factors 
constituted unfavorable omens, but they could do little to alter the 
course of events. They could only hope for a miracle to reverse the 
trend, but none materialized.^
To Wilson, the fundamental obstacle which blocked the way to 
achievement was the French-German dispute over security and armament 
equality. As a result of the Versailles Treaty, Germany possessed an 
insufficient force for an effective assault on its equipped neighbor. 
However, the former's edge in industry and population was definite and 
increasing, and French officials foresaw that arms equality mi^t mean
Wilson, Diplomat, p. 204; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 19k; 
Walters, League, ÏÏ, ^OÏ.
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Berlin's domination of Paris. Although France enjoyed a great prestige 
and a number of alliances, it continually pressed friends to guarantee 
its security in return for arms reduction. Only the London and Washing­
ton governments could have fulfilled those requests, but neither their
national interests nor their people were involved enough to be willing 
2to do so.
Wilson doubted the readiness of the French to relinquish conti­
nental hegemony, especially regarding Germany. At a delegation meeting, 
Hugh Gibson, who was acting chief delegate, requested Wilson to explain 
the French demand. Wilson then fully detailed the French argument that 
security should be guaranteed before any agreement was made on disarma­
ment, and his explanation seemed sympathetic to Paris. Senator Claude 
Swanson then asked him if he considered it "a righteous claim." Wilson 
replied that, in fact, he condemned the approach since it might possibly 
wreck the conference; actually, he dismissed the moral aspect since France 
definitely had enough strength to insist on its position without resort­
ing to moral emphasis.
When Wilson compiled his autobiographical account of that ex­
change, he elaborated on the moral approach to international affairs.
He observed that the Senator's comments reflected a common attitude of 
his countrymen who generally evaluated an event as "good," "bad," 
"righteous," or "unjust." The instant assessment was in terms of Ameri­
can criteria which the censured government might not consider valid
2t.T4Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 265-266.
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within its "borders. In his thinking, the application of conscience which 
was given by God for the judging of one's own personal conduct to others 
was a most inappropriate and dangerous use of moral judgment.̂
On February 2, the World Disarmament Conference began what Wilson 
termed "a colossal effort" about which most delegates were sincere, for 
the majority of them had some glimmer of the future troubles if they 
failed and had considerable knowledge of the strong disarmament senti­
ment in each of their countries. Early in the proceedings, a day was set 
aside on which peace societies, veterans organizations, religious groups, 
labor unions, and women's clubs could express their hope for significant 
progress. Wilson, personally, was profoundly impressed by the presenta­
tions of the private American representatives. Despite his knowledge of 
the impediments before the conference, he thought for a short time that 
public opinion might bring about success. Diplomatic maneuvers shortly
pushed those sentiments into the background, and the delegations con-
1).ducted endless and fruitless debate.
For about three weeks, the conference consisted of speeches by the 
delegations. On February $, Tardieu introduced a plan which would create 
an international police force and largely disallow the use of powerful 
and dangerous equipment except by League orders or in self-defense. The 
move did not solve the German problem, but it made French action appear
3lbid., pp. 268-270.
Vilson, Diplomat, pp. 263-265; Walters, League, II, 502; Ferrell, 
■American Diplomacy, p. 207.
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to be a justification for continued restrictions on its neighbor.
The British and American plans, delivered on February 8 and 9, 
respectively, vere very similar. Both wanted to move cautiously on the 
abolition or reduction of means of attack, a subject which was increas­
ingly known as qualitative disarmament. They also urged the continuation 
of the Washington and London treaties and the reduction of effective 
soldiers as low as possible.^
To the general relief of most delegates, Bruening of Germany 
spoke calmly for arms equality through a decrease by other governments. 
Grandi of Italy bolstered that position by supporting Berlin’s claim for 
equality and the elimination of the most dangerous kinds of weapons. He 
objected to the French insistence on new security guarantees, a point 
which Britain and the United States ignored. Because of the cordial tone 
of those addresses, Wilson felt that a hopeful attitude existed in the 
conference. In fact, Britain, Russia, Italy, and the United States were 
fairly close to the German position, if Berlin’s specific demands were 
not too great. Once again, international conditions prevented the quick
pursuit of that prospect, however, and on February 2k, the general de-
7bates ended with no more plenary sessions being held until July 23*
Walters, League, II, 502-503; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 
507; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 110-111.
Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 112-11^; Address Delivered by Gib­
son at the General Disarmament Conference, Geneva, February 9> 1932,
F.R., I, 25-30.
^Walters, League, II, 503, 505; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 114- 
13.6, 121; Wilson to Moffat, February 10, 1932, Moffat Papers.
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After that stage, the conference assigned the work to groups for 
analysis.. On February 25, the General Commission, which was composed of 
personnel from all the delegations, set up the Land, Naval, and Air Com­
mittees to examine the possible application of qualitative disarmament. 
The early meetings showed that the parent agency would have to establish 
guiding principles before much progress could be made. On April 22, the 
General Commission adopted a resolution favoring qualitative disarmament 
and one directing the study groups to designate definitely offensive 
weapons and those which were dangerous to civilians. On April 26, upon 
receiving those instructions, the commissions, aided by specialists, 
resumed their assignments which they debated for about six weeks. In the 
meantime, the General Commission delayed consideration of other agenda
Q
items until those reports were available.
Wilson was assigned to the Land Committee which considered the 
caliber and mobility of arms, the size and utility of tanks, and the 
value of training in the development of soldiers. No one proposed num­
bers for specific nations, but the delegates attempted to define offen­
sive and defensive armaments with each person contending that his coun­
try’s equipment was defensive. Wilson considered appropriate the state­
ment of Salvador de Madariaga of Spain that the designation depended on
9which end of the weapon a nation was viewing.
^Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 131-133- 
Wilson, Diplomat, p. 268.
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The reports of the three committees were far from satisfactory. 
Because each contained highly subjective interpretations and no unani­
mous statements, the agencies merely recorded the opinions and positions 
of the delegates. Since the accounts indicated no overall agreement oh 
qualitative disarmament, the Bureau, which was also known as the Steer­
ing Committee, consisting of the chief delegates from some countries for 
planning, asked the delegations to talk privately as preparation for a 
possible consensus in the General Commission. Although most representa­
tives participated in those conversations, many felt that the method 
offended those delegates from small countries who were not specifically
consulted. In particular, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States
10opposed the approach because it allegedly impeded the progress.
In mid-April, 1932, Stimson was in Geneva as chairman of the 
delegation. Actually, he visited the conference building only once, and 
he did not even participate in the committee's discussions. Most of his 
work consisted of private talks with personnel of the major European 
powers, including Prime Minister MacDonald and Chancellor Bruening with 
whom he even arrived at a possible agreement. However, they could not 
get the cooperation of Tardieu. When those statesmen returned home, 
another chance for agreement had passed without accomplishment because 
of a Erench-British conflict on security requirements.^^
^%ahaney, "Soviet Union," p. 13$.
^^Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 271-272; Ferrell, American Diplomacy,
pp. 208-212.
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After Stimson's visit, the conference delegates continued their 
meetings, hut they were accomplishing nothing substantial. They con­
sidered technical problems in much the same involved and unprogressive 
manner as in the Preparatory Commission proceedings years before. To 
further complicate matters, many points were injected to prevent 
specific recommendations for arms reduction.
Possibly, the only way of moving forward was the meeting of the
chief delegates of the major powers. Usually, only MacDonald and Sir
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, Premier Eduard Harriot and
Joseph Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, and Gibson attended
those gatherings. Not much really resulted because France was unwilling
to concede anything regarding armaments and Britain refrained from ade-
12quate assurances to Paris for assistance against aggression.
A different tack was necessary to get the conference off dead- 
center, and on June 22, at the first general meeting in six weeks,
Gibson submitted the Hoover Plan for that purpose. The United States' 
proposal urged the abolition of obvious offensive weapons including 
tanks, bombers, large mobile artillery, and chemical agents. Land forces 
and battleship numbers and total tonnage were to be reduced by a third, 
and other warships were to be cut by a fourth. At the same time, no 
country was to exceed a total of forty submarines or 3,500 tons. If the 
proposition was adopted, the United States would scrap many items, but 
the increased economic savings and the enhancement of peace prospects
^%alters. League, II, 508.
156
13would be well worthwhile.
The reaction in Geneva was immediate. Grandi demonstrated his 
hearty support by adding after his reading of each point in the Hoover 
Plan, "Italy accepts." To Wilson, the growing enthusiasm was checked by 
the suave approach of Simon who praised the American proposal and person­
nel but included so many loopholes that other delegates sensed British
opposition to the recommendation. Germany and Russia approved the propo-
li*.sition, but Prance noted the lack of any statement about security.
Despite the popularity of the Hoover Plan, the conference did 
not move perceptibly. Eventually, all that the convocation accepted was 
a resolution on July 23, which summarized the accomplishments of the 
session to that date and which projected what preparations needed to be 
undertaken for the fall meetings. While openly dissatisfied with the 
statement, most nations supported its adoption. Germany constituted the 
most notable exception by withholding its consent and by declaring that 
it would not attend in the autumn unless the conference recognized the 
principle of equality of rights. Thus, the Assembly was primarily a 
failure to this point, and its future was clouded by Berlin’s remaining 
away, awaiting proper acknowledgement of its claims.
^^stimson to Gibson, June 21, 1932, F.R., I, 211-214; Gibson to 
Stimson, June 22, 1932, F.R., I, 220-221.
^Vilson, Diplomat, p. 273; Walters, League, II, 507-508; Mahaney-, 
"Soviet Union," pp. 139-1^0. Wilson’s account is in contrast to the Gib- . 
son evaluation that Simon was friendly to the plan and that he would sup­
port it. Gibson thought that the press would list the Englishman as op­
posed because the speech was long and cautiously worded. Memorandum of a 
Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between Gibson and Davis and Hoover 
and Stimson, June 22, 1932, F.R., I, 215-216.
15Walters, League, II, 511-512; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. l40-l42.
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In the summer, Wilson looked forward to a vacation. Since he be­
lieved that the conference would continue through most of June, he re­
solved to demand two months away from the pressure of his duties; he had 
not had that much time off during his five years in Switzerland. He was
16adamant as he confided to Moffat, "I will not give up my leave."
The leave did not materialize as he anticipated. He was planning 
a three weeks’ vacation in August with another week in September, and on 
August 8, he indicated that he was leaving Berne. However, a few days 
later the relaxation with Hugh Robert, Jr. in Corsica was interrupted by 
a State Department telegram that mission chiefs were not eligible for 
furlough because of salary reductions and economic moves during the de­
pression. Disturbed by the news which "shattered the only two weeks of 
rest I had," he cut short his stay and returned to his post because the 
loss of a month's income would have been too great for his budget. Actu­
ally, he wanted to "wring someone's neck" for the failure to inform him
17fully when he first submitted his request for leave.
The ti^t money situation in the United States also had a notice­
able effect on preparations for the Bureau meeting. The allotment for
^^ilson to Moffat, March 13, 1932, Moffat Papers.
T̂o-ihson to Stimson, July 2k, 1932, 123*w693/32^; Wilson to Stim­
son, August 8, 1932, I23.W693/326; Moffat to Wilson, September 27, 1932, 
Moffat Papers; Wilson to Moffat, September 13, 1932, Moffat Papers. Thus, 
by August 26, Wilson was once again in charge in Beme. Wilson to Stim­
son, August 26, 1932, I23.W693/328. Wilson also planned to be in England 
for a week beginning September 4. Wilson to Stimson, August 31, 1932,
I23.W693/329.
158
offices would not permit the renting of hotel rooms together, so Wilson 
intended to find space elsewhere, althou^ the separation was a definite 
handicap. Despite the monetary squeeze, the Washington officials estab­
lished an allocation for working accommodations which were acceptable to 
the Minister.^®
The penurious policies of the American government also affected 
the personnel assignments for the meeting. According to Allen W. Dulles, 
the Legal Adviser of the disarmament delegation, the financial crisis con­
tinued so acute that probably the conference personnel would be without 
military and naval consultants. In response to that news, the Minister 
specifically requested that Colonel George Strong, who had previously 
worked on disarmament in Geneva, be allowed to come. Two weeks later,
the Army officer, whose knowledge was especially vital for the compli-
19cated effectives problem, was assigned to advise the Minister.
Before the Bureau meeting convened, Wilson found himself igno­
rant of some naval details. On September 13, he and Thanassis Aghnides, 
the Chief of the League's Disarmament Section, went over a general 
account that the latter had compiled about work on the resolution of 
July 23. Wilson considered himself amply informed about all the items 
except on the large naval power talks. Thus, he needed the Secretary's
18Moffat to Wilson, August 18, 1932, Moffat Papers; Wilson to 
Stimson, September 2, 1932, 500.Al^A^Personnel/351; Wilson to Moffat, 
September 15  ̂1932, Moffat Papers.
^^wilson to Moffat, August 27; 1932, Moffat Papers; Stimson to 
American Legation, Beme, September 10, 1932, 500>-A15Â -Personnel/763.
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views on the appropriate answer to Henderson’s anticipated query regard­
ing naval progress. Stimson replied that the Anglo-American naval talks 
were currently suspended and that the two nations had not determined a 
specific date to resume them. The State Department presumed that the 
other concerned governments had been preparing individually in order that 
multilateral discussions could be arranged. Stimson proposed that the 
Minister consult Simon about the drafting of an identical statement for 
submission to the conference chairman. The Englishman had nothing to
report other than a hope for conversations to begin soon, so Wilson still
20lacked adequate naval information.
On September 21, the Bureau convened and directed its attention 
to procedural matters. Henderson read his correspondence with the German 
Foreign Minister about Germany's absence and recommended the postponement 
of discussion to allow Berlin a chance to respond. Then he distributed 
questions in four categories which were based on the July 23rd resolu­
tion. When the group chose to examine the program itself to ascertain 
whether it would handle the questions or give them to committees, Wilson 
proposed that work could proceed on several items in committees. On 
effectives, he proposed the inclusion of political officials in the body 
which would be permitted to draft "its own mandate" for the Bureau to
approve. The majority reacted favorably to his remarks, but they delayed
21the decision until the next day.
^^Wilson to Stimson, September lij-, 1932, F.R., I, 328; Wilson to 
Stimson, September 22, 1932, F.R., I, 335*
^%ilson to Stimson, September 21, 1932, F.R., I, 332-333-
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As planned, the Biirean resumed its discussion. It selected indi­
vidual rapporteurs to leam delegation positions and to inform it of a 
basis for conversations "arranged in two instances." It requested a pre­
liminary report from the Chemical and Bacteriological Committee before 
general debate on the subject, and the Bureau opted for groups on the 
production and trade in arms and also on effectives. Concerning the last 
point, the Steering Committee accepted the American Minister's suggestion.
It then adjourned until the following week because some members had to
22attend the League Council on September 23.
On September 24, Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia, a rapporteur, 
conversed confidentially about future action. According to him, on 
September 26, Henderson intended to stress the hesitance to take up the 
important points of the July 23 resolution. Consequently, he would urge 
the assemblying of the General Commission about November 10, possibly to 
get the Bureau to work fast and to assemble a group which undoubtedly 
could consider major political issues.
Wilson viewed such procedure as an attempt to evade responsibil­
ity. He thought that method would delay the work by encouraging the 
Steering Committee to return the difficulties to the General Commission. 
He interpreted the July statement as obligating the Bureau to draw up 
various provisions and to make arrangements for arms reduction and for 
restricting the means of attack. Pending a definite attempt to resolve 
those problems, it could report no accomplishment, so he disapproved of
^%ilson to Stimson, September 22, 1932, F.R., I, 33^-335•
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establishing a convocation date then for the larger body. He wanted the
Bureau to leam whether it could achieve anything or whether it had to
admit failure. To him, it would have to test its instructions first, and
he would work for that goal in preparation for setting a time. Besides,
he felt that the obligation to work on certain problems would still be
23binding even if a General Commission session was scheduled.
Stimson had some words of caution for the Minister. Wilson 
should keep in mind that procedural disagreement among Britain, France, 
and the United States would be distorted much beyond the scope of the 
issue itself. Even though Washington might differ on policy matters 
with London and Paris, the Secretary desired to make it seem that the 
three countries were cooperating. That appearance might be accomplished 
through an informal understanding before the next Bureau session. Ac­
cordingly, he instructed the American delegate to work toward an under­
standing with Simon and Paul-Boncour since the American approach was a 
good one which should be promoted. If the French and British representa­
tives failed to concur with him, then he could independently take his 
stand.2^
On September 26, as expected, Henderson brought up the matter of 
a date. First, Madariaga of Spain questioned the practicality of that 
move, and then, Wilson spoke for the Bureau's attempt to fulfill its
^^Wilson, Diplomat, p. 267; Wilson to Stimson, September 2k, 
1932, F.R., I, 335:335:
PkStimson to Wilson, September 25, 1932, F.R., I, 337*
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assignment instead of postponing decision for a more general body. Paul- 
Boncour and Simon, with whom Wilson had previously agreed on the pro­
cedure, supported those arguments. The group decided to consider the
problem again about October 10, when it mi^t assess the degree of
25actual achievement.
On October 9» Wilson conversed with Benes about the Czech's 
prospective plan. He wanted Henderson to set the Bureau meeting for 
about October 19, to allow time for the submission of the reports from 
the rapporteurs and committees. Then the conference President mi^t urge 
that Italian, French, British, and American personnel informally discuss 
the major political matters in the hope of concluding some agreement. If 
possible, the talks mi^t precede the Manchurian debate in November. 
Personally, Wilson approved the procedural advantages because his govern­
ment was more willing to consider disarmament matters than many other 
topics. He stressed the need for consulting Berlin lest that government 
think that the four countries were drafting an ultimatum to it. He urged 
that he be kept informed of developments in order to secure Stimson's 
opinions if a proposal was suddenly put forward. Benes promised to do 
so since the plan was tentative and would have to be discussed with 
Harriot before any suggestion could be made to Henderson.
The Minister did not disclose other thoughts to the rapporteur 
because he had not contacted the Secretary of State about them. Benes' 
approach toward the German's insistence on equality was a natural
^^Wilson to Stimson, September 26, 1932, F.R., I, 338.
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outgrowth of events after the British suggestion of a five-power convoca­
tion at London. Later developments indicated French reluctance to con­
duct the talks outside of Geneva and the determination of the French and 
some small governments to include the latter states. According to the 
Benes plan, Henderson would possibly be informed of progress, and he 
could brief the diminutive countries. In addition, Wilson saw the need 
of telling Berlin of the plan if it materialized and of inquiring whether 
its authorities would participate in the informal session as a method of 
settling problems. By that procedure Germany would participate in a po­
litically acceptable way.^^
At a secret Bureau meeting on October 13, Wilson was brought 
up to date on Bureau progress. In a summary of his efforts to have 
French-German discussion, the chairman remarked that Baron Konstantin 
von Weurath, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, had declined to 
come to Geneva. Instead, his acceptance of the invitation to London pre­
cluded that trip. Henderson also relayed Harriot's prediction that a 
French disarmament plan would be submitted near the end of the month.
Regarding future Bureau meetings, Henderson reported the opinion 
of Drummond and the conference officials that the President should be 
authorized to set the next session for November 3* The new schedule 
would permit the committees more working time and allow an opportunity 
to transmit the French proposal. The officials wanted the General Com­
mission to convene the week of November 21, which arrangement would allow
^^Wilson to Stimson, October 9, 1932, F.R., I, 3^1-3^2.
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three veeks for the General Commission to consider Bureau reports, the
French plan, and possibly German-French difficulties. Probably, the
body vould not meet in January, 1933, since the World Economic Conference
27vas to convene then.
During the procedural discussions, the Committee for the Regula­
tion of Trade in and Manufacture of Arms vas functioning. On October 6, 
it conducted the first general discussion during vhich Leon Jouhaux of 
France urged the complete elimination of private manufacture of var 
material. If that could not be accomplished, he proposed rigid super­
vision and limitation, and Madariaga recommended the same control method 
for government and private production. His approach included those tvo 
areas, stored surpluses, and increased traffic regulation by placing 
copies of licenses for arms shipments vith a Geneva office. Wilson 
favored consideration of the license proposal vhich might provide a solu­
tion, and he outlined his government's stand on constitutional complica-
28tions and for complete publicity on private and state construction.
Within a short time, he needed some instructions on the posture 
to take. The general discussions of arms regulation vere over, and no 
significant movement had been made tovard removing differences of opinion 
by the first reading of the draft agreement of 1929 on manufacture. He 
expected the committee to start its detailed scrutiny of that text on 
October 17, and he anticipated a definite effort to abolish private
^^Wilson to Stimson, October 13, 1932, F.R., I, 3^2-3^3*
^^ilson to Stimson, October 6, 1932, F.R., I, 3̂ 0*
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production. If the committee failed to adopt the abolition of the pri­
vate and government output, then it probably would try for a regulatory 
system including arms traffic, stock inventory, and state and private 
building. Consequently, the delegate needed to know the Department's 
attitude on Madariaga's suggestion and on the responsibility which the 
United States would accept for a license program. Besides, excepting
expediency, would the elimination of private arms activities be uncon- 
29stitutional?
On October ly, Stimson focused on the last question. He frankly 
did not see that the government could exclude the aspect of utility from 
the question of abolishing private arms construction because that sector 
constituted a vital part of national defense. Certainly, the United 
States was interested in precluding the production of forbidden weapons 
which was a logical corollary of President Hoover's recommendations.
Tne State Department, having completed a thorough study recently, was now 
willing to alter its old position that it was unconstitutional for the 
national government to control private producers. Although no one could 
categorically say that such action was valid, Washington was willing to 
covenant for manufacturing restrictions on all prohibited arms. At this 
point Stimson requested the Minister's view as to whether to remain quiet 
about legal doubts. He also wondered whether to state that, if Congress 
or the federal courts ruled void a Department negotiation, the decision
^^Wilson to Stimson, October 8, 1932, F.R., I, 3^0-3^1j Wilson
to Stimson, October lit-, 1932, F.R., I, 3^3-3^^•
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vould not be "regarded as a breach of our international undertakings."
Furthermore, the responsibility for licensing of arms imports 
and exports vas vithin the treaty making pover and Congressional author­
ity to regulate commerce. Stimson actually questioned the value of the 
conference making nev regulations before the 1925 convention vas ap­
proved. Probably, a resolution favoring ratification or the inclusion 
of a statement in the nev disarmament agreement vould accomplish the 
same purpose. Accordingly, Wilson mi^t assure other delegations that 
his government vould try hard to obtain the Senate’s consent to the 1925 
treaty in its next session.
Regarding Madariaga's license proposal, the same plan vas includ­
ed in a 1920 agreement, and the provisions of the 1925 convention super­
seded the earlier ones. So, the Spanish machinery vas unnecessary if 
ratification could be obtained, but Stimson knev of no overvhelming ob­
stacle to placing copies in a central office. Otherwise, the Spaniard's
30other recommendations appeared to be impractical.
Wilson vas dissatisfied vith the Secretary's ansver to the con­
stitutional matter. The modified State Department position certainly 
simplified Wilson's current difficulties, but he brought up the subject 
again to secure a clarification vhich vas most vital to his future activ­
ities. If the problem concerned only the exclusion of manufacturing
Stimson to Wilson, October IT, 1932, F.R., I, by
October 21, the Committee on the Manufacture of Arms had adjourned 
until after the Bureau meeting of November 3- Wilson to Stimson, 
October 21, 1932, F.R., I, 3̂ 7-
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specific arms categories, Wilson would comply with the instructions of 
October 17. He pointed specifically to the American reservation con­
cerning supervision and publicity in the 1929 draft agreement. If the 
United States acknowledged the federal government's ri^t to forbid spe­
cific building, then it had to grant the ri^t to oversee that produc­
tion. He projected the possibility of supervision proceeding to economic 
areas and perhaps eventually encroaching on state sovereignty. Hot sur­
prisingly, he was reluctant to accept the switch in constitutional inter­
pretation without additional investigation, and to gain an elaboration, 
he urged the solicitation of the Attorney General's ruling. He counseled 
that American officials early explain the reason for modifying the opin­
ion which the United States had followed for seven years. In his think­
ing, the officials should "not run any risk of being subsequently put in
a position where the action of the courts might cause other nations to
31feel that we have violated our treaty obligations."
According to Moffat, that communication arrived "like a bomb­
shell." The Department's Legal Adviser and his colleagues had previously 
worked out a closely reasoned conclusion which caused Washington person­
nel immediately to reject contacting the Attorney General. Concerning 
policy, little inclination existed in the State Department to concur 
with the Minister whom Moffat interpreted as wanting to indicate that the 
United States could not agree, instead of would not. Of course, it was
3^Wilson to Stimson, October 21, 1932, F.R., I, 3^6-3^.
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a question of tactics, and the aim in Washington was to arrive at an
agreement which would fulfill the Hoover Plan rather than to make it a
parody. Naturally, the American public was the final authority, and,
if it supported the new action, a legalistic argument could not change 
•?2the policy.
As Moffat predicted, the State Department retained its stand.
It felt that the judiciary would refrain from nullifying a stipulation 
essential to a disarmament agreement. Besides, Washington would not 
endanger the possibility of successful arms limitation negotiations by 
claiming that a provision was contrary to the constitution. It relied 
on the precedent that no treaty approved by the Senate had been struck 
down by the courts. Regarding rejection of unacceptable draft articles, 
Stimson preferred not to employ the constitutional argument if possible 
since the government could more easily reject a provision on the grounds 
of expediency. Furthermore, it appeared practical to submit the Ameri­
can concurrence with the prohibition of weapons manufacture as a corol­
lary of Hoover’s plan to abolish aggressive arms without relating it to 
supervision of weapons construction. If a country agreed to exclusion, 
it was not obligated to consent to international supervision or control 
over building.
Possibly the convention might not abolish specific kinds of 
armaments although the contrary had been the basis for the exchange of 
correspondence. It appeared that the French were becoming less con­
cerned about prohibition and more interested in a graduated decrease in
^^ffat to Wilson, October 22, 1932, Moffat Papers.
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material. If that approach was adopted., then the previous instructions 
were less immediately relevant. Whatever developed, the State Depart­
ment hoped that he could avoid arms talks until definite progress was
33evident.
On November 1, in anticipation that the Bureau's first debate 
would be arms control on November 3, Wilson projected a course of action. 
He thought that he should speak formally on the topic early and call 
attention to more important items. With that in mind, he intended to 
shew that the draft convention articles on supervision and control pro­
vided for adequate regulation. Accordingly, the United States believed 
that the effectiveness of the system which the Permanent Disarmament 
Commission would use depended largely on the implementation of consider­
able reduction as envisioned by the July 23 resolution. Pending that 
achievement, Washington would delay its decision on the machinery subject 
to the final treaty provisions. Despite the preference for handling the 
more important problem first, the delegation would bow to the Bureau's 
desire to debate ratification of controls. During that time Wilson de­
sired the governments to remember that American consent to the enlarge­
ment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission rested with the treaty's 
contents on "substantial reduction.
The last sentence gave rise to a further exchange with Stimson.
He feared that Wilson was too readily acceding on supervision and control
33gtimson to Wilson, November 1, 1932, F.R., I, 351-353•
3^Wilson to Stimson, November 1, 1932, P.R., I, 351*
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matters without first utilizing the concession for diplomatic trading.
Consequently, he preferred that the Minister adopt a waiting attitude
in order to maintain a flexibility of response until the treaty was 
35concluded.
Wilson then responded that he was really stressing strategy 
without an alteration of the Secretary's position. The delegate con­
sidered it tactically important to accept the Bureau's preference to 
discuss control rather than for him to insist fruitlessly on the estab­
lishment of figures. Besides, American obstinancy on numbers mi^t en­
danger the conference's future. The selection of the other approach 
would allow continued debate and retain the reservation of a deferred 
decision for repeated use. Wilson was especially adamant for his view 
because he saw the first signs of results and because the other states 
would not take the necessary steps without some assurance of a tenta­
tive control settlement. The State Department finally acquiesced in 
his suggestion.3^
Despite previous discussion of constitutional problems, Wilson 
still had another question on the subject. Ho wondered whether the argu­
ment was sound that the United States government could not constitu­
tionally oversee or control the internal production of arms, munitions, 
and war equipment. If that position was incorrect, he would correspond
35stimson to Wilson, November 1, 1932, F.R., I, 353-35^* 
^^ilson to Stimson, November 2, 1932, F.R., I, 35^-355; Carr
to Wilson, November 2, 1932, F.R., I, 355-
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■with Stimson on moves to rectify the stand. The delegation had not made 
any commitment concerning International control, so the current Inquiry
37concerned only domestic supervision.
Wilbur J. Carr, the Acting Secretary of State, handled the reply. 
He drafted the answer In terms similar to the State Department's atti­
tude on the constitutional facets Involved In federal authority to for­
bid the manufacture of prohibited weapons. So, In future debate, the 
Minister should rely exclusively on policy arguments and avoid consti­
tutional points. Regarding whether to support provisions for federal 
action, the Department preferred to receive the opinions of committee
38members rather than to state a definite opinion then.
Wilson was not entirely satisfied, however. He expected the 
committee report merely to reproduce the debates. Consequently, If the 
summary omitted the American reservation, the effect "would be like 
Hamlet without the ghost." Accordingly, he could not remove the state­
ment without some comment. Otherwise, he expected some embarrassment In 
criticizing unacceptable provisions about which the United States had 
expressed no opinion before because of the reservation. Moreover, he 
recommended careful attention to the wording of the modification In­
stead of submitting a superficial report In two days. He counseled that 
Washington allow the exemption to remain unchanged until the Bureau took
'̂̂ Wllson to Stimson, November 3, 1932, F.R., I, 358-359-
3®Carr to Wilson, November 3, 1932, F.R., I, 363-38^-
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up the discussion. Then he could remove the exception with an accom-
39panyipg explanation.
Still the State Department desired quiet handling of the with­
drawal. Little publicity was to be given it lest the problan cause 
considerable controversy in the United States. Stimson suggested that 
the alteration be made shortly with a minimum of emphasis. Although he 
authorized the Minister to decide on the method, he advised the deletion 
by a short informal expression; Wilson might possibly speak off the
record. Wilson dutifully accepted the Secretary’s advice and went on 
it-0with his work.
^%ilson to Stimson, November J, 1932, F.R., I, 36U-365.
^^Stimson to Wilson, November 10, 1932, F.R., I, 370-371; 
Wilson to Stimson, November 11, 1932, F.R., I, 371»
CHAPTER VIII.
DISARMAMENT AND THE EFFORTS 
TO CONOIIHATE GERMANY
Disarmament progress depended, of course, to a considerable 
extent on the Geman attitude and the response of its neighbors ' claims. 
At times, the French-German dispute occupied so prominent a part that it 
was difficult, if not impossible, to handle the armaments problems effec­
tively without attention to the difficulties of those two nations. Be­
tween mid-September and December, 1932, Wilson took an active interest 
in the attempt to conciliate Germany and to reconcile German and French 
differences.
Even before the Bureau meeting in September, diplomats were con­
cerned about the German statement of July that it would not return to the 
disarmament meetings. Then on September 12, the German consul at Geneva 
told Thanassis Aghnides, the Chief of the League Disarmament Section, 
that Berlin would not have a delegate present because it was dissatis­
fied about the failure to grant equality of ri^ts. Wilson speculated 
on the possible procedure in the event of continued German boycott of 
the meetings; he thou^t that the meetings should be held as planned; 
the Bureau might express its regret about German non-participation and 
indicate a hope for a satisfactory settlement; the delegates might show 
their concern for disarmament by trying to proceed anyway, hoping that 
the maneuver would rally public opinion which mi^t force the nation 
to resume armament talks. In any event, Wilson was not, at that time, 
certain that the Berlin attitude was fully official, and the authorities
1T3
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might hesitate to finalize it.^
On September 20, Stimson informed. Wilson of his general attitude 
toward the German demand for equality. If Sir John Simon, the British 
Foreign Secretary, desired to know his opinion concerning a British note 
on a demarche, Wilson was to say that the Secretary thought it an able 
document on the legal aspects of several treaties relating to disarma­
ment work. Really, Washington had no position on the German argument 
because Europe was supposed to handle all questions pertaining to the 
Versailles Treaty although part 5 was included by reference in the 
American Treaty with Germany. Accordingly, desiring that his govern­
ment take no sides in the matter, he refrained from public comment on 
the problem, and in diplomatic circles he indicated concern about a 
general disarmament reduction. Similarly, he had shown his concern 
that German demands and its leaving the conference might impede the 
accomplishment of downward revision.^
Three days afterwards, Wilson talked with Simon about the situa­
tion during tea. Unsure of what the future would produce, the English­
man presented four approaches to the issue of equal rights. First, the 
inclusion of German responsibilities in the same convention as the other 
governments should be conceded to Berlin. Second, he favored the estab­
lishment of those obligations for the same duration as the other nations
%ilson to Stimson, September l4, 1932, F.R., I, 327-328.
^stimson to Wilson, September 20, 1932, F.R., I, 439*
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although France objected, however, to the provision. Third, the grant­
ing of the ri^t to the same kinds of armaments as the others created 
notable difficulties for France, Britain, and the United States. He 
wondered if the last country was prepared to approve a proposal which 
would allow Germany to construct a 35,000-ton battleship. Althou^ he 
was unsure whether to concede this point, he knew that government would 
not return to the talks or sign a treaty without it. Fourth, he defi­
nitely rejected permitting Berlin the right to decide on the quantity
■3of armaments and the number of men for negotiations.
Both diplomats wondered about the German intentions. Simon 
believed that the Berlin government was trying to convince its people 
that part 5 placed no legal or moral responsibility on it. Further, 
he was persuaded that the country was preparing in that manner to re­
nounce those obligations. Actually, Wilson had wondered since July, 
when its delegate objected to the resolution summarizing the first phase 
of the General Disarmament Conference, whether it was maneuvering toward 
denouncing the Versailles military clauses. If that was true, the Brit­
ish Secretary did not envision the United States, Britain, or France 
combatting the move. Although the last nation would not act physically 
against such a repudiation, Paris would use every opportunity to criti­
cize its neighbor so much as to force Germany's withdrawal from the 
League.
^Wilson to Stimson, September 23, 1932, F.R., I, ^44-^45; Wilson 
to Stimson, September 26, 1932, F.R., I, 446-447.
Wilson to Stimson, September 23, 1932, F.R., I, 444-44$.
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Naturally, Stimson commented to Wilson on Simon's four approaches 
to the German equality demands. Actually, he preferred to consider the 
matter in terms of the willingness of other governments to alter or 
eliminate part 5 of the Versailles Treaty and to fulfill their own legal 
and moral obligation to reduce armaments. He foresaw acceptance of 
point one about responsibilities, but such agreement would not decide 
whether the Versailles Treaty was superseded or suspended. To Stimson, 
point two constituted mainly a European concern about which they might 
merely agree and let the future develop on its own. On point three, he 
could not grant Germany the construction of a large battleship which 
might upset the naval balance. Furthermore, the United States would also 
seriously oppose the right to build submarines. In spite of grave ob­
stacles to formulating a fair method for all governments without making 
the naval situation more complex, he was interested in any practical 
avenue of approach. He rejected point four outright as contrary to the 
American concept of reducing armaments. Wilson could convey those 
thoughts to the British official as personal opinions instead of a formal 
and final government attitude.̂
While Stimson and Wilson were exchanging despatches, Simon was 
establishing personal contact with a German representative on September 
23» At his own request, the Britisher called on Baron Konstantin von 
Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, not knowing whether the latter was 
seeking a settlement or merely hoping for one. Plainly, the German
5stimson to Wilson, September 30, 1932, F.R., I, 444-450.
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official adopted a waiting attitude, and he was obviously disturbed by 
the "schoolmaster tone" of a previous British diplomatic note. Yet, he 
was elated that conversations had begun and the paper exchange had 
stopped. Simon displayed a willingness to include the German military 
provisions in the general disarmament treaty. Also, he favored an agree­
ment of five years after which those restrictions would lapse. The Ger­
man government did not intend to request equality in numbers.^
Early in October, Simon brought forward an arrangement for Ger­
many's return to the conference. At a dinner, he related the crucial 
nature of world problems generally and the German-French dispute partic­
ularly to Frederic M. Sackett, the American Ambassador to Germany, and 
to Norman Davis. The controversy, having become especially critical 
within the past week, needed to be resolved immediately, and only the 
good offices of Britain and the United States offered the chance of 
settlement. If they did not cooperate, the opportunity of having suc­
cessful Disarmament and Economic Conferences would vanish, so it was 
imperative to arrange a London meeting with the two disputants present. 
Realizing the futility of such a meeting without American participation, 
Simon inquired about an appropriate means for obtaining that involve­
ment. Davis and Sackett preferred that the meeting appear to be an 
outgrowth of Stimson's talks in April and July, and to be related to
Wilson to Stimson, September 26, 1932, F.R., I, 4^7- In the 
same despatch, Wilson related Baron Pompoe Aloisi of Italy reported lit­
tle achieved from contact with Neurath. F.R., I, Moffat wrote
that "your reports on conversations with Simon, Neurath emissary, etc., 
have been tremendously helpful." Moffat to Wilson, September 27, 1932, 
Moffat Papers.
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the general disarmament work.
In reporting the conversation to the Secretary of State, Davis 
expanded on reasons for American cooperation in which Sackett and Wil­
son both concurred. Informal talks provided the most likely means of 
obtaining German collaboration and disarmament progress, and logically, 
the United States had a vital interest in the deliberations. In July, 
Germany had publicly demonstrated its satisfaction over the Hoover pro­
posals which seemed to be the only general disarmament proposition that 
Prance might accept in order to get Germany back to the conference. 
Consequently, the President's measure could not be accomplished without 
a settlement of Berlin's arms demands. Also, since German determination 
to rearm might upset the naval limitation arrangement, reasonable
grounds existed for Americans participating in the talks about German 
7claims.
In a personal letter of October 4 to Moffat, who was the Chief 
of the Division of Western European Affairs, Wilson evaluated America's 
relationship to disarmament affairs. The progress, he said, was as im­
perceptible as the building up of coral islands. The other delegations 
were giving only a superficial support of Hoover's plan on effectives, 
and the German-French relations certainly constituted an overriding 
negative influence on the work. Personally, he believed that his coun­
try possessed an obligation to help resolve the differences of those
^Davis to Stimson, October 3; 1932, F.R., I, 450-451; Davis to
Stimson, October 3f 1932, F.R., I, 452.
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two governments. As such, the United States would soon discover the 
inadequacy of its contention that the problem solely involved European 
governments. Proof of its interest in the crisis would be apparent if 
the renunciation of part 5 of the Versailles Treaty disrupted the naval 
balance. Aside from that fact, the controversy so vitally affected the 
overall disarmament situation that Washington should utilize its influ­
ence to bring about a settlement. He would restrict the action to just 
good offices, and he certainly would not favor an American effort to
g
impose a settlement on anyone.
The reaction to the British suggestion of holding talks in Lon­
don was mixed. Stimson, preferring the conversations to be near Geneva, 
delayed his decision for a time, before finally authorizing Davis's full 
participation in any preliminary meetings to promote disarmament. Ger­
many did not want to go to London without advanced acceptance of its 
claims which France surely could not give prior to the convocation. The 
German government did not think any basis existed for successful delib­
erations, and it questioned the wisdom of accepting the invitation with­
out some previous assurance that its arms equality claims would be
considered.9
^Wilson to Moffat, October 4, 1932, Moffat Papers. Moffat 
replied, "I personally entirely concur in every word you said . . . 
but the dictates of political considerations have more and more been 
tending to prevent affirmative action on anything of a controversial 
nature." Moffat to Wilson, October 22, 1932, Moffat Papers.
^Stimson to Davis, October 3, 1932, F.R., I, ^53-^5^i Davis to
Stimson, October 6, 1932, F.R., I, 1+56; Andrew W. Mellon to Stimson,
October 5, 1932, F.R., I, 1+55̂ 1+56.
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Initially, France was not enthusiastic, and it would be less 
favorable if Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland did not attend. Evi­
dently, the French favored Geneva for the continuing disarmament con­
versations. Premier, Eduard Harriot believed that the time was inoppor­
tune because the prospective elections in Germany and the United States 
would make those governments less free to negotiate and to attend, 
respectively. In addition, he thought the chances of failure were high, 
but he would discuss the matter with his Cabinet in view of the British 
insistence. Shortly thereafter, he indicated that his government would 
participate even though he really wanted Geneva as the place rather than
T ^ 10London.
When powers could not arrange a meeting for the British capital, 
they again pressed for conversations in Geneva. As before, Berlin ob­
jected to that location for the same reasons that it had presented con­
cerning London, and it maintained that position until November. In that 
month, Germany's favorable reaction to the French disarmament plan 
helped to open the way for a German representative in Switzerland. 
According to Drummond, Berlin genuinely wanted an early understanding 
with Paris, and Neurath was prepared to be in the Swiss city "on any
justifiable pretext" for the initiation of the conversations. Anyway,
11he would attend the League session of November 21.
l^Davis to Stimson, October U, 1932, F.R., I, ^5^; Davis to Stim­
son, October 6, 1932, F.R., I, Davis to Stimson, October 6, 1932,
F.R., I, 1̂ 5T.
*11Davis to Stimson, October l4, 1932, F.R., I, kô2; Gordon to
Stimson,'October 15, 1932, F.R., I, k6k; Stimson to Davis, October 20,
1932, F.R., I, h68; Davis to Stimson, November 1, 1932, F.R., I, kJ2- 
473; Davis to Stimson, November 22, 1932, F.R., I, 473.
l8i
On November U, Paul-Boncour formally stated the French plan at 
a special Bureau meeting. Essentially, the proposition’s elasticity 
offered the possibility of conciliating Germany and of complementing 
Hoover’s proposals. While the American President had concentrated on 
reducing offensive strength through material restrictions, the French 
approach focused on limiting effectives. The scheme viewed an armament 
solution as involving two concentric circles which were composed of all 
nations and European countries, respectively. They should work for in­
cluding in international law the concept that no country could long 
enjoy the benefits of belligerency or neutrality and that government 
authorities should refuse to recognize any acquisitions by means con­
trary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The continental powers whose geo­
graphical location possibly subjected them to more dangers should make 
a mutual assistance agreement which would limit the number of profes­
sional troops there and allow the League to utilize them. The forces 
were designed to resist, not to halt, aggression by assisting the League 
quickly. The French proposition would decrease European armies in line 
with the American proposals by shortening the training time, and on 
qualitative disarmament the plan would abolish chemical and bacterio­
logical warfare and aerial bombing. The differentiation of defensive 
and aggressive arms which was at the heart of the Hoover approach was 
utilized concerning heavy war material. Immobile armaments would be
permitted on a nation’s coasts and borders, and other large weapons
12would be for League use but forbidden to national forces.
^^Nilson to Stimson, November k, 1932, F.R., I, 36O-361.
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On November l6, Davis, Wilson, and other delegation members sub­
mitted an analysis of the French proposition. Regarding Europe, they 
assumed that peace on the continent was the best that the general dis­
armament negotiations could produce. Consequently, it was essential to 
formulate a design which the Europeans could and would accept, and they 
considered the avenue of accomplishment secondary. They presumed that 
the United States would support any scheme which was practical of achieve­
ment and not repugnant in itself, but the diplomats foresaw considerable 
opposition to the adoption of such a plan. Even so, if only the portion 
concerning the placing of aimed forces at the disposal of the League was 
accepted, that move would be worthwhile althou^ contrary to the Ameri­
can thesis on the organization of peace.
Unfortunately, the French plan stressed complex ideas instead 
of disarmament. The Americans wanted to express their keen disappoint­
ment that the French officials had talked ambiguously about armament 
regulation, but had clearly indicated their own desires. Nevertheless, 
the British government would find the plan more distasteful, and the 
success or failure of the plan would depend on London's attitude.
Despite the pessimistic assessment of the general recommendation, Davis 
and Wilson hoped a solution could be found in its constructive provi­
sions and by inducing their French colleagues to eliminate the imprac­
tical features. The American delegates considered making recommenda­
tions to Stimson on procedure, but they withheld them pending Simon's
13speech and private talks.
^^Davis and Wilson to Stimson, November l6, 1932, F.R., I, 388-
390; Wilson to Stimson, November l6, 1932, F.R., I, 393*
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On November VJ, Simon spoke to the Bureau meeting. He did not
comment on the French proposal then, because he had no exact approach
at the time. Instead, he was more concerned about a brief summary to
be thoroughly considered before the adoption of a particular proposition.
Accordingly, it was necessary to handle the German problem of equality
of rights, so the group needed to consider specific facets and ways of
Ikremoving those impediments.
By November 21, Davis and Wilson despatched their assessment of 
the disarmament situation. Certainly, eight months of conference work 
had been devoid of tangible accomplishments, but a more sincere desire 
to deal with the problem existed now than in February. It would take 
years to achieve the objectives of the British and French plans, if, 
indeed, the Paris project could be implemented. Furthermore, they con­
sidered some aspects of the French approach basically so impractical 
that their failure would smash the peace machinery.
Possibly, the continental powers mi^t undertake a concerted 
effort to maintain peace, and that was their business. It was an en­
tirely different matter when they requested the United States to obli­
gate itself for their security. Anyway, it was faulty French reasoning 
to expect the territorial and political conditions to remain unchanged. 
Quick action in which Germany willingly cooperated was necessary to 
prevent a European crisis from possible renunciation of part 5 of the 
Versailles Treaty. Clearly, disarmament progress was too slow for the 
conference objectives to be realized soon.
l^Nilson to Stimson, November 1%, 1932, F.R., I, 395-
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So, Davis and Wilson put forward an approach. They -would 
endeavor to gain approval of a short term convention, to establish the 
Permanent Disarmament Commission, and to delegate to that agency the 
responsibility for administering the agreement. Surely, it would be 
difficult to accomplish that and to conciliate Germany at the same time. 
Possibly, the nations mi^t persuade Berlin to accept a circumscribed 
arrangement if it believed that they would undertake a genuine attempt 
to more nearly fulfill its demands prior to approval of a general con­
vention. Perhaps Germany might be willing to make some concession on 
disarmament since it had received some financial relief by the practi­
cal elimination of reparations.
The two disarmament delegates were quite cognizant of the diffi­
culties, but they considered their approach potentially productive. The 
public commission and conference discussions had magnified the impedi­
ments and inhibited the governments from indicating the full extent to 
which they would negotiate. Publicity had restricted the possibility of 
concessions partially because each problem was considered as a separate 
entity rather than a part of the whole. That awkward situation strength­
ened their belief that private talks by a select number of powers focus­
ing on limited and immediate goals constituted the only means of formu­
lating a preliminary agreement. Otherwise, endless detailed debates or 
a failure of the conference appeared to be the alternative -with the 
second being more probable. The former option doubtless would produce 
a query about American readiness to remain as a participant.
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Some means vas necessary to determine the feasibility of the 
Davls-Wilson proposal. They proposed an exploratory meeting among the 
powers which mi^t meet in Geneva soon. Of course, the gathering was 
contingent on whether French political difficulties would permit its 
representatives to attend and whether the new Berlin government would 
cooperate. Wilson expected Neurath, who was to be in Geneva on 
November 21, to consent because he would not be pledging himself to 
conference attendance and because the conversations would receive lit­
tle publicity. In their opinion, the United States did not have to 
initiate the preliminary meeting or propose a short term convention 
because a similar approach would likely result if the private talks 
began properly.^^
Davis and Wilson also drafted the contents of a proposed agree­
ment. They formulated the provisions on the basis of considerable op­
timism, the continuation of good will and the desire for success which 
had marked the negotiations for two months, and the candor and celerity 
which were expected in the private sessions. Then, they listed eight 
points concerning effectives, artillery, tanks, air armaments, chemical 
warfare, naval weapons, the manufacture of and trade in arms, and the 
establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. Those provi­
sions represented items which they thou^t mi^t possibly be adopted 
within a short time. Even before ratification, the nations should agree 
on the creation of the Permanent Disarmament Commission which would
l^Wilson to Stimson, November 21, 1932, F.R., I, 393-^01.
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compose a general disarmament treaty by utilizing the draft and any 
broad plans such as the French, British, and -American. Until ratifi­
cation, the commi ssion would be occupied strictly with treaty prepara­
tions .
In addition, the two delegates included their thou^ts on the 
effect of their convention which they expected to be operative for three 
to five years. Furthermore, it hopefully would keep the disarmament 
situation from deteriorating and symbolize a desire to conclude a more 
meaningful disarmament treaty. Presumably, many states would more 
readily accept the limited time feature especially with the austere 
world economic conditions. In turn, those circumstances would foster 
the writing of a general treaty since few governments would be bold 
enou^ to announce an arms increase during the brief life of the docu­
ment. Perhaps the major European states, Japan, and the United States 
could bring certain provisions into effect without complete approval 
unless specific items required universal consent.
Davis and Wilson also forwarded their suggestions regarding 
Germany. Believing that Berlin should be induced to cooperate at 
Geneva, they presented three main causes of action. First, the limited 
convention mi^it relax the enlistment restrictions on the German army 
and make other concessions about part 5 by negotiations. Second, Germany 
would be promised that the treaty limitations would be applied equally 
to itself and the other governments. Also, part 5 of the Versailles 
Treaty would be discontinued when the full disarmament agreement took
^^ilson to Stimson, November 21, 1932, F.R., I, kOl-^03.
187
effect. Third, on the coimsel of Sackett, Davis and Wilson advised the
granting of equal status to Germany within the Washington and London 
17Waval Treaties.
Stimson was enthusiastic about the communication of November 21. 
Essentially, he and his State Department colleagues analyzed the confer­
ence circumstances as had the two delegates. Similarly, he agreed with 
their assessment of the disadvantages and even the dangers of the French 
plan. He was more convinced than they that Simon’s speech did not sub­
stantially promote disarmament movement. Those two approaches retained 
little of the Hoover recommendations and only weakly supported the land 
effectives articles. With those divergences in mind, the Secretary 
fully approved the proposition of quickly concluding a temporary con­
vention pending the conclusion of a more general treaty. If Davis and 
Wilson could secure agreement on some of the eight points and the sign­
ing of a preliminary document in a short time, the accomplishment would 
genuinely encourage world public opinion which definitely could use a
n Oboost then.
Subsequently, the nations scheduled the meetings to begin on 
December 2, without any previously arranged formula to discuss. That 
day, representatives of Italy, France, Britain, Germany, and the United 
States were in the city, but they spent the weekend in informal conver­
sations. In the evening of December h, Wilson and Allen W. Dulles, the
^"%ilson to Stimson, November 21, 1932, F.R., I, 403-404.
l^stimson to Wilson, November 22, 1932, F.R., I,
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Legal Adviser to the delegation, conversed with William Cadogan, a 
British agent, about his government's views on a preliminary convention. 
Later that night, the two Americans revised their draft and transmitted 
it only to the British delegation.
On December $, formal talks began which Wilson attended. It 
became clear that France did not want to discuss arms problems with 
German officials present lest they condition their return on specific 
reduction provisions. That evening, Davis and Wilson attended a dinner 
given by British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald for Neurath, who had 
just reached the city, and the two chief representatives of the other 
major powers.
Before the workday ended, Wilson and Dulles discussed the Amer­
ican draft convention with Angusto Rosso of Italy, Cadogan, and Rene 
Massigli of France. As expected, the last delegate objected strenu­
ously to many provisions because the conference had not ruled on many 
items. The agitated diplomat asked that the United States not give the 
text to the Germans who would demand a high price for returning to the 
conference. Prom a subsequent and candid conversation with him, Wilson 
and Dulles concluded that presently the copy should be retained and not 
be distributed. With the concurrence of Davis, they also decided on an 
attempt to get Germany's promise to attend the conference again and then 
work on disarmament aspects.
The following day, December 6, Davis, Wilson, and Dulles met 
with representatives of the other four powers in the plenary meeting.
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In line with Davis ' s motion, MacDonald became the chairman and briefly- 
explained the reason for the convocation. Then, Davis explained the 
proposed preliminary convention on immediate disarmament steps and the 
means for concluding a broad agreement which -would include equality for 
Germany. Such action should be taken soon to placate an impatient world 
opinion and to help alleviate poor international conditions.
Real movement in the discussions resulted from a formula by 
Herriot. According to it, British, Italian, French, and American dele­
gates concurred that an objective of the Disarmament Conference was the 
granting to Germany and the other former Central Powers equality of 
rights in an arrangement which afforded.security for all countries. He 
believed that the proposition was enough recognition to allow Berlin to 
send its officials back to the conference. At dinner on December T, 
Neurath openly expressed his desire to resume conference work and inti­
mated a readiness to accept something similar to that approach with 
limited additions. After some clarification of definitions, German
19delegates agreed to have personnel at the next conference meetings.
General satisfaction resulted from the news of Germany’s con­
sent. The fifty other delegations which had awaited the results of the 
five-power talks were dissatisfied about being excluded from an active 
role. So, they agreed that Henderson would participate in future conver­
sations related to armaments reduction. At that point, the Bureau sus­
pended work until January 23, and the General Commission adjourned
19Da-vls to Stimson, November 25, 1932, F.R., I, 4T5j Memorandum 
of the Five-Power conversations at Geneva Regarding Disarmament and the 
Return of Germany to the Disarmament Conference, December 2-12, 1932, 
F.R., I, U88-508.
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until January 31# 1933* F* P- Walters, a Deputy Secretary General of 
the League remarked that "the first year of its (conference) work ended 
where it should have begun. The fleeting opportunities which mi^t have 
led to its success had been -missed, and they were not destined to
return."20
On December l4, Wilson conveyed to Stimson his thoughts on dis­
armament prospects. Although Germany's return inspired considerable 
encouragement, difficult political and technical problems still existed. 
He hoped that the conference states would soon recognize the merit of a 
short term convention in order to more fully study armament problems. 
Otherwise, he expected the conference to "die of inanition" after an 
additional period of effort.
Anyway, the United States would be present for some time. That 
expectation brou^t him to a consideration of expenditures. In response 
to the Department's orders to economize during the conference recess, he 
suggested alternative approaches to the general problem of expenses. The 
personnel mi^t continue working until the small amount of money was 
expended and leave Geneva. Perhaps American officials might inform 
Henderson of America's inability to participate after a specific day.
Of course, those moves might mean that American and foreign public opin­
ion might criticize Washington for the failure of the conference.
In lieu of that procedure, he recommended a means "of facing 
the future adequately and with dignity." Possibly, the Secretary could
2^alters, League, II, 515# Wilson to Stimson, December 13# 1932,
F.R., I, 4l5# Wilson to Stimson, December lU, 1932, F.R., I, kl^-kl6.
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immediately explain the situation and the future possibilities to Con­
gress. If Congressmen rejected the assessment, then they would bear the 
financial and political consequences. In case of a refusal of adequate 
funds, then the delegation mi^t candidly indicate that circumstance and 
withdraw from the conference.
The personnel in Geneva, he continued, were obviously overworked. 
For three months, the members had worked on disarmament and League-related 
problems, and they were exhausted by the sustained ni^t work. Likely, 
the committee work in the next stage would be more intense due to the 
scrutiny of the French plan and the German equality demands. To handle 
the future demands, Wilson foresaw the need for a larger staff, more 
office space, adequate per diems, and ample local transportation facil­
ities.^^
Undoubtedly, Wilson finished the year with the satisfaction 
that his status had been elevated during the Bureau meetings. Origi­
nally, he was designated as an alternate delegate who would act in the 
absence of a regular officer. Circumstances dictated that he be active 
in all the sessions, and he performed his assignments "in a highly 
creditable manner." Under those circumstances, Castle requested Presi­
dent Hoover to name him a full representative. Although the alteration 
would have no affect on his work per se, Castle believed that the pro­
motion would enhance Wilson's standing among the foreign diplomats and 
would be personally gratifying to him. Accordingly, the change was
^^ilson to Stimson, December 14, 1932, Moffat Papers.
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made, and the Minister ejqpressed his appreciation to Hoover and 
22Stimson.
^^Gastle to Hoover, November 21, 1932, 500*-A15A^Personnel/ 
866; Stimson to American Delegation, Geneva, November 23, 1932,
500.Al^A^Personnel/86it-; Wilson to Stimson, November 2k, 1932,
500. A15Ai)-Pers onnel/ 865.
CHAPTER IX.
THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS, 1931-1933
In mid-September, 1931, world attention focused primarily on 
domestic problems. The major powers were experiencing the brunt of the 
deep depression, and in Europe the economic disorder became so acute 
that President Herbert Hoover of the United States established a debt 
moratorium. Both England and the United States appeared incapable even 
of handling domestic crises satisfactorily. Under those circumstances, 
London and Washington offered little prospect of successful interven­
tion to stop any hostilities which did not vitally involve their national 
interest.
During September, events which had little direct relationship 
to the Geneva disarmament talks occurred in Manchuria. The province 
constituted a basic area of conflict between China and Japan, and 
Chinese nationalists believed that region their first line of defense. 
Japan felt that the territory supplied it with necessary grain for the 
increasing populace and thus viewed the region as important to its 
economic existence. Japan believed that its economic role in Manchuria 
entitled it to exceptional rights by reason of patriotism, defense, and 
broad treaty rights. As the Chinese-Manchurian association became 
stronger and as Japan's interests also grew, an open clash between 
Chinese and Japanese forces was probably only a matter of time.
Shortly thereafter, Japanese units began military action. Dur­
ing the ni^t of September l8, 1931, Japanese civilians and military
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extremists, desirous of bringing political problems to a head, blev up 
a section of the South Manchurian Railway tracks. Immediately, Japa­
nese troops entered the city of Mukden to hunt for alleged Chinese cul­
prits, and, as a result of advanced planning, the forces also moved 
into other nearby locations. In the next three months, Japanese sol­
diers moved southward toward China proper and also northward. By the 
New Tear, the Japanese Kwantung Army had advanced close to the Chinese
border, and during the year the Japanese military conquest of Manchuria 
1was finished.
On September 19, 1931, during the League's discussion of a pro­
jected arms truce, the first information from Manchuria reached Geneva. 
The European delegates were initially ignorant of the Sino-Japanese 
treaty relationships, and, indeed, most foreigners were then uninformed 
of specific events. When the personnel became aware of the serious con­
sequences for the League and the interaational system, they and their
Par Eastern advisers, who were quickly summoned to Switzerland, studied
2the matter in detail.
To redress its g'-’ievances, China took its case to the League.
On September 19, the representatives of both Japan and China indicated 
the existence of grave circumstances in the province. The Chinese 
government urged immediate Council steps to check the extension of 
hostilities, to restore the lost territory, and to ascertain the kind
^Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 121-123. 
%ilson. Diplomat, pp. 200-262.
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of reparations to which China was entitled. Two days later, it requested 
a Council meeting to determine the appropriate steps for safeguarding 
peace under an article of the Covenant. The next day, the Council 
authorized Secretary General Drummond to ask Nanking and Tokyo to cease 
activity which might aggravate the problem further. Drummond could also 
consult with Chinese smd Japanese officials about a procedure which 
would allow the safe withdrawal of troops.^
A measure of hope emerged from that contact. China insisted on 
the despatching of an inquiry commission to Manchuria which would con­
sist of military or civilian observers and possibly both. Japan, pre­
ferring direct negotiations between China and itself, firmly opposed 
such a body and, indeed, any outside interference. Nevertheless, Tokyo 
assured the League of its peaceful intentions, and Nanking pledged to 
protect Japanese lives and property. Relieved and reassured by those 
expressions, the Council passed a resolution on September 30, incorporat­
ing the Japanese promise to remove its troops in relation to the degree 
of safety extended to its nationals. Further, the Council statement 
urged both disputants to restrict the dispute to its current limits.
The Council agreed to meet on October 1̂ , if conditions warranted addi­
tional deliberation.^
^Gilbert to Stimson, September 21, 1931, F.R., III, 24-2$; Gil­
bert to Stimson, September 22, 1931, F.R., III, 29; Gilbert to Stimson, 
September 22, 1931, F.R., III, 34; Wilson to Stimson, September 22, 1931, 
F.R., III, 37.
Walters, League, II, 473-^7^; Gilbert to Stimson, October 1,
1931, F.R., III, 96-98.'"
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The Manchurian conflict cau^t the United States by surprise. 
Secretary Stimson was preoccupied with the French-Italian naval prob­
lems and the forthcoming disarmament conference. In Geneva, Wilson was 
devoting his attention to those matters plus the arms truce proposal, 
but certainly the Far Eastern crisis, the gravity of which gradually 
became evident, could not be ignored. Of course, the United States was 
interested in the developments because of its possessions in the Orient, 
its maintenance of a large navy, and the indignation of many Americans 
toward Japan. However, contrary to the views of some elements of Ameri­
can public opinion, Washington was not obligated to act under the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Nine Power Treaty. Really, the only formal 
duty involved the consultative portion of the Four Power Treaty, but it 
was not invoked. Although the United States was not committed, its 
stance vitally affected the League which could do little effective 
coercing or persuading without American concurrence or possibly assist­
ance . ̂
In that context, considerable confusion existed in Geneva. Wil­
son could not really convey to his superiors the amount of strain to 
which the personnel were subject, and news from Washington, the Geneva 
developments, and extensive press coverage made working conditions 
markedly difficult. In addition. League officials and delegates con­
sidered the Manchurian incident a test of their organization’s effec­
tiveness. The pessimists there were suggesting the passage of a Council
^Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 121-123; Wilson, Diplomat,
pp. 260-262.
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resolution requesting the United States to assume the responsibility 
because the League was impotent. According to rumors, still other 
persons wished to invite American participation in the Council work 
despite Washington's wishes to the contrary, a procedure which sup­
posedly would thrust the burden of action on the American government.
Wilson doubted that those ideas would be adopted, but he felt that
6anything might result from the decided anxiety in the Swiss city.
Under those circumstances, Wilson began dividing his time be­
tween arms truce talks and the Manchurian matter. Even thou^ he did 
not attend the Council sessions, he usually was present in Drummond's 
office where Council members frequently gathered before or after their 
sessions. Despite the restricted approach, the American position meant 
much to the League delegates. Later, Wilson concluded, "Without appear­
ing at the Council table it was obvious that I represented the decisive 
factor in decisions which might be taken.
Understandably, the Council tried to keep the United States in­
formed of League action and to secure State Department opinions. Drum­
mond early sought and obtained Stimson's views through Wilson. At first, 
the American Secretary’s replies were cautious since he was unsure what 
was actually happening in Manchuria. However, Stimson did brand the 
Japanese military moves as aggressive steps toward the strategic ob­
jective of controlling the contested province. But since the army
Wilson to Stimson, September 2k, 1931, 793*9^/l9^è*
^Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 260-262.
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officers and the civilian government were divided on intentions and 
views, he counselled against foreign action which would rally Japanese 
nationalist sentiment for the army and against the civil authorities.
In the meantime, the State Department officials were observing events
g
in terms of the Wine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
On September 22, Drummond passed along to Wilson the neivs of a
possible Par Eastern inquiry. A small committee of Council members from
Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and China had deliberated about
sending to the disputed area an investigative commission which would
include possibly military and civilian observers. China approved the
proposal, but Japan’s delegate objected. Supposedly, the probe would
be conducted even if only China concurred. Consequently, Drummond
requested Stimson's opinions whether his government would participate
9in the study group if invited.
Similarly, as the gravity of the Far Eastern reports increased. 
Council members were insistently suggesting that Americans participate 
in their discussions. Drummond even intimated a desire to know the 
extent of Stimson's willingness to cooperate, and along that line the 
Secretary General proposed two possible moves. First, an American 
official might function on the Council, which step would be the most
Wilson to Stimson, September 21, 1931, F.R., III, 22; Stimson 
to Wilson, September 22, 1931, F.R., III, 37; Gilbert to Stimson, Sep­
tember 22, 1931, F.R., III, 29; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 130-131, 
13^-135; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 26O-262; Stimson to Wilson, September 21, 
1931, F.R., III, 22.
%ilson to Stimson, September 22, 1931, F.R., III, 37«
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daring and perhaps the "most effective" hecanse of its possible effect 
on Japanese public opinion. Although the League vould have to act on 
the proposition, he considered that the proposal would be gladly 
accepted. Under the circumstances, Tokyo mi^t disagree, but it would 
refrain from a public objection. If the Secretary of State could act 
favorably on the recommendation, Europe would be generally relieved and 
grateful. Second, the Council might establish a committee of French, 
German, British, Italian, and Spanish representatives and might ask for 
the appointment of an American. Ample precedent existed for that alter­
native, in case the United States could not adopt the other measure. In 
a limited and immediate reply, Wilson remarked that American public 
opinion would ultimately determine whether the government could act 
along those lines.
Indications are that Wilson now felt stronger about American 
participation in the Council deliberations than his previous corre­
spondence indicated. On September 23, Norman Davis, a member of the 
League Financial Committee who was assisting Wilson during the rush, 
engaged the Secretary in a telephone conversation. Davis spoke about 
the explosive nature of the Sino-Japanese situation and exclaimed that 
"such great opportunity to do something wonderful" existed. In his 
enthusiasm for action, he proposed that the United States help offset 
the Japanese military clique by the dramatic move of actually working 
in the League. He included the Minister among the Geneva personnel who
^^ilson to Stimson, September 23, 1931, F.R., III, 39-kO-
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believed that this maneuver would actually resolve the difficulties.^^
While Stimson was expressing his opposition to that approach, 
Wilson entered the room. He had just finished a speech in the Assembly's 
Third Committee on disarmament when he was summoned to the telephone. He 
related to Stimson the developments in the small committee of the major 
powers. They intended to send an investigative body of observers to 
Manchuria and to inquire about the possibility of Stimson's appointing 
a man to the Council committee. The Secretary replied that he was dis­
turbed that the members would adopt a course and then request the United 
States to assume responsibility for their decisions.
The prospective creation of an investigative group upset Stimson 
since he considered it offensive to the Oriental disposition for out­
siders to conduct an unsolicited inquiry. Such a probe would cause the 
Japanese nationalistic groups to align with the military against Japa­
nese Foreign Minister Eijuro Shidehara and other peace advocates, thus 
generating more popular Japanese support for the army in Manchuria. He 
objected to a judicial approach to the Far Eastern crisis, the procedure 
in setting up the committee, and the personnel who would be chosen. 
Furthermore, Stimson doubted his ability to name a person to a commission 
in which the United States would have little opportunity to express its 
opinions freely. Stimson disliked the whole idea of an outside investi­
gation and hoped it would be defeated without publicity. He then author­
ized Wilson to inform the Secretary General confidentially and "very
■^^emorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between 
Stimson and Davis, September 23; 1931, F.R., III, 3̂*
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strongly" of those views hoping that the character of the contemplated
12committee might he altered.
On September 23> Stimson elaborated on those views and spelled 
out three stages in an American policy toward the League and the Man­
churian matter. First, the United States would oppose the neutral com­
mission idea, but back the Council's urging that Japan and China re­
solve their differences throu^ bilateral negotiations. Second, if 
that procedure was unproductive, then Washington would support Sino- 
Japanese use of means envisioned in the League Covenant. Third, if 
that line failed, the United States would employ the methods included 
in the Wine Power Treaty or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Those steps would 
give the American government a flexibility of response and allow the 
Orientals greater opportunity to settle their own problems before out­
side parties intervened. In any event, the United States would fulfill
its obligations if either party acted in clear violation of the two last
13named international agreements.
At the end of September, it seemed that Wilson could safely 
leave his duties in Switzerland. It appeared that Japan had adopted a 
more conciliatory attitude and that the differences would be resolved
•^^ilson to Stimson, September 24, 1931, 793*94/1944^; Memoran­
dum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between Stimson and Wilson, 
September 23, 1931, P.R., III, 45-47*
^%emorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between 
Stimson and Wilson, September 23, 1931, F*R*, HI, 49-51; Stimson to 
Wilson, September 23, 1931, F.R., III, 46-49*
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peaceably. On September 30, he received a telegram which instructed 
him to proceed to the State Department for consultation about the Gen­
eva events and the scheduled disarmament conference. He was glad to 
receive that message because he was exhausted from the work on the arms 
truce, the Far Eastern crisis, and other problems. So, on the evening 
of October 3, Wilson departed for Washington via Brussels and Paris.
For approximately four months thereafter, he was only slightly associa­
ted with the Far Eastern affairs because of his attention to disarma­
ment matters.
In early October, the Manchurian problem was still in its first 
stages, but the Japanese army soon made matters worse by its conduct 
which amounted increasingly to a military occupation. On October 8, as 
a part of the campaign to destroy the authority of Chinese Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang in Manchuria, the Japanese army planes bombed Chinchow. At 
the same time, the Tokyo government displayed a self-contradictory 
attitude in deploring the bombing but conditioning troop withdrawal up­
on Chinese agreement to some fundamental Japanese stipulations.
In those circumstances on October 13, the Council convened to 
discuss further handling of the difficulties. On that day, the Chinese 
and Japanese delegates presented their charges and countercharges.
^^Stimson to Wilson, September 20, 1931, 500«Al̂ Alt-Personnel/ 
113 2/3; Wilson, Diplomat, p. 263; Wilson to Stimson, October 1, 1931, 
I23.W693/29I; Wilson to Stimson, December Ü-, 1931, 123.w693/3l4; 
Wilson to Stimson, December 21, 1931, 793-9V3266.
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Then the international body took up the possibility of an American 
participating in the deliberations since Stimson had indicated on 
October 5 that the United States would try independently to support 
League action to regulate China and Japan. The Japanese delegate ob­
jected to American involvement, because its presence mi^t encourage 
the Council to act definitely against Japan. Despite that opposition, 
Prentiss Gilbert, the American Consul General at Geneva, took a seat at 
the discussions on October l6, but he spoke only about material relating 
to the Kellogg Pact.
A resolution was brought forward for Japan to start the with­
drawal of its troops and to complete the process within three weeks 
time. In addition, when removal was accomplished, the two disputants 
would initiate direct talks to resolve their differences. Japan's lone 
opposition vote constituted a veto, because the League operated on the 
premise that effective action against aggression under Article 11 re­
quired unanimous approval of all Council members. No major power, in­
cluding the United States, was willing to employ coercion under the 
Covenant or otherwise at the risk of military conflict with Japan. 
Furthermore, the powers continued to hope that Tokyo might fulfill its 
promises and to feel that extreme steps against Japan would not be in 
China's best interests. Likewise, the economic depression and internal 
problems kept European governments and the United States from assuming 
firm positions
^5ualters, League, II, Ij-75-̂ 78.
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The Council, which convened in Paris on November l6, faced a 
no less serious problem. Since its adjournment in October, the Japa­
nese forces had expanded both north and south, and Japan was gripped by 
war fever. Also, at Paris no American delegate was at the sessions, 
although Charles G. Dawes, the American Ambassador to London, was pre­
sent in a nearby hotel which served as his observation point. In addi­
tion, the Council was notably lacking in leadership and definite plans, 
but it could not admit its inability to control the course of events.
Nor would it undertake the possibly dangerous step of sanctions against 
Japan, especially since Stimson had announced that the difficulties 
could be resolved without force.
The Paris gathering was not altogether on dead center. In a
secret session, the Japanese delegate personally suggested that the
League create a body to observe conditions in Manchuria and China, a
step which the United States heartily approved. After three weeks of
deliberations, the Council voted to send a commission of inquiry which
would study and report on the general elements aggravating Sino-Japanese
relations. Also, on December 10, Washington enhanced the status of the
17group by announcing publicly its support of that procedure.
Unhappily, the commission was slow in getting into operation. 
Early in January, 1932, the members were selected entirely from the 
major powers. They were Lord lytton of Britain, General Prank McCoy
^^Ibid., pp. 478-1̂ 79. 
^Tlbid., pp. 478-481.
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of the United States, General Henri E. Claudel of France, Count Luigi
Aldrovandi of Italy, and Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany. Lytton vas
chosen as the chairman, and thereafter the body was commonly referred
to as the Lytton Commission. On February 3; following a preliminary
session in Geneva, the Europeans departed for the Far East where McCoy
joined them. The delays reflected unfavorably on the League Council,
but the commission probably could not have checked further Japanese
expansion in 1932 anyway. The group arrived in Japan, then went to
Shanghai and Nanking, traveled to Manchuria in April, and returned to
l8China to formulate its conclusions.
. From early October through January, 1932, Wilson followed the 
Far Eastern events from afar. While en route to Washington in October, 
he heard the news of the renewed Sino-Japanese fighting, the reconven­
ing of the Council session on October ik, and the seating of Gilbert. 
Later in a personal meeting with Stimson, the Secretary expressed a 
preference for Wilson's presence in Paris since he had originally 
covered the case in Geneva. Besides, Wilson's attendance would have 
seemed more appropriate and would have attracted less attention from 
the press. Because so many significant things had happened in connec­
tion with the League and the Far East, Stimson, speaking for his col­
leagues, confided that it was "a pity we ordered you home.” After 
several rounds of discussions in Washington and a visit to relatives 
in Chicago, Wilson prepared to go back to Switzerland. During the 
return, he consulted with foreign diplomats primarily about disarmament
^^Ibid., pp. 482-483.
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rather than Manchuria. Upon reaching his headquarters, he perused the
Paris documents which imprecisely filled him in on American activities
19in the French capital.
Back in Berne, his interest in the Manchurian problem was a
secondary one. Again, he gave priority to disarmament affairs thou^
the Far Eastern crisis kept intruding in his work. He was hesitant
about being in Geneva when the next Council session began on January 25,
lest he be asked about the American attitude on Manchuria. The State
Department authorized him to be at the League then, if he made it plain
20that he was only concerned about armament matters.
In the light of continued Japanese military operations in Man­
churia during December, 1931, Washington’s policy toward Tokyo was in­
effective. For over three months, the United States had acted independ­
ently of other nations but yet concurrently with them. Stimson had 
given America's moral support to the League hoping to create a world 
opinion which would strengthen the civilian elements in the Japanese 
government and help halt the military push in Manchuria. His maneuvers 
were unsuccessful largely because his basic premise was wrong that 
United States forebearance would enable the Japanese moderates to main­
tain power and restrain the militarists. At first, a positive and
^%ilson to Stimson, December 21, 1931, 793-9^3266; Stimson to 
American Legation, Berne, December 21, 1931, 793-9V3265.
^%ilson to Stimson, January l8, 1932, 500.A15Ak/731i Stimson to
American Legation, Beme, January 18, 1932, 500.A15Ai)-/736-
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tangible expression of world opinion mi^t have halted the army, but
that opportunity passed early. Furthermore, the American approach was
handicapped because President Hoover was unready and unwilling to assume
21more than a moral stand in support of international agreements.
In early January, 1932, circumstances led to an additional Amer­
ican diplomatic initiative. Since the resolution for creation of the 
Lytton Commission, the Japanese had continued their military expansion.
On January 2, Stimson received word of Japanese troop occupation of 
Chinchow in South Manchuria, a move which Stimson interpreted as a 
definite infringement on Chinese sovereignty. Something more than the 
old futile American policy and League protests was necessary to check 
the Japanese movement. Stimson hoped that a withholding of recognition 
would cause Japan to alter its expansive course. So, on January 7, 
Stimson informed China and Japan that the United States would not recog­
nize as legally valid any situation, treaty, or agreement which curtailed 
its treaty rights in China or which resulted from a violation of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact. At the time, Stimson hoped that Britain, France, 
and the other major powers would issue similar messages. Britain set 
the tone by publishing a blunt refusal in the London Times, and the 
other governments remained silent. The Japanese, noting the negative
Siting E. Morison. Turmoil and Tradition; A Study of the Life 
and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston; Houston Mifflin Co., I960}, 
pp. 375-376, 378; hereafter cited as Morison, Stimson; Richard N. Current, 
Secretary Stimson (New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press,
P* 79; hereafter cited as Current, Stimson.
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foreign response, reacted even bolder in the future. The nonrecognition
approach thus failed, and, fifteen years later, Stimson labeled it a 
22failure himself.
The nonrecognition doctrine obviously did not prevent further 
Japanese aggression. In late January, 1932, Japanese naval units at­
tacked Shanghai, an outstanding Chinese port city. The assault resulted 
from the effective Chinese boycott against Japanese goods throughout 
the land. Its application was especially severe in that city, a fact 
which brou^t Japanese merchants there close to economic ruin. In re­
sponse to the businessmen's requests, the Japanese admiral in charge
28initiated the Shanghai incident which lasted approximately one month.
Western statesmen were seriously alarmed by the clash of Ori­
ental troops at Shanghai. The nations were far more concerned about 
that occurrence than the Manchurian difficulties because of their com­
mercial investments in the city. Despite the gravity of the latest 
happening. Occidental government officials did not move decisively. The 
world-wide economic depression kept them from acting as they might have 
at a more opportune time. The European powers did little, and Secretary
Stimson felt unsure of a course to follow since he lacked support at
2hhome and abroad for punitive action.
^^Ourrent, Stimson, pp. 87-89; Ferrell, American Diplomacy,
pp. 151-153»
^^Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. 170-175»
^^Ibid., pp. 171-172; Walters, League, II, 484-485»
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Yet, some concerted Western steps were taken. On January 31, 
Britain and the United States increased their military and naval forces 
in Shanghai. Stimson, on February 2, suggested that the Western govern­
ments jointly ask Japan and China to cease hostilities and begin delib­
erations with neutral observers present. Thus, the major powers made 
those representations which indicated a degree of diplomatic unity.
Unfortunately for the success of the maneuver, Japan rejected the plan 
25on February k.
Then Stimson wanted to end further appeals to Tokyo, but recon­
sideration led btm toward invocation of the Nine Power Treaty. He ex­
pected Britain and the United States to sponsor an international confer­
ence which would give Japan the opportunity to state its complaints 
against China. If Japan refused to attend, the other nations might con­
sider the possibility of economic sanctions against Japan. In that case, 
the United States Congress was more likely to participate in an embargo 
after the treaty was invoked rather than if the League proposed it under 
Covenant provisions. Stimson's hope was visionary about possible eco­
nomic restrictions during the depression, but he could work toward
26negotiations under the Washington Conference agreement.
Accordingly, Stimson contacted Simon about action under the Nine 
Power Treaty. On February 9, the American official drafted a possible
^^Ferrell, American Diplomacy, pp. I78-I80.
PgIbid., pp. 180-181.
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joint declaration, and for approximately one week the two men conferred
with each other by trans-Atlantic telephone. Stimson pressed for the
treaty procedure, but Simon, who could not secure Cabinet support for
that position, withheld his consent. On February l6, the Englishman
stated his preference for the Council's Committee of Twelve to adopt the
nonrecognition doctrine after which the treaty members might be more
willing to approve the American proposal. He contended that the treaty
participants would inevitably act if the League moved first. Stimson,
who was not so sure that result necessarily followed, temporarily de-
27cided to await further deliberations.
In varying degrees, Wilson was keeping up with Manchurian 
developments in Geneva. When he went to the Disarmament Conference of 
1932, the Department ordered him to maintain a working knowledge of the 
Sino-Japanese situation there. The despatching of telegrams to inform 
Washington constituted a satisfactory means of communication which was 
to be continued, and, when necessary, he could obtain Gilbert's help 
as he had prior to his trip to Washington. Because of the vital neces­
sity for quick attention to developments, the consul general was to 
handle affairs in case the Minister had to be away. The Secretary pre­
sumed that Wilson would indicate when it became appropriate for him to
28resume personal handling of the Par Eastern contacts.
Actually, the awkward communications arrangement in Geneva made 
coordination of the United States' efforts on the Far Eastern crisis and
. '̂̂ Ibid., pp. 181-182.
2®Stimson to Wilson, February 1, 1932, F.R., III, 170.
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on disarmament very difficult. Hugh Gihson, Senator Claude Swanson of 
Virginia, Norman Davis, and Wilson, all members of the Disarmament Con­
ference delegation, assessed that procedure in the light of conditions 
in the city. They noted the effort of Simon to present both British and 
American views in the Council and in private conversations. Increas­
ingly, various governments assumed that London and Washington had taken 
to themselves the responsibility for resolving the crisis and that 
Council steps would be superfluous. To support that contention, foreign 
representatives indicated the lack of communication by Wilson and Gil­
bert with Drummond since the fall of 1931* In the minds of the foreign 
delegates, the United States was no longer cooperating with them. Ac­
cording to the American delegation, others might possibly reason that 
the American initiatives provided an excuse for the League Council’s 
shirking responsibility for securing a settlement with Japan. To counter 
such thinking and to gain Council support for contemplated Anglo-American 
action, Gibson counseled that Wilson resume direct contact with Drummond 
or the Council members
Stimson concurred with the conclusion of his Geneva personnel.
He instructed his Minister to inform appropriate officials discreetly 
of the world-wide responsibility for collective action. He also ex­
plained that urgency and practicality had governed his previous sharing 
of views with Simon rather than throu^ his diplomats as usual. Ac­
cordingly, Wilson resumed conferring with Council officials about the
^%ibson to Stimson, February 10, 1932, F.R., III, 273-27^*
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Sino-Japanese situation.
While Stimson and Simon were deliberating about possible action 
under the Wine Power Pact, the League Council considered adoption of a 
nonrecognition note. On February 11, Wilson noted the increasing signs 
of a desire for the Council to expiress full endorsement of the Stimson 
message of January 7» The Minister felt that American influence, dis­
creetly utilized, could cause the Council members to make definite moves 
rather than to continue in their bewilderment and inaction. Stimson 
liked the procedure and instructed him to assure them of his continued 
interest in resolving the Far Eastern mess. Finally, on February l6, 
the twelve neutral Council members urgently appealed to Japan to utilize 
Covenant methods for a peaceful settlement. Further, they pointed out 
that League members ought not to recognize as valid territorial or 
political changes which resulted from external aggression. So, those
powers cautiously adopted the approach which the American Secretary had
31chosen on January J.
On February 23, Stimson, believing that action inadequate to 
stop Japan, issued another unilateral statement which bore some simi­
larity to the January message. The following day, the famous letter to
^^Stimson to Wilson, February 11, 1932, F.R., III, 290-291»
3%ilson to Stimson, February 11, 1932, F.R., III, 286j Stimson 
to Wilson, February 12, 1932, F.R., III, 32k; Wilson to Stimson, Febru­
ary 16, 1932, F.R., III, 351-352, 362, 363-3&k. By directing their 
comments to Japan, the Council showed that it held that country largely 
responsible for a settlement. Walters, League, II, ^87.
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Senator William E. Borah of the Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee 
reached Wilson. It reiterated American adherence to the Open Door 
agreements and the Washington treaties of 1922 on commercial equality 
and territorial integrity. The missive recalled to Japan and Britain 
their commitments to comply with the agreements and asked governments 
to withhold official recognition from territorial changes resulting 
from treaty violations. Furthermore, the correspondence cautioned that 
alterations of the treaty system would allow the United States to con­
struct capital ships on a larger scale and to huild up Pacific island 
fortifications. The document was forwarded to inform and instruct the 
American delegation. Wilson was authorized to show the letter to 
Drummond as written proof of readiness to cooperate with and inform the
Council. The message was well-received in the League, and in March the
32Assembly adopted its contents.
During the early Assembly sessions, Wilson and Stimson discussed 
the prospect of its adopting the nonrecognition policy. The Minister 
reported no objection to the ideas, and, indeed, the delegates regarded 
the measure as the minimum that agency could do. Stimson believed that 
immediate steps in line with the Borah letter would exert a salutary
3^Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-1933 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. ikl; hereafter cited as Rappaport, 
StiTnaon and Japan; Wilson to Stimson, February 2h, 1932, F.R., III, h2h', 
Stimson to Wilson, February 24, 1932, F.R., III, 429; Memorandum of Trans- 
Atlantic Telephone Conversation between Stimson and Wilson, February 2T, 
1932, F.R., III, 462; Walters, League, II, 488.
influence on the League’s Shan^ai conference and possibly preclude any 
foreign government's securing permanent concessions at China's expense. 
Accordingly, Americans in Geneva should discreetly promote ideas which 
corresponded to those of Washington and discourage contrary ones. So, 
at every opportunity, they impressed on other diplomats the importance 
of the nonrecognition principle. Subsequently, the Assembly unanimously 
endorsed the nonrecognition policy on March 11.^^
After the March 11 resolution, a special body handled the Par 
Eastern problem in Switzerland. The Assembly established the Committee 
of nineteen to assist in bringing about an immediate and final agree­
ment at Shanghai, to help find a settlement for the Sino-Japanese crisis, 
and to assume the League's work concerning the general dispute. It con­
sisted of twelve Council members, excluding China and Japan, the Assem­
bly President, and six other persons. The committee decided quite early 
that, since Shanghai was the current focal point of interest, it would 
primarily support the steps there and apply appropriate pressure on the 
disputants. On May throu^ joint collaboration, the Assembly com­
mittee in Geneva and a great power committee at Shanghai arranged an 
armistice for the city. The League committee then waited for the
^Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between 
Stimson and Wilson, March 3; 1932, F.R., III, $01; Wilson to Stimson, 
March k, 1932, F.R., III, $08-509; Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Tele­
phone Conversation between Stimson and Wilson, March h, 1932, F.R., III, 
$11; Stimson to Wilson, March 'J, 1932, F.R., III, $2$-$26; Wilson to 
Stimson, March 8, 1932, F.R., III, $33; Wilson to Stimson, March 10, 
1932, 793'9^/k687; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 1$2-1$3; Memorandum 
of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation between Stimson and Wilson, 
March 11, 1932, F.R., III, $69.
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completion of the Lytton Commission report vhich constituted the founda­
tion for a general solution.
During the summer months, the possibility of Japanese recogni­
tion of Manchukuo, the new state which Japan had established in Manchu­
ria, generated considerable apprehension. In an address on August 8, 
Stimson sou^t to clarify the American position in case of a possible 
wai* between the League and Japan. He censured Tokyo for failure to 
consult with other signatories of the Kellogg Pact before acting in the 
Par East. Furthermore, he more nearly aligned the United States with 
the League's enforcement means through the Pact of Paris. Most of the 
world seemed impressed by that speech and other efforts to keep the 
Japanese nation from aggravating the Par Eastern situation until the 
Lytton report was delivered. Japan constituted the important exception, 
and on September 15, its Foreign Office formally recognized the Manchu­
kuo government, thereby insulting the League and breaking its earlier 
pledge to accept the Lytton investigation.^^
Those developments led to an increasing desire for American 
leadership in Geneva which, according to press accounts, the League 
expected. In response to such reports, Stimson reiterated the approach
^Sfalters, League, II, 489-490; Wilson to Stimson, March l6, 
1932, F.R., III, 589.
^^ilson to Stimson, June I6, 1932, F.R., IV, 79; Stimson to 
Wilson, June I8, 1932, F.R., IV, 83-84; Wilson to Stimson, June I9, 
1932, F.R., IV, 92; Wilson to Stimson, June 24, 1932, F.R., III, 107- 
108; Wilson to Stimson, June 30, 1932, F.R., IV, 122-123; Wilson to 
Stimson, July 23, 1932, F.R., IV, I8I; Rappaport, Stimson and Japan,
pp. 168-174, 176.
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which Wilson was to maintain informally. He should discourage that 
expectation of United States involvement among the League leaders since 
the international body was responsible for initiating action. Washing­
ton was willing to cooperate and receive suggestions, but it preferred 
to act along similar but independent lines. In advancing American views 
quietly, the Minister was to adhere strictly to the nonrecognition pol­
icy. Probably, if the organization adopted positive measures, Washing­
ton would undertake corresponding ones. Wilson assessed those instruc­
tions as "very wisely reasoned.
On September 4, 1932, after months of investigation and weeks of 
deliberations, the lytton Commission completed its work. The personnel 
unanimously concluded that Japan was at fault in that Japanese accounts 
and arguments did not justify its conduct in Manchuria. The commission 
placed a considerable part of the responsibility on China although Japan 
was censured more. The body refused to consider aggressive conquest 
valid, but it did not suggest a return to pre-conflict conditions in 
Manchuria. As a means of settling differences between the overpopu­
lated country and the chaotic nation, the commission proposed direct 
Sino-Japanese negotiations on the management of the disputed region. 
Those findings were sent to Geneva, and the document was released to 
League members and the United States on October 2.
The world-wide response to the report boded ill for the pro­
posals . The commission had mistakenly believed that Japan would accept
^^Stimson to Wilson, July 22, 1932, F.R., IV, I8O-I8I; Stimson
to Wilson, September 23, 1932, P.R., IV, 271-272; Wilson to Stimson,
September 2l+, 1932, 793*9^Gommission/377*
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the conclusions, hut the Tokyo Cabinet had decided in the summer not to 
abide by any such proposition. Actually, it had officially recognized 
the independence of Manchukuo in order to establish a fact vhich vould 
be hard for other nations to reverse. At the same time, the major 
vestern povers refused to accept the recommendations. Britain, declin­
ing to accept the leadership role, promised to back up whatever action 
Stimson took, but Stimson preferred Britain to take the lead and to 
support Simon instead. Understandably, Stimson chose to refrain from 
positive action since he did not have the physical means or the popular 
support necessary. The Secretary, his advisers. Departmental personnel, 
and diplomats elected to follow the League rather than precede it with 
moves, because of the potential danger and hopelessness of a unilateral 
approach. Stimson recognized that the United States had incurred more 
than its share of Japanese hostility, and a further American demonstra-
■?7tion might bring war.
In Uoveniber, Stimson reiterated his policy to Davis, Gibson, 
Wilson, and Gilbert. The government would not participate in any League 
discussion which concerned duties under the Covenant or constitutional 
responsibilities, and he wanted any such League tendency discouraged. 
Instead, the international body should adopt a plan and request Ameri­
can concurrence, retaining the full responsibility for action on the 
lytton report with the League. The Secretary also deprecated the 
League’s attempts to transfer the problem to the Nine Power Treaty
3'̂ Rappaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 179-188.
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members. In the final analysis, Washington was operating on the basis
38of principles and practices and not malice toward Japan.
On November I9, two days before the Council convened to consider 
the lytton Commission report, Davis and Wilson learned firsthand the 
Japanese attitude regarding future League action. Matsuoka Yosuke, 
Tokyo's delegate to Geneva, spoke of his country's firm determination 
to pursue its own policy concerning Manchuria. His government planned 
to reject any approach which did not allow for the existence of Manchu- 
kuo and recognition of it. Accordingly, if the powers cooperated in 
any undertaking which undermined Japanese dignity, Japan would be forced 
to withdraw from the League. While he held profound doubts about the 
possibility of a satisfactory settlement, Davis and Wilson emphasized 
to him the need for good will in order to achieve a constructive ad­
justment . Despite Matsuoka's stubbornness, the two Americans incor-
39rectly anticipated that he would change his position favorably.
A division between the large and small powers of the League 
blocked the immediate adoption of a firm nonrecognition statement which 
Stimson wanted. The Council, thus divided, was unwilling and unable to 
solve the Sino-Japanese differences, so the general problem was sent to
Stimson to Wilson, November I9, 1932, F.R., IV, 3^7-3^91 
Stimson to Gibson, November 1̂ , 1932, F.R., IV, 3*+2-3̂ 3; Stimson to 
Wilson, October 17, 1932, F.R., IV, 303; Wilson to Stimson, November I5, 
1932, F.R., IV, 3k6.
^^Davis and Wilson to Stimson, November I9, 1932, F.R., IV,
3^9-352; Rappaport, stimson and Japan, pp. I9O-I9I.
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the Assembly. The small countries called for approval of the lytton 
report; chastisement of Japan, and nonrecognition of Manchukuo. Simon, 
representing the great powers, urged a moderate course of sending the 
matter to the Committee of Nineteen. Otherwise, strong Assembly action 
could mean Japan's withdrawal from the League and possibly war. There­
after, the committee and its subcommittee deliberated the problem until 
mid-February when it recommended the adoption of the lytton findings as 
a foundation for a solution and for the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. 
Subsequently, on February 2l+, forty-two nations approved the committee's 
verdict, but Japan rejected the majority decision. Following Matsuoka's 
protest, his delegation abruptly left the meeting which was the first 
step in Japanese withdrawal from the League.
Personnel at Geneva as well as throughout the world were both 
shocked and surprised by Japan's action. Wilson himself had second 
thoughts about the appropriateness of League and American positions 
toward Japan. While he listened to Matsuoka's speech, the Minister ex­
perienced his first serious misgivings about the wisdom of the Assembly 
and American actions. Deeply disturbed by the day's events, he doubted 
the practicality of the nonrecognition policy since ultimately one 
party or another would have to accept what it had previously opposed.
^%appaport, Stimson and Japan, pp. 191-192; Wilson to Stimson, 
December 12, 1932, F.R., XV, 441-491; Wilson to Stimson, December 15, 
1932, F.R., IV, 432":?33j Stimson to Wilson, December 5, 1932, F.R., IV, 
388; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 278-279; Walters, League, II, k9k-h-95.
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He did not see nonrecognition as a deterrent against the use of force, 
and events bore out that conviction. Regarding condemnation, he thought 
that nations •which were indignant enough to censure a country should he 
•willing to employ forceful measures to adjust an unacceptable condixion. 
Otherwise, their action •would only make matters worse. In Wilson’s 
opinion, the outcome showed that no side emerged from the Far Eastern 
crisis •with its dignity wholly intact.
^%ilson to Stimson, February 1933, F.R., III, l60; Wilson 




The Disarmament Conference fared no better during the second 
year than the first. In December, 1932, Germany was induced to return 
to the Assembly, but its stay lasted only until October, 1933* In 
March, 1933, Japan, which had been threatening omniously to sever its 
ties with the League, started the process, and during the period Italy 
began developing military plans according to its alleged abilities. The 
British and American governments attempted to salvage the meeting, but 
their efforts were inadequate for the more difficult atmosphere of 1933* 
After October, 1933, the conference markedly declined and the hopes of 
world disarmament fell correspondingly.^
Since the French plan of November 4, 1932, was scheduled as one 
of the first items on the agenda when the General Commission met Febru­
ary 2, 1933, the United States considered its strategy. Gibson and 
Wilson worked out a tentative text for early presentation which concen­
trated on disarmament problems but not on political issues. After some 
correspondence with the two diplomats, Stimson first opted against a 
statement on the proposition and for an informal explanation to Paris 
about American silence.^
Valters, League, II, 5̂ 1.
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mittee/lh6j Wilson to Stimson, January l6, 1933, F.R., I, 4-; Wilson 
to Stimson, January 2k, 1933, F.R., I, 5-êj Wilson to Stimson, January 
27, 1933, 500.A15AhGeneral Committee/lUS; Stimson to Wilson, January 




Events altered that decision, however. Conversations in Geneva 
convinced the delegation that some pronouncement was necessary. Since 
the French proposal primarily pertained to European security, Gibson 
wanted to indicate that the United States would remain silent until dis­
cussion concerned non-European and non-League governments. Stimson 
approved Gibson's remarks, if he and the delegation could maintain the 
general American position without creating or adding to controversy. 
Stimson preferred a period of calm in armament deliberations in order
not to complicate further the already tense situation concerning inter-
3national debts, the Far East, and Latin American conditions.
Although the American delegation was largely silent, the other 
representatives were not. The French proposal came under strong criti­
cism from Italy and Germany as lacking means for effective armament re­
duction. Even the French refused to accept the December agreement, and 
six weeks of wrangling almost resulted in a deadlock.^
On March l6, the British brought forward a draft convention in 
order to prevent a stalemate. It designated maximum figures for arma­
ments reductions which were based on previously expressed opinions and 
the particular interests of the London government. The document was
^Gibson to Stimson, February 2, 1933, F.R., I, 8-9; Stimson to 
Gibson, February 2, 1933, F.R., I, 9; Moffat to Wilson, January 31,
1933, Moffat Papers; Wilson to Moffat, February l8, 1933, Moffat Papers; 
Davis to Wilson, March 2, 1933, Wilson Papers.
Valters, League, H, 5̂ 1-5̂ 2.
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innovative in that it constituted the first statement of numbers on 
effectives and airplanes. It provided for the transforming of European 
land armies into militias, the decrease in the number and size of naval 
and air units, and the abolition of chemical and biological warfare 
agents. The British maneuver tried to meet German claims by replacing 
the Versailles Treaty disarmament prohibitions with equality of treat­
ment which meant that Germany would achieve parity in armaments after 
five years. A Permanent Disarmament Commission would handle supervision 
and investigation to assure compliance with the general agreement. The 
approach held out some assurance of assistance against aggression by 
employing Stimson's idea that the United States as a member of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was obliged to confer with other members in case of 
violations. In essence, the plan included the most acceptable parts of 
the Berlin, Paris, and Washington plans, and the governments might have 
approved its provisions a year earlier if it had been presented then.^ 
From March 24 to March 2T, the General Commission discussed the 
proposal. Althou^ only Italy fully accepted it, the body agreed to use 
the draft text as the basis of deliberations after the Easter vacation 
when it reconvened on April 25. In the meantime, technical committees 
would operate in accordance with the decision of their chairman.^
^Ibid., pp. 542-543.
^Gibson to Hull, March 27, 1933, F.R., I, Walters, League,
II, 542-544; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. 155-156; Wilson, Diplomat,
pp. 288-289.
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The United States favored the British initiative, hut the State 
Department viewed the idea generally acceptable only as a first stage. 
While the delegation maintained that the plan adequately included every­
thing except London’s interests, the amendments were to be only minor 
ones which would not aggravate objections or undermine American support 
of the undertaking. The British had intentionally based their recommen­
dation on a "principle of balance of sacrifice" in order to gain German 
and French adherence, and the success or the failure of the plan rested 
on that tenet. Subsequently, Wilson and his colleagues worked with that
7in mind as they attempted to fulfill the Department ’ s instructions.
After the Easter recess, the General Commission became involved 
in a fundamental French-German controversy which was disguised behind 
procedural points. Basically, the problem was the continuing one of 
French security vis-à-vis German equality of arms. The procedural as­
pect arose over whether to reread a section on effectives or hold a 
first reading of a section on material. Gradually, the forces divided 
with the French and the British wanting to move forward and the Germans 
insisting on discussion regarding troops. So, the personnel of the major 
powers tried to work out a solution among themselves. Since Massigli, 
Eden, Wilson, and the Italian delegate opposed German rearmament, the 
General Commission broke the impasse by reserving all armaments aspects
’̂Hull to Davis, May 2, 1933, F.R., I, 122-123; Wilson to Hull, 
May 3, 1933, F.R., I, 123-124; Wilson to Hull, April 29, 1933, 
500.A15A4General Committee/317; Wilson to Hull, May 11, 1933, F»R«,
I, 137.
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ofor the second perusal of the draft convention.
The United States made even more evident effort to assure the 
French and to promote the British plan. On May l6, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt implored all governments to hring about success in the Dis­
armament and World Economic Conferences. He urged the acceptance of the 
disarmament approach, pledges to foster weapons reduction until nations 
fully abolished offensive arms, and an inclusive nonaggression pact. 
Subsequently, Davis, Wilson, and Fred Mayer, the Counselor of Legation 
at Berne, formulated a means which would put the British at ease regard­
ing the United States attitude on collective security without obligating 
Washington to support sanctions actively. On May 22, Davis declared to 
the General Commission that his country would support the Anglo proposi­
tion for consultation if any nation violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
Also, Washington would not impede international action against an aggres­
sor if deliberations upheld the League's decision.9
The announcement attracted more favorable comment than actual 
support, although most European governments were happy about the state­
ment. League members previously had hesitantly considered the application
®Hull to Davis, May 6, 1933, F.R., I, 128; Wilson to Hull, May 8, 
1933, F.R., I, 129-132; Wilson to Hull, May 9, 1933, F.R., I, 133; Wilson 
to Hull, jMay 11, 1933, F.R., I, 138; Mahaney, "Soviet Union, " p. l62.
Walters, League, II, 5^6; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 284-286; Wilson 
to Hull, May l4, 1933, 500.A15A4Personnel/1307; Wilson to Hull, May 14, 
1933, 500.A15A4Personnel/IO38; Hull to Davis, May I8, 1933, F.R., I, 150. 
Wilson felt that only in recent weeks had the United States been acting 
properly concerning disarmament although he had been closely associated 
with the subject for approximately six years. Wilson to Hull, May I8, 
1933, Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D. C.; hereafter cited as Hull Papers.
226
of sanctions lest Washington object concerning freedom of the seas. The 
declaration did not win Simon away from his movement toward isolationism 
or his aversion to sanctions. Equally significant, Germany, which really 
desired definite numbers for men and weapons, was not impressed by a 
security formula. The American delegation's promotion of it was not 
effective because the United States did not fully participate in the per­
manent and temporary undertakings of the League. The declaration repre­
sented the furthest extent of American cooperation with the European 
governments to erect a collective security system. Thereafter, the 
United States reverted to its unilateral and consultative role.
Other factors made progress markedly slow. Japan brou^t up new 
questions on naval limitation, and Britain alone wanted air bombardment 
for police uses only. Prance worked for more exact stipulations on in­
spection, and Russia pushed for a regional security arrangement. Con­
fused and discouraged, world public opinion insisted less aggressively 
on action by the reluctant disarmament representatives. So, with no 
genuine movement in early June, the delegates adjourned on June 8 in 
order to attend the World Economic Conference four days later. Before 
dismissal, the General Commission decided that the British draft conven­
tion could continue as the basis of a future treaty and that the body
would convene in October. The postponement of debate was practically
11tantamount to an admission that the British project was a failure.
^^Walters, League, II, 5^6-54?; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 286-288. 
^%alters. League, II, $48; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," p. 167.
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Before the autumn convocation of the Bureau and the General Com­
mission, representatives met in Paris to work out an approach which all 
conference delegations mi^t accept. Present were Joseph Paul-Boncour, 
Massigli, Simon, Eden, Davis, now the chairman of the American personnel, 
and Wilson. Technically, the men considered that they were moving for­
ward, hut notable differences existed in the spirit of the proposals.
The basic idea under consideration consisted of two disarmament stages 
of four years each. In the first, amounts would not increase, and, in 
the second, reduction of armaments would start. France viewed the ini­
tial portion as a trial period in order to determine if Germany would 
honor the agreement. If Berlin did not, then Paris would refuse to 
enter the next period. The British and the Americans wanted autouatic 
initiation of the second stage since no government would voluntarily 
accept probation. While Simon, Eden, Davis, and Paul-Boncour were seem­
ingly convinced that they were in substantial agreement, Massigli, Wil­
son, and Alexander Cadogan of Britain, who drafted the text of the pro-
IPposai, were largely aware of the profound divergence of views.
On October Ik, the differences became abundantly clear. In a 
public Bureau meeting, Simon ably presented the proposition without 
arousing antagonism, Davis followed in the same vein, but Paul-Boncour
■'Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 288-290; Memorandum of Conversation at 
Quai d'Orsay, September 22, 1933, F.R., I, 227-232; Memorandum by Davis, 
September 19, 1933, F.R., I, 2l8-22liTWalters, League, H ,  $48-549- The 
Paris embassy despatched a complete list of all the personnel at the 
meeting. Marriner to Hull, September 25, 1933, F.R., I, 226-227-
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angered the Germans by repeatedly stressing the probationary facet. The 
German delegate reminded the others that his government had always in­
sisted on substantial arms reductions by the military powers and the 
speedy extension of equal status. Despite that statement, the Bureau 
approved a motion to send the proposal to the General Commission, and 
less than two hours after Bureau adjournment, Berlin notified Henderson 
of its withdrawal from the conference.
Gennany's actions had the profoundest repercussions on the Dis­
armament Conference. The meetings continued, although no large measure 
of reality existed without German participation. After the German de­
parture, Washington displayed less interest in disarmament matters as 
isolationism increased in the country, and Italy, seeing little or no 
meaning in the meetings, considered its delegates as observers. At this 
point, a new armaments race began, and the military budgets increased 
rapidly.
The disruption necessitated the consideration of future proce­
dure. On October l6, the General Commission suspended its sessions for 
ten days to allow for consultation i-ri-th the home offices while, in the 
meantime, delegates conversed with each other about prospective action.
^^Davis to Hull, October 11, 1933, F.R., I, 252; Davis to Hull, 
October 111-, 1933, F.R., I, 26^-265; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 293-294; 
Mahaney, "Soviet Union," p. 170; Walters, League, II, 549-550. Also, on 
October l4, Adolf Hitler, the German Chancellor, announced the departure 
of his personnel from the League. Walters, League, H, 550. .
^Valters, League, II, 550-551*
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Italy favored immediate adjournment of the conference, hut Britain and 
the United States supported temporary postponement to allow German re­
consideration of its decision. France, the primary proponent of contin­
ued deliberations, advocated the completion of a convention which would 
be submitted to Berlin for its signature, but, if Germany refused, it 
would prove that it basically wanted to rearm. Subsequently, on October 
26, the General Commission voted unanimously to pursue disarmament objec­
tives in accordance with the British draft, and it instructed the Bureau 
to prepare a modified text.^^
The method of consultation received considerable attention. 
Henderson and the Bureau officers met with representatives of Britain, 
Prance, Italy, and the United States about the course to follow. The 
major European parties involved realized the need for deliberations but 
disagreed among themselves fundamentally on how that should be accom­
plished. Wilson reported that the procedural point of whether to act 
only within the League or to utilize other machinery temporarily eclipsed 
the Disarmament Conference itself. Germany wanted to work outside the 
League and the assembly, whereas France would converse only if the meet­
ings fostered an agreement at Geneva. Also, Boncour opposed any method 
which might satisfy Germany that Berlin had blocked the conference.
Simon proposed parallel efforts which would consist of discussions in 
London, Rome, and Paris to supplement the conference’s committee and
l^Mabaney, "Soviet Union," pp. lTl-172; Memorandum of Trans- 
Atlantic Telephone Conversation between Roosevelt and Hull and Davis, 
October 16, 1933, F.R., I, 273-276.
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rapporteur system. Wilson spoke for that procedure although the United 
States would not participate in any such meetings which mainly concerned 
current European political prohlems. Although the Bureau did not decide 
about parallel activities at that time, such means were later utilized.
Diplomatic correspondence proved unable to make significant head­
way in the first five months of 193^, when Germany, France, and Britain 
conducted, unsuccessful negotiations from a distance. While the first 
country's demands were becoming stronger, the second's government was not 
disposed to compromise. The London Foreign Office, increasingly more 
amenable to German demands, began to clash with French views with greater
frequency. Italy favored the British move toward conciliation, but it
17went no further than general assent.
Consequently, fundamental disagreement characterized the sessions 
of the General Commission which convened on May 29- France wanted the 
conference continued even without Germany which meant that Paris desired 
more specific machinery for security. On the contrary, Britain consid­
ered an assembly meaningless unless the rearmed Third Reich participated.
Wilson to Hull, November 17, 1933; 500.Al̂ Alt-General Committee/ 
659; Wilson to Moffat, November 17, 1933; F.R»; I; 307-308; Wilson to 
Under Secretary, Novemiber l6, 1933; F.R., I; 306-307; Wilson to Hull, 
November 19, 1933; F.R., I, 310-313; Wilson to Hull, November 20, 1933;
500.A15A4General Committee/661*-; Wilson to Hull, November 21, 1933; F.R. ; 
I, 318-319; Phillips to American delegate, Geneva, November 21, 1933;
500.AI5All-General Committee/668; Wilson to Hull, November 23, 1933;
500.A15Al(-General Committee/670; Phillips to American delegate, Geneva, 
November 2k, 1933; 500.A15Al«3eneral Committee/675»
"̂̂ Walters, League, II, 55I; Wilson to Hull, February 17, 193^; 
F.R., I, 21-22; Hull to Wilson, February 20, 193^; F.R., I, 23-24; Wil­
son to Hull, April 12, 1934, F.R., I, 47-48; Wilson to Hull, May 2, 1934, 
F.R., I, 60; Wilson to Hull, May I6, 1934, F.R., I, 65; Mahaney, "Soviet 
Union," pp. 172-174.
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but, in addition, London would not obligate itself further on security.
Also, Rome refused to be involved until German delegates returned to 
18the sessions.
During the last General Commission session, Davis restated the 
American position which remained basically unchanged. He generally 
agreed with the British approach, and he proposed a return to the draft 
convention of June'8, 1933, which was acceptable to Germany. His govern­
ment would participate for obtaining a general disarmament treaty and the 
promotion of peace. Washington was ready to endorse an international 
nonaggression pact and even consult other signatories if armed conflict 
threatened, but it would not join in any European political negotiations 
or contemplate an obligation to employ force for the settlement of dis­
putes. Although bavls could not win approval of that suggestion, he was 
instrumental in reconciling some differences which led to the decision 
regarding the use of committees. At that point, Davis left Geneva, and 
Wilson headed the American disarmament effort in effect.
In the end, the conference delegated matters to small groups for 
study. On June 11, the General Commission established the Security Com­
mittee and the Committee on Guarantees of Execution, both new bodies, 
and ordered the Air Committee and the Arms Committee to continue their 
deliberations. The same day, the General Commission adjourned sine die
^%iahaney, "Soviet Union," p. 175*
^9ibid., pp. 175, l80-l8lj Walters, League, II, 552-553; Wilson 
to Moffat,Tune 11, 193^, Moffat Papers.
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and those moves circumvented the conference’s admission of failure and
20the fundamental issue of disarmament.
Two of the select bodies met and concluded their work before the
end of June. The Security Committee submitted a report which established
the principles for the conclusion of regional security pacts and which
stipulated that the agreements would conform to the League Covenant and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The body recommended the use of the Model
Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1928 as a pattern. The Committee of
Guarantees of Execution merely discussed various means of violating a
disarmament convention and proper courses of action, and then it drafted
a note on some specific methods which the nations would have to modify
21in future discussions.
The Arms Committee devoted more time to its task, beginning de­
liberations on June 15 on proposals which Wilson advanced and which the 
committee chairman drafted. Under those articles, since each country 
was responsible for controlling the production and the trade of state 
and private producers within its jurisdiction, individual governments 
would work for the passage of domestic legislation along those lines.
The Permanent Disarmament Commission would exercise protracted and
^%ahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. l8l-l83j Walters, League, II, 
553-555; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 299-300.
^%ahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. I83-I85; Wilson to Hull, June I5, 
193 ,̂ 500.A15AUGeneral Committee (Security)/3; Wilson to Hull, June 28, 
193 ,̂ 500.A15A4General Committee (Security)/k; Wilson to Hull, June 27, 
193 ,̂ F.R., I, 124-125; Wilson to Davis, June 30, 1934, Norman H. Davis 
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; 
hereafter cited as Davis Papers.
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automatic supervision over the signatories through a general licensing 
method. On July 2, the committee approved the text vhich was recommended 
to be a part of a disarmament convention, and it adjourned until 
autumn.
Consideration of the draft continued, but no consensus was 
reached. At the Bureau meeting of November 20, Henderson led off with 
the suggestion of protocols concerning arms manufacture and trade, budg­
etary publicity, and the setting up of the Permanent Disarmament Commis­
sion. The Bureau approved Henderson’s plan and provided for the Ameri­
can draft, which Wilson presented about arms production in line with the 
text adopted on July 2, to be sent to capitals for their study and re­
sponse. Between February 111- and April 13, 1935, conference organs de­
bated the United States proposals. Agreement floundered on the French 
push for maximum publicity which would permit Paris to know the extent 
of German rearmament and bn the British reluctance to disclose armament 
figures lest publication affec: its growing armaments program. Instead, 
a modified copy was accepted and sent to the governments for future con­
sideration. The assembly bodies never acted on the report, and no fur­
ther formal meetings were conducted. So, in the fall of 1935, Wilson 
closed the Geneva office of the American delegation, and, subsequently.
%ilson to Davis, June 30, 1934, Davis Papers; Wilson to Davis, 
June 15, 1934, 500.A15A4General Committee (Arms)/3; Wilson to Hull,
June 28, 1934, 500.A15A4General Committee (Ams)/5; Mahaney, "Soviet 
Union," p. l84; Wilson to Hull, July 2, 1934, F.R., I, 127; Wilson to 
Hull, July 3, 1934, F.R., I, 128; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," p. 184.
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operated out of the consulate or the Berne facilities.
Essentially, the disarmament efforts initiated in 1932 had 
failed. European political developments caused the breakdown of the 
conference, and the unchecked armaments race assured that it would not 
be summoned again. Also, those developments ended the last European 
attempt to secure a general weapons agreement.
■While the Disarmament Conference was going through its last 
stages, another test of the western democracies and the League was devel­
oping between Italy and Ethiopia. Althou^ European nations were most 
concerned about the speedy pace of German rearmament, the world gradu­
ally learned of President Benito Mussolini's military preparations for 
an attack on its African neighbor which had fertile land and unknown 
mineral wealth. The fir^t .clash occurred on December 5» 193^, and the 
offended party appealed to the League for help. In the spring, the in­
ternational organization concentrated more upon censuring. Germany for 
violation of the Versailles Treaty military clauses than about consider­
ing an Italian violation of the Covenant. In April and May, the latter
^%ilson to Hull, November 20, 193^, F.R., I, 18T-188; Wilson to 
Hull, November l8, 193^, F.R., I, 183; Hull to Wilson, October 15, 193^, 
F.R., I, 1^3; Mahaney, "Soviet Union," pp. I88-I9O; Walters, League, II, 
555; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 301, 305-307; Wilson to Hull, April I5, 1935, 
F.R., I, 62; Hull to Wilson, September 3, I935, F.R., I, 63; Wilson to 
Hull, October 30, 1935» 500.A15A4-Personnel/i486; Wilson to Hull, February 
14, 1935, F.R., I, 12-15; Wilson to Hull, March 8, 1935, F.R., I, 32-33- 
A brief and inconclusive Bureau meeting was held in 1937, but it adjourned 
because political and economic conditions were not conducive to successful 
resumption of conference work. Wilson to Hull, May 31, 1937, F.R., I,
18-19.
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problem vas finally placed on the agenda despite strong resistance from
Rome. The Council'did not seriously take up the crisis, however, until
2kthe fall and winter of 1935•
During the summer, public opinion and governmental positions 
plainly conflicted. A considerable portion of the world hoped for peace 
throu^ League action, and the British people particularly urged vigor­
ous measures. Yet, the British Cabinet was hesitant to follow the senti­
ment of its public. Thus, from June onward, the stniggle became one of 
Italy versus the League, and isolationism and reaction bolstered 
Mussolini's position.^5
In the crisis, British influence became dominant on the conti­
nent, whereas, previously, France had held sway. Certainly British 
leadership increased inside and outside the League, although it was not 
always clear and firm. London wanted to resolve Italian-Ethiopian diffi­
culties apart from the League, if possible, and then present the settle­
ment to the international body for its approval. Definitely, Britain did 
not want to disrupt Italian-French-British unity which would encourage 
Berlin to undertake bolder projects. Also, London planned to avoid 
placing Rome in a position which would necessitate its aligning with 
Germany. When it became impossible to settle the problem outside of
^H^alters, League, II, 623-625, 633, 638; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 
308-309; Wilson to Hull, May 29; 1935, Wilson Papers,
^%alters, League, II, 635-636; Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 310-311.
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Geneva, Britain and France adopted the contradictory double policy of 
trying to uphold the Covenant by collective action and attempting to 
preserve cordial relations with Mussolini's government.
In September, the Council took up the African problem. Early 
the League's Arbitration Committee absolved Italy and Ethiopia of re­
sponsibility for beginning the hostilities. Still facing the problem 
of Italy's violation of the Covenant, the Council established a Commit­
tee of Five to study the issue and look for a pacific solution. The 
major body took that circuitous action because it hoped to stop Rome 
without offending it. Yet, League supporters were encouraged by the
promises of Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, and French
27Premier Pierre Laval to fulfill their covenant obligations.
Further changes in the Ethiopian situation demanded additional 
League attention. On October 3> Italy distinctly escalated the scale 
of conflict without a declaration of war, so, now the Council had to de­
cide whether a war existed and whether its initiation violated the 
Covenant. On the first point, it found that war was occurring, as Presi­
dent Roosevelt had decided on October 5 in applying the arms embargo 
section of the American Neutrality Act. Further, it answered the second 
question affirmatively, and the promptness of the decision definitely 
surprised Italy.
^^ilson to Hull, May 29, 1935, Wilson Papers; Wilson to Hull, 
June 17, 1935, F.R., I, 29^; Walters, League, II, 6kO, 6h^~6k6, 648.
^%alters. League, II, 642, 644-646, 648-650, 652-653.
^^Ibid., pp. 652, 655.
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That action led to the matter of sanctions. The League first 
established an embargo to prevent weapons from entering Italy, and it 
provided for restrictions forbidding loans and credits to Rome and for 
the stoppage of imports from Italy, effective November l8. The sanc- 
tionists chose to apply limitations on a gradual basis, because such 
nonmember states as Germany, Japan, Brazil, and the United States might 
undermine the effectiveness of the restrictions by trading with the 
European country anyway. Furthermore, limited sanctions would be effec­
tive in a long war which was anticipated and would not unduly antagonize 
Rome. In addition, unknown to most delegates then, Hoare and Laval, who
had agreed that there was not to be a war, desired measures short of
29spurring Mussolini into retaliatory steps.
The League added no other sanctions thereafter, although the 
matter was under consideration for more than six months. Canada made a 
proposal, which was shortly repudiated by a new government, for the ap­
plication of restrictions regarding essential war materials which includ­
ed oil, iron, steel, coal, and coke. Mussolini, suffering from the eco­
nomic strictures and poor military results in November, pressed Laval to 
delay debate on those items and ultimately to prevent their application. 
In turn, the French Premier persuaded Hoare to relax pressure on Rome in




The French leader's maneuver resulted in the Hoare-Laval plan.
It included the Ethiopian cession of a large amount of territory to its 
antagonist and the placing of another sizeable area under Italian admin­
istration. The mere news of the scheme had the immediate effect of post­
poning sanction extension and the eventual death of the idea. The Hoare- 
Laval proposition, Italian military successes, and the founding of the 
Fascist Empire in Ethiopia caused the League members to remove the other
imposed sanctions in the summer of 1936. Thereafter, Italy displayed
31contempt for the League and the sanctionist powers.
Throughout the dispute, the United States pursued an independent 
policy. In those years, the country was experiencing resurgent isola­
tionism which profoundly influenced its policy and action. Since the 
Ethiopian problem related to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia asked Washington to prevent possible violation of 
that convention. In a bland reply. Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
expressed both his gratification that the League was studying the situa­
tion and the expectation that the two belligerents would abide by their 
international commitments. The imminence of a clash in Africa did con­
tribute to the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935 which provided for 
a mandatory embargo on American arms and munitions to belligerents and 
the transportation of those items to belligerent ports. On October 5, 
President Roosevelt applied those provisions after Italy accelerated the
31lbid., pp. 668-673, 676-678, 681, 688.
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fighting, hut the United States refused to cooperate in the sanctions 
effort.
The entire episode vas marked hy less American cooperation and
consultation vith the League than in the Far Eastern Crisis, a fact
which is supported hy the activities of Wilson in 1935 and 1936. During
the League sessions, he conversed vith the delegates of the major powers,
33hut American opinions were not as readily sought as in 1931-1933•
Indeed, no one seriously asked for American ideas in early September, 
although more representatives conversed with Wilson after that month.
During the episode, the Minister was more truly an observer than 
in the earlier crisis. As he watched, he was happy that Britain was 
asserting itself at Geneva and had displaced France as the dominant in­
fluence. He also noticed that the League members seemed to have Germany 
in mind when they were attempting to deal with Italy. In their thinking, 
Germany constituted the really disturbing element on the continent, and 
they might check Hitler by stopping Mussolini. To some extent, their 
action was a "dress rehearsal" for the type action that they expected 
to take if Berlin tried to implement some of its announcements.
^^Allan Wevins, The New Deal and World Affairs: A Chronicle of
International Affairs, 1933-19^5 (New Haven; Yale University Press,
195O), pp. 62, 66, 92-95J hereafter cited as Wevins, Wew Deal.
^^An exception was Wilson’s relations with the Italian represen­
tative who charged the American as holding a "pro-League attitude" regard­
ing Italy. Wilson explained that the Italian had not come to talk with 
him personally and, as a result, that Wilson was receiving information 
from non-Italian sources. Thereafter, Rome had a man to see him several 
times a week. Wilson, Diplomat, pp. 316-317•
^Sjilson to Hull, September 14, 1935, F.R., I, 648-649.
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Nonetheless, in the first week of October, 1935  ̂Wilson was both sur­
prised and elated over the speed and the firmness with which the League 
acted.
Upon the passage of the Italian-Ethiopian difficulties and the 
disarmament efforts, Wilson's work on major issues passed. After years 
of residence in Switzerland, Wilson naturally reflected on the United 
States relationship with the League. Unable to answer definitely whether 
refusal to become a member was wise, he personally thought that both 
Europe and his government fared better without the letter's being a part 
of the organization. So many issues were local or regional in nature 
that the delegation would have been voting on matters which did not con­
cern it. Also, the American public demonstrated only a temporary inter­
est in diplomatic and foreign affairs and not a lasting and sustained 
concern. With the people possessing such a disposition, the nation 
really could not exert much influence in an international organization. 
Along that line, he opined that the United States probably would have 
ended its affiliation with the League in any case when Germany institu-
36ted rearmament and Europe aligned for war.
With a lighter work load, Wilson found the post in Switzerland 
less gratifying. He made fewer trips to Geneva on official business 
because the League's stature had diminished to an all-time low. Conse­
quently, his usefulness was declining, and he had an excessive amount
35v7iison, Diplomat, pp. 310-31^*
3 ^ i d . , pp. 332-335.
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of leisure time. To fill his hours, he took up skiing, and he began his 
first book. The Education of a Diplomat, which recounted his early 
experiences in the diplomatic service.
Because of his inactivity in Switzerland, Wilson investigated the 
possibility of a new assignment. Before his career ended, he wanted a 
major post such as Tokyo or Berlin, but neither of those places was open 
at the time. In the spring of 1937, Hull notified the Minister of Presi­
dent Roosevelt's wish for him to become an Assistant Secretary of State. 
Wilson really preferred a field assignment where he thought that his con­
tribution would be more personally satisfying, but Davis persuaded him 
that his chances of an important position would be greater after a time 
in Washington. That fact, and the recognition of a need for a change 
after ten years in one place, convinced him to accept the offer. In 
July, 1937, he left Berne for the policy post.^?
^^Ibid., pp. 337-338; Wilson to Massigli, June 30, 1937, Wilson 
Papers; Wilson to Grew, April 16, 1937, Wilson Papers ; Grew to Wilson, 
March 22, 1937, Wilson Papers; Welles to Wilson, June 2, 1937, Wilson 
Papers; Wilson to Phillips, June 28, 1937, Wilson Papers; Phillips to 
Wilson, June 25, 1937, Wilson Papers ; Davis to Wilson, June 10, 1937, 
Wilson Papers; Wilson to James C. Dunn, the Chief of the Division of 
Western European Affairs, April 21, 1937, 123.W693A 69; Hull to Wilson, 
May 11, 1937, Hull Papers; Wilson to Dunn, June 28, 1937, Wilson Papers.
CHAPTER XI.
BERLDI AND WASHINGTON
In Washington on August 25, 1937, Wilson took his oath of office 
as an Assistant Secretary of State. He found the State Department in a 
state of flux because of a reorganization project, the significant num­
ber of personnel who were arriving and departing, and the difficulties 
in the Far East and Europe. His own work involved attention to both Par 
Eastern and European affairs, particularly as a principal advise? to 
Secretary Hull on Europe. He was a welcome addition to the staff since 
the Department had only a limited number of individuals personally and 
intimately knowledgeable about recent European conditions.^
Naturally, Wilson saw Secretary Hull frequently, and he revealed 
his view of the Secretary's qualities. He especially admired Hull's 
integrity and sincerity, but he sometimes disliked the top official's 
simple approach to events. Occasionally, the Secretary assumed a posi­
tion and then accepted evidence which would support an opposite con­
clusion.
Before long, Wilson became a participant in the Secretary's 
symposiums which consisted of gathering the highest echelon personnel 
into a room for considering major problems of foreign policy. Then
%ilson to Bullitt, August 25, 1937, Wilson Papers; Wilson to 
Massigli, June 30, 1937, Wilson Papers; Welles to Wilson, July 20, 1937, 
Wilson Papers; Phillips to Wilson, June 25, 1937, Wilson Papers; Hull 




Hull proceeded around the room asking each person to give his opinion, 
and, after that, everyone discussed the advantages and disadvantages of 
various approaches. Wilson experienced difficulty adjusting to the sys­
tem, because he could not personally conduct affairs in that manner and 
because the procedure consumed an excessive amount of time. However, 
Wilson's colleagues generally considered the results good, so he accom­
modated himself to the practice which he came to appreciate more in the
pfuture sessions.
The most pressing international problem confronting the Depart­
ment in the summer and fall of 1937 was the China, Incident. Since 1932, 
Japan had tried to increase its political standing on the Asian conti­
nent without open warfare. But the Chinese nation increasingly insisted 
on Hanking's resistance to Japan instead of appeasement, while, at the 
same time, military leaders gained more influence in the Tokyo govern­
ment. The ultimate result was the beginning of Sino-Japanese hostili­
ties which presaged World War II in the Pacific.
On the night of July J, 1937, near the ̂ larao Polo Bridge a short 
distance from Peiping, a contingent of Japanese troops were engaged in 
maneuvers outside a specified area in violation of the Boxer Protocol. 
Japanese and Chinese soldiers came into contact and fired on each other,
^Hugh R. Wilson^Jr.7, Disarmament and the Cold War in the 
Thirties (New York: Vantage Press, 1963), PP* 59, 75-76; hereafter
cited as Wilson, Disarmament; Wilson to Grew, August 28, 1937, Wilson 
Papers.
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and at that moment Japan renewed its open military attempt to secure 
parts of China. The Chinese, demonstrating marked determination, re­
solved to prevent the seizure of the heartland of their possessions.
But local efforts to end the hostilities failed; Peiping and Tientsin 
fell to the enemy on July 29, and fighting was occurring as far south
■3as Shanghai by mid-August.
The United States assumed a more cautious and independent atti­
tude during this crisis than it had six years before. Secretary Hull 
preferred to make statements about the promotion of peace without obli­
gating his country to act. Indeed, the avoidance of alliances or en­
tangling commitments was essential to Hull's approach. Accordingly, the 
United States sought to lessen the danger of its possible involvement 
in military or political controversy but to protect the ri^ts and prop­
erty of its citizens. The key features of the indefinite and gradually
1).developing Roosevelt policy included neutrality and patient observation.
Dictating American policy in part was the Neutrality Act of 
193T* That legislation stipulated a compulsory and impartial embargo 
on the exports of munitions and loans to belligerents in case of war.
^Edwin 0. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Rev. ed.;
New York: The Viking Press, 195T), PP- 26-27; Richard W. Leopold, The
Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966), p. 527; hereafter cited as Leopold, Growth.
^A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, I962), pp. 454-456; hereafter cited
as Griswold, Far Eastern Policy.
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But the President could decide for himself whether war or a state of war 
existed; under that provision he might use the law or decline to employ 
it at his discretion.^
Because of the Par Eastern hostilities. Secretary Hull called 
several sessions of the top State Department officials to consider the 
applicability of the Neutrality Act. At first, a general feeling existed 
that the law should not be invoked then, but that its application could 
not be postponed indefinitely. Generally, the personnel wanted to uti­
lize the legislation which offered a statutory basis for action. Also, 
the procedure supposedly would not arouse public desire for full invoca­
tion of the law. In contrast. Secretary Hull preferred only a presiden­
tial statement to discourage arms trade with belligerents.
At first, Wilson stated an alternate approach from the one which 
the President later officially adopted. On September it-, he expressed his 
ideas, as did other Departmental personnel, in response to the Secretary's 
direct request for opinions. He suggested the immediate application of 
Section I, but he did not want Section II invoked. He chose that posi­
tion for the Par East because, generally, no danger existed to American 
trade there, as it might potentially concerning Europe. Consequently, 
Wilson saw no need to restrict, actually penalize, American shippers who 
conducted trade with Japan. Instead, he proposed a statement similar to 
that of Roosevelt's declaration of 1935 during the Italian-Ethiopian 
crisis. The scheme included a warning that Anericans in their contact
^Leopold, Growth, p. 508*
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■with helligerents assumed, the risk for commercial intercourse. Wilson 
foresaw the possihility of citizens being killed in China or in the 
seas off Asia, and the probability of public criticism for failure to 
protect them. He would preclude that possibility by forewarning Ameri­
can nationals.^
The President adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward use of the 
statute. In line with the thinking of Secretary Hull, Roosevelt de­
clared that arms trade ■with and shipment to belligerents were contrary 
to American policy. By September 1^, he decided to review daily the 
pertinence of the Neutrality Acts to events, thus to permit the United 
States to apply the law when necessary, but to allow China to receive 
weapons in the meantime. The President formally defined the hostilities 
as an incident rather than a war, since the latter classification would
7have automatically made the statute effective.
After the September l4 announcement. President Roosevelt devel­
oped a quarantine concept. Originally, Secretary Hull and Norman Dâ vis 
recommended a Presidential statement on international cooperation, and 
Roosevelt asked other State Department officials, including Wilson, for 
their written ideas on the subject. In turn, the President adopted most 
of the suggestions, but the quarantine idea, which he stated in a Chicago 
address on October was his alone. He referred to war as a disease 
which might infect nations and peoples far removed from the origin of
Wilson, Disarmament, pp. 6o, 62, 6k, 68-69* 
"̂ Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, p. 4^6.
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hostilities. Although alluding to the usual practice of isolating pa­
tients during an epidemic, he made no specific recommendations for imple­
menting such a procedure. He thought that the peaceful nations should 
make a mutual effort to guarantee basic international principles and 
pledges in treaty promises. While cautioning that isolation or neutral­
ity were not means of meeting world problems, he was determined to pre-g
vent American involvement in war.
Actually, Roosevelt was attempting to gauge sentiment on American 
foreign policy. Staunch isolationists sharply criticized the alleged 
attempt to entangle the United States in war, instead of drawing back 
from it. Optimistic internationalists applauded the address and urged 
aid to Chinese Nationalists and the Loyalist faction in Spain.^
Hull and Wilson reached conflicting interpretations of the mes­
sage. Both were surprised by the inclusion of the quarantine portion, 
since no one in the Department had suggested it. Hull felt that the move 
constituted a definite setback to his effort of the past six months to 
shift public opinion toward concerted international action. Unlike the 
Secretary, Wilson thought that the President was proposing the taking of 
positive steps to curb aggression abroad. He disliked the proposition 
because the United States had only limited interests in the Par East and 
because it probably precluded the unilaterial application of the Neutral­
ity Act.
^Leopold, Growth, p. 533*
9lbid.
^^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Mac­
millan Co., I9U8), I, 545; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: % e  Lion
and the Fox (New York: Hercourt. Brace and Co., 1956), PP* 31W-319;
Wilson, Disarmament, pp. 68-69.
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During September and October, 1937, some feeling developed for 
definite action toward Japan, which was continuing its military expan­
sion in north and south China. The Department personnel seemed divided 
into two schools of thought, perhaps more on desire than actual policy. 
The first group looked for a method of coercing Japan to halt its aggres­
sion. Proponents of that view included Judge R. Walton Moore, the Coun­
selor of the State Department, Assistant Secretary George Messersmith, 
and Stanley Hombeck, the Chief of Far Eastern Affairs. The second group 
wanted to express dissatisfaction with Japan’s conduct in China and pos­
sibly to state that Tokyo had not kept its international agreements.
That alignment consisted of Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, J. 
Pierrepont Moffat, James C. Dunn, all of the Western European Division, 
Joseph Green, the Chief of Arms and Munitions Control, and Wilson. The 
vital point of their procedure was that no actual pressure should be 
applied because it mi^t lead the United States into war.^^
Several factors accounted for the conclusions of the second 
school. First, American economic interests in the Far East were much 
more limited than in Europe. Second, Britain could not assist in combat 
or coercion in East Asia because of London’s greater attention to Euro­
pean conditions. Third, in that situation, only the United States Wavy 
could offer protection of Washington’s interests. Fourth, any American
^^ilson. Disarmament, p. 66.
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show of force would, mean that the Philippines were exposed to possible 
12Japanese attack.
Wilson had considerable misgivings about American involvement 
in the Par East. In his frustration, he wished that President George 
Washington had cautioned the United States against political entangle­
ments in the Pacific. Wilson could not understand why the United States 
so readily assumed a Par Eastern role when its interests were greatly 
restricted. In contrast, the American government reluctantly accepted 
political obligations in Europe where its cultural and material inter­
ests were a hundredfold larger. Purthermore, he contended that anger at 
Japan over the violations of treaties and aggression were abstractions 
which should not be fought for since no abstraction was worth the price 
of war. He believed that only the defense of territory and vital inter­
ests justified risking a government's security and land. Therefore, he 
adhered to a very narrow concept of action in the Par East.
Throughout the autumn of 1937, the Roosevelt administration con­
tinued to grope for a policy. Clearly, the United States did not con­
template the sending of naval or military forces to the Par East, nor 
did it plan to abandon its isolationist approach. Britain and the Uni­
ted States conferred about the appropriateness of extending their good
-̂ Afilson to Grew, October l8, 1937, Wilson Papers; Wilson, 
Disarmament, pp. 67-68.
^^Wilson, Disarmament, pp. 69, 72-73-
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offices to China and Japan for ending hostilities, hut neither London 
nor Washington was willing to implement that procedure. Instead, the 
United States elected to act in accordance with the Nine Power Treaty. 
Even here, its response was extremely limited. Indeed, it had no pro­
posal to make to the Brussels Conference, which consisted of the nine 
powers except Japan, or a plan of procedure about Sino-Japanese diffi­
culties which the United States would support. The powers at Brussels 
restated the treaty principles as essential to peace and declared that 
a cessation of hostilities would best serve the two combatant nations 
and all governments. Unfortunately, those weak, ineffective measures 
tended to stiffen Japanese resentment toward intervention from Washing­
ton and other capitals.
Similarly, American relations with Germany were strained because 
of economic and political differences and aggravated by unsatisfactory 
American diplomatic representation in Berlin, the latter condition help­
ing to open the way for Wilson's return to a field assignment. Since 
1933, William E. Dodd, a historian and loyal Democrat, had been the Am­
bassador to Germany, but he did not get along with the German govern­
ment, other foreign officials, or his own staff. Dodd, a firm believer 
in American democracy, expressed his disapproval of the Nazi regime in
Leopold, Growth, p. 531; Wilson, Memorandum, November 28, 1937, 
F.R., III, 727-728; Wilson, Memorandum of a Conversation with Walravens, 
Second Secretary of the Belgian Embassy, October 20, 1937, F.R., IV, 9^- 
95; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 4^8-460; Wilson to Grew, November 
16, 1937, Wilson Papers.
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undiplomatic private conversations and public speeches. In September, 
1937, the State Department, increasingly displeased with his perform­
ance as were Reich personnel, and the President agreed to replace him 
at the end of the year. It considered several diplomatic figures who 
mi^t restore American diplomatic contacts, including William Bullit, 
Joseph Davies, and Hu^ Gibson, who declined the office, before it fi­
nally chose Wilson. On December 29, 1937; Dodd left Berlin, and on 
January I8, 1938, Wilson took the oath of office. Although the 
ambassador-designate arrived in Berlin in mid-February, 1938, he did 
not assume his official duties until March 3; due to the absence of 
the Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler from the city. ^
For the third time in his Foreign Service career, Wilson held a 
diplomatic post in Germany. On none of those occasions did he like liv­
ing in the country, although he was fully occupied during each stay. The 
work was absorbing, but conditions there did not appeal to him, probably 
because the German life-style differed from his preferences. His personal 
desire for an assignment where the customs and people were more to his
^Hugh R. Wilson, Jr., A Career Idplomat, The Third Chapter:
The Third Reich (Wew York, 1960), p. jS; hereafter cited as Wilson, Jr., 
Career Diplomat; Dodd to Wilson, December 9; 1937; 123-W693/50^; Welles, 
Memorandum of Conversation with German Ambassador Dieckhoff, December 15, 
1937; 123.Wo93/50% Hull to Roosevelt, December 7; 1937; I23.W693/506; 
Dodd to Hull, December 4, 1937; 123.W&93/515; Wilson to Nathaniel T. 
Davis, Chief of the Division of Foreign Administration, January 18,
1938, I23.W693/518; Hull to Wilson, January 17; 1938; 123.W693/519; 
Gilbert to Hull, February I6, 1938, I23.W693/523; Wilson to Hull,
March 3, 1938, 123.W693/527; Robert Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat; The 
Life of William E. Dodd (New York; Oxford University Press', Ï968)',
p p .  3 1 0 - 3 1 5 .
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tastes clashed with his professional wish to remain in Berlin where he 
could observe and handle interesting problems daily. In 1938, he 
possessed feelings of revulsion at some phases of the Nazi regime, par­
ticularly the treatment of the Jews. Yet, he also had a profound de­
sire to observe the means which Germany was using to restore itself 
politically and economically. "The spectc. le of that powerful and in­
genious race dealing with its problems .̂anuinely engrossing," he 
later said in a speech in the United States during 19^0 or 19^1»
In Germany, Wilson scrutinized "the most baffling of all peoples, 
the most diff -.alt to understand." During his three German assignments, 
he was impressed by the outstanding ability of Germans to cope with un­
usual conditions, especially in the industrial and financial realms. In 
his opinion, however, that ingenuity did not extend to government, an 
area in which he considered the Gernsns "baffled and troubled." In addi­
tion, the populace comprised a volatile, dynamic, and restless people 
who were seldom completely satisfied with their accomplishments. The 
German "character" was so compelling to Wilson, that he regarded the 
Germans as the most changeable of all western peoples ; yet, the Germans 
loved order and method which they liked to be imposed by higher authori­
ties. Those two traits were particularly evident to the Ambassador in 
the Jewish persecution. Planned cruelty, or calculated barbarity by the 
state might be upheld if the program benefited all the nation, but Ger­
mans could not forgive a man acting alone for revenge or punishment in 
violation j,f the law, or venting uncontrol3.ed anger. When Wilson spoke
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of the harharovis treatment of the Jews, Geimans were astonished and 
countered with the crimes of A1 Capone in Chicago, the lynching of 
Negroes, and the lahor riots in the United States. To Wilson's remark 
that public opinion in his country condemned such violence, the typical 
German reply was, "All the worse. Where passion prevails, there is 
barbarity." Only gradually did Wilson come to grasp the profound dif­
ference between Americans and Germans.
By 1938, Germany enjoyed a prosperity which showed itself in the 
busy mining and manufacturing activities, and which had been gained at a 
great human price. The Nazi regime had eliminated unemployment and the 
disorders of the 1920's, and, in fact, some industries experienced a 
labor shortage which helped to elevate the workman's status. But Wilson 
soon discovered how the government achieved the apparent order and unity. 
The Gestapo and the Black Shirts, both secret police organizations, 
acted ruthlessly and effectively to squelch actual or potential dis­
orders ; children betrayed their parents in the name of Nazism; terror 
gripped the hearts of thousands of Germans.
Despite its cruelty, the Nazi regime won a marked degree of 
sympathy and support among the workmen with its labor program. Nazi 
government and party agencies formulated and ably conducted significant 
social and welfare activities which gained for the workers security in 
job tenure, old age benefits, paid vacations, and adequate working and 
living conditions. Thus, the lot of workers was drastically improved 
without a corresponding pay increase. Hitler himself took a genuine 
interest in the welfare of the workingmen, although he had little regard
z^k
for the intellectual or the vhite collar classes. Critics and opponents 
of Hitler and Nazism mi^t complain about the undemocratic way of ad­
ministering the program, but the plan was a definite contribution to the 
life of industrial personnel.
When Wilson first arrived in Berlin, he doubted the durability 
of the Nazi regime, a view which American travelers in Germany and some 
publications in the United States frequently held. Wilson quickly saw 
the error of those assessments, and he told Hull that the avowed Nazis 
constituted a large minority whose power far exceeded its numbers. The 
opposition which constituted those persons fundamentally against the 
regime included a much smaller group of less political influence due to 
government restrictions on general political activities. Wilson felt 
that most citizens, whom he considered the most influential group within 
the nation, did not support or oppose the Nazi government on principle. 
Generally, they distrusted most Nazi party officials except Hitler, but 
they backed the regime because of patriotism and the lack of any alter­
native to their current administration.
Wilson also contended that Germany's economic future appeared 
secure. While the nation certainly did not have gold reserves comparable 
to those of Prance, the United States, and Switzerland, the international 
demand for German products kept the value of the mark stable. Likewise, 
the trade balance was good and, according to German observers, would
^^Wilson, "Under Three Reichs," Wilson Papers; Wilson to Hull, 
May 2k, 1938> Wilson Papers.
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continue to te so. In case of a planned modification in trade arrange­
ments, the alternation would have to he done slowly in order not to 
disrupt the exchange by creating a dangerous imbalance. Even Jewish 
bankers and businessmen, who might understandably be expected to be 
critical of Nazi programs, were gradually becoming convinced that the 
economic system was viable. Those circumstances persuaded Wilson that
for the immediate future prophets of an early collapse of the Nazi Reich
17were thinking wishfully.
Within a short time, Wilson revealed his observations about 
Hitler. He described the Nazi Fuehrer as a man of simple and direct 
communication, and his chief impression from their first meeting was 
"the lack of drama in this exceedingly dramatic figure." The American 
Ambassador was more personally impressed with the evident charm of Musso­
lini than with that of Hitler, but the first session with Hitler was 
strictly formal, so the two officials did not communicate freely. Wilson 
said that he was happy to meet the Reich leader who had brought prosper­
ity and pride to the previously defeated and demoralized Germany. Hitler, 
who, in a rare response, seemed unwilling to accept the sole credit for 
his country’s attainments, spoke of the restored confidence and the 
nation's accomplishments under the National Socialist Party. Either 
Hitler was being unusually modest on this occasion or Wilson failed to
"̂̂ Wilson to Hull, May 2k, 1938, Wilson. Papers ; Wilson to Moffat,
March 7, 1938, Wilson Papers.
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-1 Qperceive the megalomania of his host.
By the time of the second conversation, Wilson had formed a more
precise opinion. By then, he had picked up the characterization of
Hitler as an artist, an approach which Germans frequently used. Wilson
felt the term appropriate if it referred to a person who reached his
decisions and acted more through instinct than a reasoned train of
thought. Naturally, the Reich Chancellor garnered information from many
sources, for he could not conduct governmental affairs otherwise; his
thought processes, while using that information, were directed toward
the emotional idea of a greater Germany. To Wilson, the artist concept
encompassed Hitler's outstanding talent of weighing chances, of judging
the hesitancy of other states to block German action, and to act at the
moment when other governments were most impotent--all factors which were
19operative in the annexation of Austria.
While Wilson was still adjusting to the new post, the Austrian 
crisis developed. Several months before. Hitler had informed his pri­
mary advisers of the need to incorporate all Germans into the Third Reich. 
Thus, he would annex Austria, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, and 
Danzig under the guise of self-detemination. He created a critical 
situation in the first country and pressured its president to resign, 
and his successor, a prominent Austrian Nazi, promptly requested German 
troops to keep order. By March 12, Reich soldiers occupied Vienna, and
^®Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 3; 1938, in Wilson, Jr., 
Career Diplomat, pp. 18-21.
^%ilson to Roosevelt, March 12, 1938, ibid., pp. 21-22.
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a month later elections in Germany and Austria confirmed the union which 
the Versailles Treaty prohibited. Throu^out the episode, Berlin re­
ceived a minimum of outside protest, because Prance was undergoing an­
other of its frequent Cabinet crises and because Britain considered the 
German move inevitable, on ethnic grounds.
In the main, the United States remained quiet except for the 
problem of guarding the lives and property of its citizens. When the 
American chargé in Vienna had difficulty contacting authorities about 
protection-of-interest cases, he informed Wilson of the situation. The 
latter took up the matter with the German Foreign Office officials who 
claimed that he could present the problem to them because the two coun­
tries were united. He refused to accept that procedure since the United 
States had not yet taken an official position about the change of author­
ity in Austria. Consequently, at that moment, he could only contact the 
German officers to obtain information about nationals. Once Washington
accepted the altered Austrian status, several protests to the German
21government brou^t the situation under control.
Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent; American Entry 
Into World War II (Hew York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., I965), p. 51;
hereafter cited as Divine, Reluctant Belligerent; Wilson to Hull,
March 12, I938, F.R., I, 426-427; Wilson to Hull, March 13, 1938, F.R.,
I, 434-437.
^^Wilson, Memorandum of a Conversation With Hans G. von Macken- 
sen. State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, March I8, 1938, Wil­
son Papers; Wilson to Hull, March I8, 1938, F.R., II, 50^-507j Divine, 
Reluctant Belligerent, p. 51  ̂Wilson to Hull, April 27, 1938, F.R., II, 
510; Welles to Wilson, April 27, 1938, F.R., II, 5)2; Wilson to Hull, 
April 29, 1938, F.R., n, 512-513; Wilson to Hull, May 7, 1938, F.R.,
II, 514; Wilson to Moffat, April 2, 1938, Wilson Papers.
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The United States was less successful in its attempts to collect 
Austrian debts. In 1930, Vienna and Washington had signed a debt agree­
ment, and two years later they agreed on a moratorium. When that nation’s 
independence ended, the United States considered that Germany would assume 
responsibility for discharging the public and private obligations. Ac­
cordingly, Wilson so infomed Berlin, which refused to accept a legal 
liability to pay the amount or to participate in international delibera­
tions about it. Ultimately, Wilson made no more progress toward collec-
22tion than any of his foreign colleagues.
While Americans in the United States bitterly denounced the brutal 
blow to Austria, and the Germans celebrated their coup, Wilson assessed 
the meaning of the Anschluss. Clearly, Hitler's government enjoyed eco­
nomic superiority in the area, and the acquisition gave him a valuable 
means of expansion into southeast Europe. In addition, the Fuehrer was 
fulfilling the goals of uniting all Germans, gaining equality of rights 
for his people, and ending the limitations of the Versailles Treaty.
Once the Third Reich consolidated its Austrian gains and solved the 
Czechoslovakian minority problems, then Wilson expected the Chancellor 
to turn toward Russia for expansion and settlement.̂ 3
2%ull to Wilson, April 5, 1938, F.R., II, 483-^84; Hull to Wil­
son, May 28, 1938, F.R., II, 48?; Wilson to Hull, May 31, 1938, F.R., II, 
488-^89; Wilson to Hull, July 15, 1938, F.R., H ,  493; Moffat to Wilson, 
August 29, 1938, Wilson Papers; Hull to Wilson, October I8, 1938, F.R., 
II, 494-495; Wilson to Hull, September 8, 1938, Moffat Papers.
23j/[offat to Wilson, March 21, 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson to 
Moffat, April 2, 1938, Wilson Papers ; Wilson to Hull, March 24, 1938, 
in Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, pp. 22-23*
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Indeedj Czechoslovakia vas the next area of Hitler's attention.
In the spring of 1938; the spokesman for the Sudeten Germans demanded 
full independence for his people vho lived in that part of Czechoslovakia 
adjacent to Germany. Prague refused and asked France and Britain for 
assistance, vhich vas not readily given. Consequently, Germany and 
Czechoslovakia vere making military preparations in the spring and summer 
vhile the Sudeten representative and Prague officials conferred about
piipossible solutions in the summer.
Tensions increased, rather than declined. Early in September, 
the Sudeten-Czech deliberations vere stalled until Prague decided to 
give the minority its independence. Unfortunately for the prospects of 
immediate settlement. Hitler nov demanded the cession of the Sudetenland 
to his government. In turn, President Eduard Benes requested France to 
help his country, and Paris looked to London for action. The delibera­
tions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Premier 
Eduoard Daladier about the extreme German demand convinced them that 
Czechoslovakia should yield to Berlin's vishes. So, on September 21, a 
reluctant Benes undervent the humiliation of releasing the Sudeten Ger­
mans, the strategic vorks, and 800,000 Czechs in that disputed area.
^^Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 52-53; Nevins, Nev Deal, 
pp. 150-151. On March I5, Wilson vrote, "Austria is an integral part of 
the Reich. Bismarck's vork is to continue. I vould rather be a citizen 
of Missouri than of Czechoslovakia vith three million Germans in my terri­
tory and on the flank of Bismarck's children." Wilson, "Diary," 1938, 
p. 9; Wilson Papers.
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Hitler wanted more, however. The next day, he issued the ulti­
matum that the Sudetenland he transferred hy October 1 or the Reich army 
would enter the region, naturally, France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia 
were taken aback, but, at the Munich Conference, British and French dele­
gates conceded the central point. In return, the German Chancellor 
promised not to secure further European territory, a pledge which he 
broke within six months. On September 30, Czechoslovakia became the 
sacrifice to fulfill the widespread demand for peace at any price. As a 
result, the Munich settlement cost the western democracies much, althou^ 
they gained a year to prepare for World War 11.^^
During the crisis Wilson's role was largely limited to observa­
tion. The value of his reports varied because he had difficulty verify­
ing or disproving accounts which he heard. His sources of information 
were both limited and imprecise, since the Chancellor was away from Ber­
lin for long periods and so were other foreign personnel. Besides, he 
was even unsure of the reliability of his Nazi party informants, because 
their relationship to the Fuehrer fluctuated so much that it was better 
to await developments rather than to speculate. While Wilson personally 
did not think that Germany contemplated a military assault on Czecho-
A
Slovakia, he was confident that immediate results were dependent on 
Czech internal stability, the degree of conciliation which Benes .
^^Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 53-5^J Wevins, New Deal, 
pp. 151-158.
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26displayed, and Hitler’s disposition.
Not -until September did Wilson become apprehensive about the 
prospects for a deliberated settlement. Prior to that month, he rea­
soned that the Sudetenland vas not important enough for the Chancellor 
to risk a general war. Since Hitler had always left room to maneuver 
out of dangerous situations, the Ambassador tended to discount some of 
the grave reports brought to him by officials -who had conversed with the 
Fuehrer. When the German leader failed to reserve a means of escape 
after mid-September, Wilson became firmly convinced that general war
would come in the immediate future if Czechoslovakia did not answer the
27Reich ultimatum satisfactorily.
Evidently profoundly impressed by such news and the overall ur­
gency of the problem. President Roosevelt belatedly worked for a settle­
ment through consultation. Although American national interest was not 
immediately jeopardized, he urged the renewal of the negotiations, only 
to have Germany reject the offer. Then he and Chamberlain appealed to
^^ilson to Hull, April 28, 1938, F.R., I, 4-91; Carr to Wilson, 
June 27, 1938, Wilson Papers ; Wilson to Hull, August 13, 1938, Wilson 
Papers: Wilson to Hull, September 8, 1938, in Wilson, Jr., Career Diplo­
mat, pp. 48-49. During a tense period of May, Wilson suggested the pos­
sibility of informing the German and the Czech Foreign Minister of the 
American interest in a peaceful solution to preserve European peace. 
Secretary Hull decided that such an approach was inadvisable. Wilson to 
Hull, May 21, 1938, F.R., I, 506-507; Hull to Wilson, May 23, 1938, F.R., 
I, 515-
"̂̂ Wilson to Hull, September 25, 1938, F.R., I, 656; Wilson to
Hull, September 27, 1938, F.R., I, 683-684; Wilson to Hull, September 1,
1938, F.R., I, 566-567.
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Mussolini for the use of his good offices, a move which shortly hrou^t
results when Hitler agreed to confer with the involved powers at 
?8Munich.
The United States played only a sli^t role in the Czech crisis. 
Because American national interests were not directly touched, the Brit­
ish and French governments decided independently of the United States not 
to defend the Czech position, a circumstance which encouraged Hitler to 
stand firm. Certainly, Washington officials were relieved hy the pacific 
settlement, hut before long, however, even the American public questioned
the wisdom of conceding so much to Germany, a fact which contributed to
29the decline of isolationism in the United States.
While aggressive expansion was adding to tensions in Europe, 
German-American relations were also strained. Throughout Wilson's ten­
ure in Berlin, hostility existed because of different views on the Jewish 
question, the Berlin-Tokyo axis, the discrimination in bond payments, 
trade problems, and the divergent concepts about individual liberty and 
government control. Nor was the situation improved by the marked German 
sensitivity to foreign opinions of the Third Reich and the extreme Ameri­
can press criticism of the Hazi regime. When Berlin officials complained 
about that bias, the Ambassador countered that Americans were convinced
^^Nevins, New Deal, pp. 154-156; Roosevelt to Hitler, September 
27, 1938, F.R., 1,^684-685.
^^Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 54-55; Nevins, New Deal,
pp. 159-160.
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of the sound basis for their comments. Moreover, the German press fre-
• a nquently published errors about the United States.
Wilson actually deplored the bitterness of the journalistic 
accounts which he believed definitely aggravated tension. The complaints 
accentuated the irritation of the Germans and made diplomatic and com­
mercial intercourse more difficult. Much more could be accomplished by 
trying to cooperate with the German nation instead of maligning it; the 
prospect for improved relations would be better if United States citizens 
would only halt their adverse criticism.3^
Trade relations constituted another major area of difficulty.
A specific problem resulted from the refusal of Washington to allow the 
sale of helium to Germany as fuel for their airships. Earlier in 1938, 
the United States had agreed to supply the German Zeppelin Company with 
a specific amount of the gas. Later, Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Iekes refused to approve the shipment unless Germany guaranteed that the 
helinm would not be used for war purposes and unless Germany granted 
American officers supervision of the element within the Third Reich.
3 Wilson, "Diary," 1938, p. 12, Wilson papers; Wilson, Memorandum 
of a Conversation with German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ernst von 
Weizsacker, undated, F.R., 1938, II, 438-4^1; Wilson, Memorandum of a 
Conversation with Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda 
and Public Enlightenment, undated, F.R., 1938, II, 434-438; Wilson to 
Hoover, May 11, 1938, in Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, p. 28.
3%ilson to Hoover, May 11, 1938, in Wilson,Jr., Career Diplomat, 
p. 28; Wilson, Memorandum of a Conversation with Reich Propaganda Minister, 
Dr. Goebbels, undated, F.R., 1938, II, 438.
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Since neither country vould alter its position on those points, the 
United States finally repudiated the contract. Understandably, Berlin 
charged Washington vith bad faith, and its people vere "deeply resent­
ful" over "a pretty shabby trick." Wilson, vho deplored vhat he con­
sidered a vrong decision by his government, realized that the helium 
regulations made his vork more difficult and contributed to the unfriendly 
attitude tovard the United States.
Wor vere general trade relations good, and at least four factors 
accounted for the lack of better conditions. First, Americans vere con­
vinced that German debt regulations vere discriminatory tovard them. 
Second, they felt that Germany vas dumping goods on the vorld market. 
Third, they opposed the Geiman pursuit of bilateral trade rather than 
the more open system of Hull's reciprocal trade agreements. Fourth, they 
objected to the German veltans chauung.
In 1938, essentially no progress vas made in removing those ob­
stacles. Although the United States vanted the normalization of commer­
cial relations, the State Department vas unwilling to alter its position
3%ilson to Hull, April 13, 1938, F.R., II, 457-^58; Welles to 
Wilson, April 20, I938, F.R., II, ^58; Wilson, "Diary," 1938, pp. 25, 27, 
Wilson Papers ; Green to Wilson, April I9, 1938, Wilson Papers; Green to 
Wilson, May 17, 1938, Wilson Papers ; Wilson to Welles, May 12, 1938, in 
Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, pp. 31-32; Wilson to Green, I4ay 19, 1938, 
Wilson Papers; Wilson to Green, June 6, 1938, Wilson Papers ; Green to 
Wilson, June 29, 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson to Welles, July II+, 1938, 
Wilson Papers; Welles to Wilson, July 27, 1938, Wilson Papers.
^^Wilson to Hull, August I6, 1938, F.R., II, 422-^2^.
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vhile the Third Reich exercised exclusive trade control in its area.
80; Wilson vas limited merely to explaining Hull's philosophy of trade 
and the advantages of the approach vithout making any offer to the 
Foreign Office personnel. Consequently, American business and export
34interest had to make their ovn plans independently.
The major item of contention between the United States and Ger­
many vas the Jevish persecution. Early in his regime, Hitler struck upon 
the idea of his people as a superior Aryan race in order to promote a 
definite national pride in the nation. A part of his plan vas to purge 
the Third Reich of "inferior" races, and particularly the Jevs. So, he 
instituted a program of confiscating Jewish property, eliminating Jevs 
from business and the professions, and destroying their culture. In 
1938, the persecution increased markedly, especially after the Austrian 
and Czech crises. German Jews began emigrating from the Reich, and the 
United States and other governments made feeble, reluctant, and largely 
unsuccessful efforts to take them in. When a German Jew killed a Reich 
diplomatic official in Paris during November, the Hitler government 
accelerated the already vicious persecutions. President Roosevelt, like
3 Wilson, Memorandum of a Conversation with Ribbentrop and Macken- 
sen, February 17, 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson, "Diary," 1938, p. 17, Wil­
son Papers; Sayre to Wilson, April 28, 1938, F.R., II, hl8~kl9; Messer­
smith to Wilson, February 2̂ , 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson to Messersmith, 
March I6, 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson to Sayre, November 10, 1938, F.R., 
II, k27-k28; Sayre to Brinkmann, December 16, 1938, F.R., II, 431; Wil­
son to Hull, April 4, 1938, I23.W693/532. Nor was Washington willing to 
associate debt discussions concerning American holders of German bonds 
vith trade problems, a point Wilson made clear to the Economics Ministry. 
Hull to Wilson, June 29, 1938, F.R., II, 420; Wilson to Hull, June 30, 
1938, F.R., II, 420; Wilson to Hull, June 30, 1938, F.R., II, 421; Hull 
to Wilson, July 2, 1938, F.R., H ,  421-422.
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leaders of both political parties, publicly indicated horror and shock, 
and, further, the United States demonstrated its displeasure by calling 
Wilson home for consultation. The action was little short of severing 
diplomatic relations, but certainly less drastic in its implications
In the United States, the degree of hatred toward the Nazi regime 
greatly surprised Wilson. He received considerable anonymous mail from 
persons who requested him to resign and speak freely about conditions in 
Germany and from individuals who wanted diplomatic relations improved 
lest the Jewish question draw the United States into a war with Germany. 
He recognized that no improvement in German-Anerican relations would 
come about unless his countrymen could think coolly about the Jewish 
question, and the continued persecutions in Germany exacerbated tensions. 
Under those circumstances, the State Department decided in March, 1939, 
to retain him on a consultative status indefinitely.
Ultimately, German action led to Wilson's resignation as the 
Ambassador to Berlin. First, Hitler indicated his interest in securing 
all of Czechoslovakia, and then, in March, 1939, Reich forces occupied 
Czechoslovakia in clear violation of the Munich pledge. The same month. 
Hitler's government proposed to Poland the German annexation of Danzig
^^Hevins, Hew Deal, pp. I6I-165; Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, 
p. 55," Wilson to Hull, April 22, 1938, Hull Papers; Wilson to Hull,
April 5, 1938, F.R., II, 360-361; Hull to Wilson, May 7, 1938, F.R.,
II, 369-370; Wilson to Roosevelt, June 2, 1938, F.R., II, 37^-375j 
Wilson to Hull, June 22, 1938, F.R., H, 380-382; Wilson, Political 
Report of the Ambassador in Germany, undated, F.R., 1938, II, 386-387; 
Wilson to Hull, October 26, 1938, F.R., II, 395-396; Wilson to Hu3.1, 
Wovember 12, 1938, F.R., II, 396; Messersmith to Hull, November 1̂ , 1938, 
F.R., II, 396-398; Hull to Wilson, November 14, 1938, F.R., II, 398-399; 
Wilson to Myron C. Taylor, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, July 
27; 1938, Wilson Papers.
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and a strip of land across the Polish corridor, naturally Warsaw refused, 
and a diplomatic deadlock developed over the Danzig question. The world 
fully expected and prepared for a German attack on Poland, and in May, 
Hitler told a secret meeting of Reich officials that he would invade the 
area at the first good opportunity. On September 1, when Reich troops 
entered Poland, Germany touched off World War II in Europe. Immediately, 
Wilson resigned as a protest against the ruthless conduct of Germany.3̂  
Wilson spent the last fifteen months of his Foreign Service 
career working with minor State Department agencies in Washington. From 
September, 1939, to January, 1940, he worked temporarily with a bureau 
which handled refugee problems. In January, since no interesting field 
jobs were available, he was made a Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
State and assigned to the newly formed Advisory Committee on Problems of 
Foreign Relations. The body, chaired by Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles, surveyed the problems which would probably arise once Europe 
reached a peace settlement. Wilson, the vice chairman, served as the 
liaison man for the three main subdivisions. The Political Committee
3^essersmith to Wilson, November 25, 1938, 123 .W693/58O; Wilson 
to Gilbert, December 1, 1938, Wilson Papers; Wilson to Kirk, May 8, 1939, 
Wilson Papers ; Messersmith, Memorandum to Davis, March I8, 1939, 123 *W- 
693/ÔO2; Wilson to Kirk, September 2, 1939, Wilson Papers. As late as 
March, 1940, Wilson indicated a willingness to go back to Germany if the 
Roosevelt administration really contemplated the exchange of ambassadors 
as reported by the press. Since the general American-German relations 
remained unimproved, the President had given no thought to the appoint­
ment of an ambassador. Wilson to Hull, March 7, 1940, Hull Papers ; Hull 
to Roosevelt, March 15, 1940, Hull Papers. Nevins, New Deal, pp. I78-
180, 187, 193.
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under Welles directed its attention to European and world problems both 
before and after the war while the Disaimament Committee, led by 
Counselor E. Walton Moore, concerned itself with weapons control. The 
Economic Committee, directed by Leo Pasvolsky who was an economist and 
a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, studied international eco­
nomic relations.37
A general feeling of skepticism among many involved personnel 
handicapped the project from the beginning. A number of individuals, 
especially those from Economic Affairs whose role was vital to the study, 
believed that the investigation was really academic and, therefore, that 
it was of little practical value. Wilson agreed that much work was 
academic, but that the idea was worthwhile, even if only a tenth of the 
material could be used after the war. The lack of enthusiasm was rein­
forced by the German push beyond Poland into Holland, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg. Consequently, the effective period of the committee ended 
in May, 19^0, although officials conducted fruitless meetings there­
after . 33
Wilson to Kirk, September 2, 1939, Wilson Papers; Wilson to 
Mrs. Kate Wilson, September 1, 1939, 123*w693/626; Wilson, Jr., Career 
Diplomat, p. 9̂ J Hu3.1 to Wilson, January 31, 19^0, Wilson Papers ;
Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, p. 93; Wilson, "Diary," January 12, 19^0, 
Wilson Papers.
^^Wilson, "Diary," January 12, l6, l8, 19^0, May 20, February 28, 
March 1, 9, 19, 19^0, Wilson Papers; Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, 
pp. 100-101; Wilson, Memorandum, Advisory Committee on Problems of 
Foreign Relations, May 31, 19^0, Wilson Papers ; Wilson to Grew, March 9, 
19^0, Wilson Papers ; Wilson to Henderson, February 7, 19^0, Wilson 
Papers.
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When Wilson's association with the committee's work ended in May, 
Wilson began thinking about his future. He had accepted the vice chair­
manship of the Advisory Committee with much satisfaction that henceforth 
he could remain at home. At his age, field appointments were less 
attractive than in his earlier days, especially since no interesting 
overseas assignments were open to him. Increasingly, he wanted to play 
golf, write at least enou^ to avoid becoming bored, and care for Mrs. 
Wilson who was seriously ill. The combination of circumstances con- 
id.nced him to retire, and on November 18, 19^0, he left the State Depart­
ment after almost thirty years of association with it.^9
He held no government position for approximately one year. In 
the spring semester of 19^1, he was the Lamont Lecturer in Government 
at Yale University. During the year, he published Diplomat Between Wars 
which covered his diplomatic career between 1917 and 1937, and Diplomacy 
As a Career which consisted of his lectures at the Milton Academy in 
Milton, Massachusetts. After the Pearl Harbor attack, he served in the 
organization which developed into the Office of Strategic Services where 
he worked with many former and active Foreign Service Officers dealing 
with espionage, counterintelligence, and morale operations. In 19^4, he 
participated in the preparations for the Dumbarton Oaks conversations on
3%offat to Wilson, July iB, 19^0, Moffat Papers; Wilson to 
Moffat, July 25, 19^0, Moffat Papers; Wilson, "Diary," October 2k, 19^0, 
Wilson Papers; Wilson to Grew, September 1, 19^0, Wilson Papers ; Wilson 
to Hull, November 26, 19^0, Hull Papers.
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international organization, and the next year, he was an observer at the
San Francisco conference which established the United Nations. On October
401, 1945; he resigned from the OSS to return to private life.
During I945 and 1946, he was active in the Republican Party 
apparatus. On April 11, 1945, Herbert Brownell, Jr., the GOP National 
Chairman, appointed Wilson the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of 
the National Committee to assist Congressional members in Washington,
D. C. During the spring, Wilson was urging a policy of close American 
cooperation with the Soviet Union to prevent a division of the world 
into two hostile camps and to preserve world peace. In December, 19^5, 
he became an adviser to a newly appointed Republican committee on the 
development of national policy, in which capacity he continued until the 
following summer when he went to his summer home at Bennington, Vermont.
On August 19, 1946, he was admitted to Putnam Memorial Hospital in 
Bennington, with a serious cardiac condition from which he never recovered,
4land he succumbed to a second heart attack on December 29, 19^6.
Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, p. IO8; New York Times, May 29, 
19^5, p. 9s U. S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Prepara­
tions, 1939-19^5, Department of State Publication 35&0, General Foreign 
Policy Series I5 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19^9,
pp. 316, 323, 381.
^^ew York Times, April 12, 19^5, P* 24; ibid., December 15, 19^5, 
p. 13; ibid., August 2Ü, 1946, p. 29; ibid., December 30, 1946, p. 19; 
Wilson, Jr., Career Diplomat, p. I08.
CHAH?ER XII.
CONCnJSIOKS
Between 1919 and 19^0, the United States gave a varied amount of 
attention to foreign affairs. The nation enthusiastically entered 
World War I, and the peace negotiations that followed with the idealism 
that the world could be safe from future global conflict. Yet, almost 
immediately, Washington rejected membership in the League of Nations and 
moved steadily toward isolationism in the 1920’s. Simultaneously, the 
country devoted more and more attention to domestic materialism, little 
thinking that prosperity would end abruptly at the end of the decade.
In the 1930's, the United States shifted its concern in the main 
to internal matters. The economic depression, which increasingly included 
more countries, constituted the overriding influence in the formulation 
of both domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the United States and the 
other governments became noticeably preoccupied with domestic concerns. 
Consequently, the Hoover and Roosevelt administration gave first prior­
ity to alleviating economic distress.
But the United States did participate in international matters 
when it could do so without assuming any special responsibility for pre­
serving world peace and when the people would permit. In the 1920's, 
the government established a cautious contact with the League of Nations 
and increased its cooperation on different occasions. The degree of 
involvement depended on the general importance of the subject, the 
previous American position, and the machinery for handling problems.
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Thus, the United States participated actively in minor conferences and 
such major meetings as the Geneva Naval Conference and the General Dis­
armament Conference. During the Manchurian crisis, the American partici­
pation in League deliberations was most hesitant and in the Italian- 
Ethiopian dispute nil except for minimal informal conversations.
At first, then, the United States had nothing to do with the 
League, but in a short while it sent unofficial observers. Yet, the 
State Department ordered the American Ministers and Consuls in Switzer­
land to be most circumspect about contacts and appearances, and after 
1927, as the United States was involved in more League-sponsored activi­
ties, Washington's instructions closely regulated its representatives. 
When American officials attended the sessions, they made it plain that 
they could not bind their government; when the American Minister talked 
to the Secretary General of the League, the contact often was confiden­
tial and informal.
As one of the major world powers, on more than one occasion the 
United States represented a potential key to League action, but the com­
mitment to nonmembership and isolationism generally blocked American 
involvement. Sometimes other nations accused Washington of obstruction­
ism for keeping the League from moving forward. On several occasions, 
in particular during the Manchurian crisis, the attempt to place the 
responsibility on the United States was really a pretext for shifting the 
blame for failure onto an innocent party. Still, the American arrange­
ments were awkward, cumbersome, and confusing, dictated as they were by
2T3
the American people vho were hypersensitive about association with the 
League and who demanded that the State Department follow a policy of 
aloofness.
Both inside and outside of the League, a manifestation of the 
interwar stresses consisted of naval and arms production. The Washing­
ton Conference set the precedent of limiting naval construction by cate­
gories and ratios. The League did its part by sponsoring the Geneva 
Naval Conference which failed because France and Italy would not attend 
and because Britain, Japan, and the United States had different needs 
to fulfill. Likewise, the differences in land armaments and interests 
kept the nations on the League's Preparatory Commission from reaching 
fundamental agreement even after more than five years of debates. In 
1930, the London Naval Conference removed some obstacles, although France 
and Italy continued to disagree on naval ratios.
Despite numerous delays, the General Disarmament Conference 
finally managed to convene and hold its sessions. The prospects for 
success were never bright with the existence of the international depres­
sion, the Manchurian crisis, the divergence of armament requirements, the 
growing dislocations in European governments, the unresolved French-Italian 
naval dispute, the French demand for security, and the German demand for 
equality of treatment by abrogating the Versailles Treaty restrictions.
The German-French tension proved the major stumbling block, especially 
with the United States and Britain being unable and unwilling to guarantee 
French territory against German resurgence. Consequently, political 
impediments remained unmoved, and, indeed, the disarmament effort failed
21k
long before the sessions ended.
The United States took an active interest throughout the period 
of the League's attention to disarmament. From the beginning, it was 
less vitally concerned about arms production, mainly because of its geo­
graphic remoteness from Europe and, though the United States was affec­
ted, in the main the American government regarded armament problems as 
primarily those of Europe. Washington did not materially hinder the 
efforts, but it did make numerous reservations along the way. When it 
tried to get talks and sessions moving, the steps were generally inade­
quate and too late. Likewise, though the United States acted whenever 
its interests mi^t be jeopardized, it often held off stating its posi­
tion in the hope that the other governments would settle their differ­
ences .
Given the need for caution in American-League relations, the 
State Department could hardly have made a better choice for the Minis­
terial assignment in Switzerland than Hugh Wilson. He possessed some 
ideal qualities for the post: he was a quiet, efficient, hardworking,
and intelligent man, who handled diplomatic matters in an unobtrusive 
manner. In line with his concept of the good diplomat, he confined 
himself to observing, conversing, reflecting, and reporting,* if he could 
not affect policy, he could at least share his advice, counsel, and in­
sights. Hot surprisingly, he disliked diplomats who angrily criticized 
their foreign colleagues or the policy of other nations. And the vent­
ing of anger was an exercise which Wilson felt was better left undone, 
since such expression tended to aggravate relations instead of improving
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them; denunciation only made it more difficult to communicate and to 
solve problems. Similarly, a nation should exercise extreme care in 
making a moral interpretation of policy and events because its standards 
of morality and conscience were not always shared by the other involved 
parties. If one government intended to censure another, it should be 
willing to utilize force or to forego the attempt, since such unsupported 
attempts also exacerbated tensions.
Wilson's pre-ministerial experiences contributed to his qualifi­
cations for the job in Switzerland. In Latin American, Japan, and Europe, 
Wilson learned the "diplomatic ranks-as .a. ..secretary and counsellor, occa­
sionally working as a chargé, and for the period 1923-1927 he utilized 
his journalistic training as the Chief of the Division of Current Infor­
mation, which work helped him specifically in two disarmament conferences 
and generally in his press contacts in Switzerland. The State Department 
early recognized those administrative qualities and his ability to handle 
situations skillfully and considered those factors in giving him the 
position. While a bit young and inexperienced in terms of the usual 
requirements for the Geneva and Berne post, he performed the assignment 
well, considering the ambiguity of the American-League relationship.
His reserved nature and disdain of pomp and ceremony made it possible 
for him to converse with League officials in a confidential and informal 
way without attracting undue attention; undoubtedly, a less adept person 
would have inspired more newspaper stories about alleged associations 
with the League.
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This is not to say that Wilson never asserted himself while in 
Switzerland. He often played situations by ear, as he did during the 
CorPerence on the Abolition of Export and Import Prohibition, because 
he was unable to contact the State Department on rushed occasions and 
because Washington could not foresee all developments and the means of 
handling them. Likewise, during 1931, he especially exerted efforts to 
prevent foreign nations from delaying preparations for the General Dis­
armament Conference and from placing preparatory responsibility upon the 
United States. Sometimes, he also disagreed with Washington's approach 
and stated so. On other occasions, he expressed a line of attack to 
Washington, and the Secretary of State overruled him. In such instances, 
his Geneva perspective was too restricted, because of his limited en­
vironment and in view of Washington's overall policy orientation.
Particularly on arms control and disarmament, Wilson constituted 
an element of assistance and continuity in Switzerland. Between 1927 
and 193^, he was the one American official most often present, either as 
an adviser or a full delegate, the latter rank not coming until 1932.
He received increased responsibility slowly because of his inexperience 
in armament matters and the presence of men with more personal knowledge 
and experience. Prior to Wilson's arrival in Switzerland, Hugji Gibson 
had established himself as America's leading disarmament expert during 
the Coolidge administration, a distinction which Gibson also retained 
throughout the Hoover term. When Roosevelt became President, he desig­
nated Norman Davis, who had been associated with arms restriction talks 
in the Hoover administration, to head the American delegation. At the
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same time, Washington's need for internationally known politicians and 
personalities to handle affairs precluded Wilson's being designated a 
delegate. In the early years, Wilson was given full status only if the 
meeting was less important than a plenary session. Wot until late 1932, 
when the disarmament delegations had dispersed from the General Disarma­
ment Conference and the prospect of a protracted and unsuccessful con­
ference existed, did the State Deparlment grant him full rank.
When the State Department began looking for a successor to 
William E. Dodd in Berlin, Wilson appeared as a logical choice; his per­
formance in Switzerland and his quiet, professional approach to diplomacy 
qualified him for an ambassadorship, and the United States needed a man 
in Berlin who could communicate with German officials and provide it 
with accurate information, capabilities that Dodd had lost. He was not 
able to improve American-German relations, but no diplomat could have; 
the best one can say is that he did not make them worse, and many men 
could have done that. When the Jewish persecutions resulted in Washing­
ton's decision to withdraw him, Wilson's service in that major field posi­
tion ended. Thou^ he returned to Washington, he had to retain his title 
or face the prospect of embarrassing his government; the only alternative 
was to resign, since no high places, especially in the field, were open.
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